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a sympathetic relationship among the resembling individuals. Sympathy based on resemblance, he maintains, in large part determines who will coöperate, what kinds of things may be made the basis of organization and how far organization will remain local, or extend to world-wide limits.
In their modern form the two rival theories, then, are these: (1) harmonious organization develops out of men's differences when a recognition of the utility of organized effort exists; (2) harmonious organization develops out of men's resemblances because a strong feeling of sympathy and willingness to associate arises both instinctively and intelligently out of the very fact of resemblance.
It is now pertinent to inquire whether, as a matter of fact, either of these theories or both combined sufficiently account for the most important large-scale organizations that have existed among men. Slight reflection will suffice to show that history discloses very different sub-forms of the utility type of organization and that these forms differ greatly in stability and in harmony both from each other and from the sympathy form.
In large-scale organizations purposefully created because of their utility, history discloses few in which that utility, in its broader aspect, has been appreciated by all of the coöperating members. Only in organizations approaching a pure democracy has an approximation to such conditions been attained. In other forms of organization, force or reward has been employed to gain the coöperation of persons outside a limited number of organizers, who alone have appreciated the full utility of organization. Even in democracies, however, when population is too large for all to participate in government, it is possible only for the majority of the members of the organization to exercise control over general policies; executive functions are of necessity delegated. Thus three sub-forms of the utility type of organization are to be distinguished. They may be termed respectively the organizer-force, the organizer-reward, and the democratic-control-expert-executive
Brief analysis and appeal to history will serve to indicate the relative stability of these forms, both with respect to each other and to the sympathy type of organization.
Of the organizer-force form the slavery system and the militaristic empire are examples. Neither of these systems, however, has inherent stability. Both run the danger of revolt. The militaristic empire breaks down sooner or later because unlikeness of peripheral regions causes local patriotism to assert itself whenever there is possibility of success. Slavery does not survive the growth of intelligence. Governments of the organizer-force form, moreover, have to face the constant threat of revolution. If Germany be cited as a possible exception, the reply is, that special conditions have stimulated the loyalty of the Germans to their sovereign. Germany was unified but recently and then only by war. Her people have not yet wholly overcome the distrust of one another engendered by long-standing local differences. Germany has thus required a strong hand to create and to preserve her unity. In addition, the Germans, not altogether without reason, have believed themselves surrounded by hostile nations. These conditions sufficiently account for the exception. It must not be overlooked, however, that even in Germany there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the form of organization of her government. Thus the briefest examination of the organizerforce form of organization discloses the futility of expecting permanent international peace to result from an extension of this form throughout the world. Even in its local manifestations this form exhibits inherent instability and lack of harmony.
The organizer-reward form of organization also appears to have its own peculiar tendency towards instability. This was true of the feudal systems of the past, and is true of the great business corporations of today, both of which are examples of the organizer-reward form. In the feudal system the reward offered by the organizers in return for service was protection; in modern industry the reward is a money wage. In both cases, however, when subordinate members of the organization have been ignorant, there has been some tendency towards the exploitation as well as the utilization of such members. To the
extent, however, that intelligence has developed, there has been less and less voluntary continuance of organizations whose utility has been thought by the subordinate members to be limited to one class in the organization. Force has been met
by force. Since intelligence is increasing, it is not fortuitous that the great internal problem of advanced nations is the control of such exploitive industry as exists, while the great political problem of less advanced nations is the struggle for democracy. In both cases the struggle is to prevent the organizer-reward form from becoming the organizer-force form and to replace the instability and the lack of harmony of these forms by the greater stability and greater harmony of the democratic-control-expert-executive form. Far more than is the case in the other utility forms, the democratic form directs. its policies with a view to the welfare of all its members. Minorities are represented on the executive staff. All members of the organization participate in control. The danger of dissatisfaction on the part of non-executive members is reduced to a minimum.
