he must consult the emperor and the chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. 1

1

In fact no answer was given until three days later, on August 4, when the German troops had already crossed the Belgian frontier. Then von Jagow again had to explain Germany's action; and again he could defend it only on strategic grounds:

They had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as, if they had gone by the more southern route, they could not have hoped .. to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops."

The conduct of Austro-German diplomacy during the critical period, July 23-31, is open to censure alike from the strategist. and from the diplomatist. If for strategic reasons the "commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor" were to be disregarded, why was an ultimatum not sent to Russia earlier? Why not demand, as soon as Austria had declared war on Servia, that Russia pledge itself to keep the peace? On the other hand, if the diplomatic game was to be played at all, why not play it out? The least defensible of policies is a vacillating policy.

In the present state of our information it is as difficult to say why conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were opened on the 30th of July as to explain why they were cut off at midnight on the 31st. The only theory that seems at all plausible is that of the French ambassador in Berlin. Writing on July 29, he reported that the German chancellor had promised

'British Blue Book, no. 122. Cf. French Yellow Book, no. 123. * British Blue Book, no. 160, at page 78.

to urge upon Vienna direct negotiations with St. Petersburg, and he added:

The chancellor's attitude is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir Edward Grey with Prince Lichnowsky [German ambassador in London]. Up to these very last few days people have flattered themselves here that England would remain aloof, and the impression produced by her attitude upon the German government and upon financiers and business men is profound.'

Doubt as to Great Britain's attitude might well induce the German General Staff itself to think twice before forcing war upon Russia. Whether Germany hoped to gain its "place in the sun" by peaceful arrangements with Great Britain, or expected to develop its world power on the ruins of the British Empire, it is inconceivable that it intended to fight Great Britain at the same time that it was fighting Russia and France. And until July 29 the German government seems to have been confident that Great Britain would remain neutral. On what grounds was this confidence based?

When we read the official and unofficial explanations of Great Britain's intervention which have been advanced on the part of Germany since the outbreak of the war, and which aim to show that Great Britain had quite other reasons for intervening than Germany's breach of Belgian neutrality, our perplexity increases. When, for example, we are reminded that for centuries it has been Great Britain's policy to promote and support continental coalitions against any continental state which threatened to obtain a dominating position, especially if such a state was developing sea power, we wonder why this fact was not taken into account by the German government before the outbreak of the present war. And when we are told that to Great Britain itself -to take the German chancellor's most recent explanation of his famous phrase-the treaty of 1839 was only "a scrap of paper," we wonder why, in a country justly renowned for its painstaking historical research, it should be forgotten that the

1 French Yellow Book, no. 92. The same explanation of the German change of attitude was given by the Italian minister for foreign affairs, July 30; cf. British Blue Book, no. 106.

neutralizing of Belgium in 1839, like the creation of the kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, was chiefly promoted by Great Britain, for the quite intelligible purpose of preventing this part of the European coast line from being used as a base for military operations against its own territory.

Some of the arguments which Germany addressed to Great Britain in order to dissuade that power from intervening to protect France or Belgium are quite similar to those which Austria and Germany addressed to Russia, in order to show that Russia had no reason to intervene for the protection of Servia. Austria assured Russia that, if the war were localized, it would undertake to respect the integrity and to guarantee the continuance of the Servian state.1 In a conversation with the British ambassador on July 29, the German chancellor, after stating that it was clear to him "that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed," proceeded to reassure the ambassador:

That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that the neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British government that the Imperial government aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.2

In the same conversation, the German chancellor said that if, in consequence of the action of France, Germany should be forced to enter upon operations in Belgium, "Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany." In each case there appears to have been an assumption that such an undertaking would be satisfactory; that any result of war short of annexation would be unobjectionable. The Russian objection to the crushing of Servia, however, and the British objection to the crushing of France rested chiefly on the effect upon the balance of power in the Balkans and in Europe. From the political point of view, it is not by annexation alone that the

German White Paper, Memorandum, annexes 3, 10, 10 A, 10 B; Russian Orange Paper, nos. 28, 35, 60; British Blue Book, nos. 47, 48, 59; French Yellow Book,

no, 62.

