increasing prestige the bureau would naturally extend its functions to those of recommendation and advice to national and local governments.

The fourth suggestion is that there be established a permanent world commission on international migration. At the present time problems of migration, such, for example, as those of the Japanese and Chinese to the United States, are settled by the nations primarily interested, without recognition of the fact that migration is essentially a world problem in which all humanity has an interest. The local problems of migration that arise from time to time are but a part of an age-long movement of population which is gradually producing an equilibrium between density of population and natural resources in every part of the world. Movements between two nations, however, will never be settled on reasons other than local. A world commission would at least work toward a world-policy in this possibly the most important of world-problems.

The fifth suggestion is that these and all other projects for the creation of the world-mind and centralized organization be furthered by utilizing all the modern methods of the commercial accelerator of public opinion," the publicity agent and the advertiser versed in psychologically efficient methods. There should be an adequate world-publicity service, the task of which should be to develop like responses to the proposed projects in the populations back of governments, and by publicity methods to develop that like-mindedness which is essential for world-wide organization on the sympathy basis.

The development of many other projects similar to those outlined above, it is apparent, would inevitably tend toward the production of one centralized organization with many departments. Separate world organizations for different purposes could not long exist without integration. The central organization would inevitably assume the duties of the international postal union; it would create a world monetary system; and it would assume the functions of an international court. With increasing prestige, such an organization would gain greater and greater moral power. Resting on like-mindedness in the populations back of national governments, it would ultimately

develop a world-loyalty and find its recommendations enforced by the moral sense of the world. Force, except for local police purposes, would not be needed.

Peace should be

The final suggestion based on the preceding analysis is that the principle underlying these projects be adopted as at least one of the fundamental propositions for the guidance of peace negotiators at the close of the present war. established not upon the basis of the interests of victorious nations alone, nor even upon the combined interests of victors and vanquished, but upon the basis of the future welfare of all peoples. The inauguration of policies for the production of like-mindedness might well be provided for in the peace treaty itself. National boundaries should not be set on a basis which will intensify national self-sufficiency and aloofness, but on a basis which will encourage inter-communication and the development of like-mindedness throughout the world. Moreover, the choice of national representatives for the peace negotiations should include men capable of taking the world-view rather than the exclusively nationalistic view. Representatives of the neutral nations should be admitted to the proceedings. A popular demand that these representatives be of the worldmind type should be created immediately by publicity methods. So far as possible, practical projects for the creation of the world-mind and world-organization should be provided for in the treaty of peace, and as a guarantee of good faith no indemnity other than a pro-rata contribution for the maintenance of these projects should be exacted. Provision should be made also for permanently meeting the cost of such projects, by agreement that a definite percentage of national taxes be set aside for the use of the world organizations created by the treaty. In short, an authoritative and intelligent beginning toward world-organization should be made at the close of the present war.






HE constitution of Pennsylvania contains two interesting clauses not found in many of the other state constitutions. These deal with the granting of state appropriations to privately-managed or sectarian charitable or educational institutions. Article iii of the present Pennsylvania constitution, adopted in 1873, deals with the actions of the state legislature. Among the regulations and limitations set down for this body are the following:

Article III, Section 17. No appropriation shall be made to any charitable or educational institution not under the absolute control of the Commonwealth, other than normal schools established by law for the professional training of teachers for the public schools of the State, except by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each House.

Section 18. No appropriations, except for pensions or gratuities for military services, shall be made for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes, to any person or community, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation or association.'

There must have been definite reason for the insertion of these very specific clauses, stating to the members of the legis lature what they must and what they must not do. It would seem that the constitutional convention which discussed these sections. and the electorate which incorporated them into their organic law had some clear idea of their meaning and of their need. It would seem that appropriations were forbidden except under very extraordinary circumstances and that under no conditions were certain types of appropriations to be made. We find, however, that although Pennsylvania is one of the few states which includes such prohibitions in her constitution, she is the only one that gives state money in large amounts and to a large number of privately-managed charitable agencies.

The meaning of the sections under discussion has never been determined by the courts of the state.

The emphasis in these sections of the Pennsylvania constitution, instead of stopping appropriations for these private purposes, seems rather to have encouraged them. Prior to the adoption of the new constitution, the legislature met annually. In 1871, seventeen privately-managed charitable institutions received $239,295. In 1872, the legislature appropriated to ten privately-managed institutions the sum of $365,686.24. For the two-year period ending 1913, the legislature of 1911 appropriated to two hundred and seventy-five privately-managed institutions the sum of $6,249,400. For the corresponding twoyear period and for the same purposes, $604,981.24 had been appropriated for 1872-73. The number of institutions had increased over two thousand per cent in forty years; ten times as much money was appropriated. The evil that the members of the constitutional convention sought to combat was certainly small as compared with the pernicious developments indicated by the present figures. One-tenth of the entire revenue of the state is today being given to privately-managed institutions not under the control of the state. If it were the intention of the people of Pennsylvania in 1873 to limit the amount of the appropriations to institutions not under the absolute control of the commonwealth, what would be their consternation today if they realized that the state of Pennsylvania is actually allow ing private persons and private corporations to spend one-tenth of its income.

It is not our purpose here to discover the reasons for the rapid increase of expenditures for this purpose. Various suggestions have been made: first, that the system was developed as an adjunct to the Pennsylvania "machine ", so that individual communities could be "held in line" for the dominant Republican organization; second, that the practice of holding up the appropriations of the hospital "back home" was a club over the head of the individual legislator; and third, that the rapid increase of the appropriations to privately-managed institutions of purely local scope was a return to the corporations and to the local communities for the removal of certain taxable property from the field of local taxation. In all probability there is truth in all these explanations and there are very probably

others that could be discovered. It is our desire, however, to discover the intent of the framers of the constitution and to learn whether their purpose has been violated.

The people of Pennsylvania apparently made an effort to stop an abuse which was just beginning. The abuse was not stopped, but has grown instead to proportions far beyond the conception of the people who framed and secured the adoption of this organic law forty years ago.

The constitutional convention was called as the result of the feeling in the state that it was necessary to remodel certain sections of the constitution, especially those which dealt with the powers of the legislature and with its procedure. The two clauses in question were made a part of the article which limits the power of the legislative branch of the government; the convention apparently desired to put a stop to various abuses that had grown up in the granting of appropriations. There had been numerous accusations of irregularities in the legislature preceding the calling of the convention. It was the desire. to limit the powers of this body that created the demand for a new constitution. Ex-Governor Curtin, one of the leaders of the convention, said that "if the members of the legislature, as has been repeatedly said on this floor, are the corrupt men they have been represented to be, if one tithe of what is said in reference to them on this floor be true, it is indeed alarming . . .” At a large meeting of citizens held in Horticultural Hall, Philadelphia, to urge the adoption of the constitution, a resolution was adopted of which the following is a part:

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Resolved, That this meeting earnestly recommend the adoption of the new Constitution.

First. Because the Legislature are hereby restrained from employing their high public functions for those base purposes of mere private gain which the statute books and shameful experience prove has for many years been their chief occupation. . . .

This was a representive meeting and many of the prominent

1 Debates of the Constitutional Convention, vol. v, p. 274, c. I.

* The Age, Philadelphia, Dec. 9, 1873, p. 1, c. 5. Cf. Public Ledger, Philadelphia, December 9, 1873, p. I, c. 4.

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