desire of the French people for revenge, and when the German military party wished to crush France before it became stronger, Bismarck opposed the plan. Of this episode he wrote:

Such a war, in my opinion, would not have led to permanently tenable conditions in Europe, but might well have given rise to a common feeling of distrust on the part of Russia, Austria and England and eventually to concerted action on their part against the new and not yet consolidated Empire, which, in waging such a war, would have started on the road on which the first and second French Empires, in a continuous policy of war and prestige, went to meet destruction. Europe would have seen in our action an abuse of the power we had acquired, and everyone's hand . . . would have been persistently raised against Germany or would have been on the sword hilt.'

According to Bismarck, the military plan of seizing the first favorable opportunity of crushing France was not abandoned in 1875. "Later also," he says, this plan was advocated; but he remained convinced that it was impossible to say that any war was inevitable. No one, he said, "can look into the cards held by Providence." And, as was his wont, he summed up his views in a single pregnant phrase, declaring that offensive war to anticipate a possible attack was, "in a sense, suicide in apprehension of death."

2

1 Memoirs, p. 519; translation, vol. ii, p. 192. Cf. ibid., pp. 516-522; translation, vol. ii, pp. 188-195. Cf. also article, November 4, 1892, in Hofmann, vol. ii, pp. 160, 161.

It was assumed at the time in France and in England, and it is still commonly asserted, that Bismarck himself supported the plan of attacking France in 1875, and was deterred only by Russian and English protests. Of this I find no proof; and such an attitude on Bismarck's part seems to me improbable, because it would have been inconsistent with his entire policy from 1871 to the close of his administration. By those who assert Bismarck's desire to force a war in 1875, no value is attached to his own denials; wrongly, I think; for while Bismarck sometimes was guilty of suppressing the truth and of suggesting falsehood, he had a possibly inconsistent but very marked unwillingness to employ the lie direct. Testimony that Bismarck was not in sympathy with the plan of the military party is afforded in the diary of Prince Hohenlohe, who at the time was the German ambassador in Paris. Cf. Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe, translation, vol. ii, pp. 129, 131, 145-146, 155, 160. The truth seems to be that Bismarck permitted the threat of war to be carried to a certain point for the sake of checking open expression of French hostility.

Bernhardi reasserts the military point of view:

When there are indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies who only await the favorable moment to strike, the moral duty of the state towards its citizens is to begin the struggle while the prospects of success and the political circumstances are still tolerably favorable.'

Bismarck did not live to see the formation of the Triple Entente, to which Bernhardi obviously alludes; but, long before Russia and France had joined hands, he had spoken of the possibility of a future war with these powers and of the attitude which Germany should assume. In 1888, addressing the German Parliament, he said:

If I were to come before you and say: We are seriously menaced by France and by Russia; it is to be foreseen that we shall be attacked; that is my conviction as a diplomatist, based also on military information; for our defense it is better to employ the anticipatory thrust of the attack and open hostilities at once; accordingly, I ask the Imperial Diet for a credit of a milliard of marks in order to start the war against both our neighbors-well, gentlemen, I do not know whether you have sufficient confidence in me to vote such a grant. I hope not. . . . We must not let the advantage of the defensive position escape us, even if at the moment we are superior to our future enemies. . Even if we are attacked at an unfavorable moment, we shall be strong enough for our defense. And we shall keep the chance of peace, leaving it to Divine Providence to determine whether in the meantime the necessity of war may not disappear.2

It is not when war seems probable in the near future, but when it is in sight, that military considerations come into sharpest conflict with the aims of the diplomatist. On more than one occasion, during the German unity wars, the military demand for prompt action threatened to deprive Bismarck of the time he needed for the attainment of his diplomatic ends. 1864, when it seemed to him of the utmost importance that Prussia should take no steps without Austria, it was a military point of honor that menaced his policy. He tells the story in his memoirs:

In

Our further coöperation with Austria was imperiled, in the first place, by energetic pressure of military influences on the king, to persuade him to cross the Jutland frontier without Austria. My old friend Field Marshal Wrangel telegraphed to the king, and not in cipher, the grossest insults against me. In one of these telegrams there was a passage, obviously referring to me, about diplomatists who belonged on the gallows.1