British Blue Book, no. 85.

balance of power is affected. If, as a result of war, Servia became politically dependent on Austria, or France were seriously weakened, the balance of power would be disturbed. The difference would be one of degree only. Similarly as regards Belgium: if that country were used as a base of military operations against France, a precedent would be created for using it, in a future war, as a base of operations against England. This peril might be greater if Belgium were annexed by Germany, but it would not be obviated by the reëstablishment of Belgium as a nominally independent and neutralized state. Here again the difference would be in degree only. To the military man, on the other hand, the balance of power appears to be seriously disturbed only by annexation, because only in such event can the victorious state build fortresses and levy troops in the conquered territory. I do not mean to imply that military men do not recognize that the balance of power is affected when a country is weakened by a crushing defeat and loaded with a heavy war indemnity, or when it has become politically dependent upon the conquering power; but the difference between these results and outright annexation seems to them, I think, one of kind rather than one of degree. If the Austrian and German governments seriously expected these proffered pledges to influence the action of Russia or of Great Britain, the point of view which they took, and apparently assumed that Russia and Great Britain would also take, was, I suggest, military rather than political.

By July 29, however, if not earlier, the Austrian and German governments had apparently become convinced not only that Russia would probably intervene but that Great Britain also might intervene.' Why then did Germany precipitate the continental war by its ultimatum to Russia and give Great Britain formal cause for war by the invasion of Belgium? Partly, beyond a doubt, because the greater the number of hostile powers, the more necessary it seemed to realize to the full the advantages of superior military preparation; partly, also, and perhaps

For British warnings, which became increasingly grave in tone, cf. British Blue Book, Introductory Narrative and nos. 48, 89, 101, 102, 109, 111, 123.

mainly, because all along Austria and Germany had counted, in the case of Russia, on internal dissensions and possible foreign. complications and, in the case of Great Britain, on the imminence of civil war in Ireland' and the possibility of revolts in India, in Egypt and in South Africa. If these difficulties. and dangers did not deter Russia or Great Britain from war, they would at least make it difficult for either of them to wage war efficiently. In case of Great Britain, the German government apparently hoped to the last that peril of sedition would prove deterrent. They could not have believed that Great Britain would not like to fight, but they persuaded themselves that it would be unable to fight.3 They reached this conclusion, however, only by ignoring the fact, familiar to every student of history, that foreign war usually allays and often ends internal dissensions. Today, not only is this point appreciated in Germany, but we are told that Great Britain went to war in order to shelve the Irish question!

Upon the question whether the German government expected to use Belgium as a military highway into France without encountering Belgian resistance, or anticipated and possibly desired resistance, I shall not venture to express an opinion. It is obvious that Belgian resistance has enabled the invaders to use not only the territory but all the resources of this country in the prosecution of the war and has opened the way for its

'British Blue Book, nos. 32, 71; French Yellow Book, no. 35.

'French Yellow Book, no. 35. It will be remembered that there was armed conflict, accompanied by loss of life, in Dublin, July 26.

The question whether, as has been repeatedly urged, Great Britain could have prevented the war by placing itself from the outset unequivocally on the side of Russia and France lies outside the scope of this paper. To ask this question is to concede that the attitude of Austria and Germany was aggressive. The question raised is whether their aggression could have been checked by a British threat of war. The British government gave its reasons for not pursuing such a course during the negotiations (British Blue Book, nos. 6, 17, 24, 44, 59), and it has since more fully developed its argument on this point (speech of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, August 3; ibid., at pp. 89–91). It may, however, be suggested that if, as is here maintained, the German expectation of British neutrality was based, not on any doubt as to Great Britain's inclination to intervene, but on the belief that Great Britain could not intervene, or at least could not intervene effectively, it is difficult to see why Germany should have attached any more weight to a threat than it actually attached to repeated warnings.