The most striking fact, however, with respect to the question of the relative stability and harmony of the various forms of organization is that the largest and the most permanent relatively harmonious organizations that have appeared among men are those great modern nations whose inhabitants live in a unified area of characterization and are essentially alike in language, race, customs, traditions and religion. Homogeneity in all these respects, it is true, does not as yet exist even on a national scale and there is certainly no prospect of such homogeneity on a world scale in the near future. These considerations must not blind us to the fact, however, that England, France, Spain, Germany, Russia, Italy, the Scandinavian nations, the United States, Japan and China-the largest and internally the most harmonious organizations yet known to man-are each composed of individuals the vast majority of whom are relatively alike in language, customs and traditions, and for the most part in race and religion. Nations that are markedly heterogeneous in the characteristics mentioned, such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Balkan states and European
Turkey, are notoriously unstable. Furthermore, the stability possessed by the various utility-form organizations that exist within or among the stable nations of the world is, in large part, the result of the stability and permanence of the nations themselves. The stability of all three of the utility forms thus rests upon the inherent stability of the sympathy type of organization.
If the foregoing analysis be correct, certain propositions of great importance for the problem of international peace may now be stated. First, nationality on the basis of sympathy is likely to persist for an indefinite period. Second, because of the ignorance of the inhabitants of a number of important nations, the organizer-force and the organizer-reward forms of government and of business organization are also likely to persist, for a considerable period, in various parts of the globe. Third, where the organizer-force or organizer-reward form of organization is superimposed on nationality, readiness to maintain harmony with other national groups can exist only when such international harmony is to the interest of the organizer class in each of such nations. Where the democratic-controlexpert-executive form prevails, readiness to maintain harmony with other national groups can exist only when such international harmony is to the interest of each nation so organized, taken as a whole.
These propositions mean that, under present conditions, permanent world peace can be produced only if in the organizerforce and in the organizer-reward nations the organizer is less interested in personal fame than in the welfare of the whole organization, if the organizing class does not seek aggrandizement or if the organizing class is willing to permit a peaceful transition within the nation to the democratic-control-expertexecutive form of organization rather than to seek perpetuation of its own control through foreign war. They mean also that such peace can be maintained only if democratic nations can be kept free from that trooping of emotion which sometimes suddenly sweeps vast bodies of men into unreasoning demand
for aggressive action, and if the interests of such nations lead them to desire international peace.
Appeal to the facts of national organization today makes it only too apparent that these conditions necessary for permanent international peace neither exist now nor are likely to exist in the near future. Even if the most hopeful view be taken of the tendency toward elimination of the organizer-force and the organizer-reward forms of large-scale organization, and of the tendency toward the adoption of the democratic-control-expertexecutive form by the nations of the world, it is doubtful if even democratic nations would always find international peace coinciding with their own interests and desires. Democracies have gone to war in the past. Moreover, wars waged by democracies have not always been the result of aggression from without. The Mexican, the Civil, and the Spanish-American wars are sufficient to prove the fact. Furthermore, democracies are not wholly free from the trooping of emotion. Still further, the tariff wars in which France and the United States have engaged on various occasions suffice to show that the economic interests of democracies, as well as of nations otherwise organized, may be divergent. With the increasing commercial competition of nations whose inhabitants maintain only a very low standard of living, the further development of exclusive economic policies is to be expected. When China and India have learned modern. methods of production, their competition for the markets of the world will not be without influence on high-standard nations. Economic conditions of this sort may force even democraticallyorganized nations into war. Low-standard nations will not passively see themselves excluded from the markets of the world, nor will high-standard nations voluntarily lower their standards. In addition to this, it must be remembered that another cause of friction even among democratic nations may arise from population pressure. The United States has already excluded the Chinaman, and has a Japanese problem on her hands. At present, there is comparatively little threat of force to back the Oriental demand for outlet in order to lessen population-pressure. Oriental nations, for the most part, are not equipped to enforce such demands, and Korea and Manchuria are proving