More important and more typical was a difference of opinion. between Bismarck and Moltke in 1866. In the four months. preceding the war against Austria, Bismarck conducted what, for our present purposes, is perhaps the most instructive of all his ante bellum campaigns. Precisely because he was forcing war upon Austria, he was particularly anxious to avoid the appearance of aggression. Accordingly, at every stage in the dispute, he kept Prussia one move behind Austria in the matter of open military preparations. In the middle of March, Austria concentrated troops in Bohemia. In reply, Prussia placed its active army in a state of readiness for war. In the course of April, several of the smaller German states began to make military preparations. On April 8, a treaty of alliance was concluded between Prussia and Italy, and Italy began to mobilize. Austria then mobilized in the south against Italy; and, in the last days of April, it ordered a general mobilization. During this month, Austria twice offered to stay its military preparations if Prussia would do the same; but it demanded free hand against Italy, and Prussia refused to leave its ally in the lurch. During the first half of May, Prussia mobilized its reserves and concentrated troops on the Saxon frontier and in Silesia. Then it waited. At this point, Moltke lost patience. He wished an immediate commencement of military operations, because, with every day's delay, the imperfectly equipped and only partially concentrated hostile forces were growing stronger." King William, however, supported Bismarck, and the Prussian troops were held in leash for nearly a month after mobilization.

Memoirs, p. 323; translation, vol. i, p. 379.

'Sybel, Begründung des deutschen Reichs, vol. iv, p. 421; translation, vol. iv, P. 471.

Then at last Bismarck got what he was waiting for-overt aggression on the part of Austria.'

These were not the only differences between Bismarck and the General Staff. Other conflicts are recorded, concerning the conduct of military operations and concerning terms of peace. When war has broken out, the leaders of the army resent, and not without reason, the intrusion of political considerations in the discussion of what are primarily military questions. Bismarck, however, insisted that "the determination and limitation of the objects which are to be attained by war . . . are and remain, during the war as before its outbreak, political problems; and the way in which these are solved cannot be without influence upon the conduct of the war." 2 As regards terms of peace, Bismarck came once at least into sharp conflict with the leaders of the Prussian army. In 1866, after the defeat of Austria, they wished to enter Vienna and to demand cession of Austrian territory as well as a large war indemnity. Believing that the common interests of Austria and Germany would eventually draw them together again, and desiring to avoid such resentment as needlessly humiliating terms of peace would leave rankling in Austrian minds, Bismarck successfully opposed these demands. In 1870-71, also, there seems to have been a difference of opinion between Bismarck and the military men regarding the annexation of French territory. Here again, Bismarck appreciated the dangers of lasting rancor on the part of the defeated nation; but how far and how strongly he opposed the military demands is uncertain. In any case, the reasons that he gave for the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany were purely strategic. This is, I think, the only instance in which he allowed his political instincts to be controlled by military considerations.

1 As regards the manner in which a country should meet a menacing concentration of troops on its frontier, Bismarck expressed himself twenty years later in the same sense in which he acted in 1866. Concentration of troops, he said, was a matter concerning which explanations even were not to be demanded. "If one begins to ask for explanations, the reply may be somewhat ambiguous, and then the triplication will be quite free from ambiguity." Concentration of troops should be met by taking quietly the necessary military precautions. Speech of February 6, 1888.

2 Memoirs, p. 445; translation, vol. ii, p. 106.

In all these conflicts, the military opponents of Bismarck showed failure to appreciate the imponderables. This, I think, is typical of the military mind. The business of the diplomatist is to persuade; that of the soldier is to crush. The diplomatist has to get under the skin of his adversary, not with lead or steel, but with imagination. And when it comes to divining the sentiments and prejudices of men of alien blood and speech, it is necessary to be well versed in their national history. For these and other studies essential to the diplomatist, the military officer has no sufficient leisure. With the increasing complexity of the instruments and methods of warfare, his professional training becomes more and more exacting of toil and of time. When the question is of anticipating or averting a probable war, or of hastening or delaying an imminent war, the strategist, because he does not give due consideration to the imponderables, is unable justly to appreciate the political advantages of the defensive attitude. He is apt, rather, to ignore them entirely, because of his appreciation of the advantages of aggression. Earlier mobilization may mean initial victories; these encourage his soldiers and discourage the enemy's. Initial success, again, may well have more influence on the attitude of doubtful allies or wavering neutrals than any prejudice created by aggression. Desire to keep his country's attitude correct on the face of the record seems to him an idle scruple; to permit the enemy either to grow stronger or to strike first seems a crime. When Moltke heard of Bismarck's decision not to fight France in 1867, he said: "Bismarck's standpoint is unassailable; but it will one day cost us many human lives." And the younger Moltke (German chief of staff at the outbreak of the present war) is reported to have said in 1913: "The commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor must be disregarded. . . . We must forestall our principal ad

Memoirs of Moltke, loc. cit. In this instance Moltke's forecast seems not to have been verified. During the three years 1867-1870 the reorganization of the forces of the smaller German states on the Prussian model gave Germany a greater accession of strength than France secured by its military reforms and improved armament. That in 1867 any success comparable to that of 1870 could have been gained by Germany with smaller sacrifices is highly improbable. Cf. Bismarck, September 16, 1892, in Hofmann, vol. ii, p. 150.