KALES, A. M. Unpopular Government in the United States. Russlands KEELING, F. Child Labor in the United Kingdom. A. G. Porritt. Responsible Government in the Dominions. Die Monroedoktrin. Le Crédit Industriel et Commercial KER. See Low. H. F. Whicher. 322 KITCHIN, G. Sir Roger L'Estrange. KOWALEWSKY, M. Die ökonomische Entwicklung Europas, Vol. KRAUS, H. and B. NOGARO. Les Crise des Finances publiques en France, en Angleterre, en Allemagne. LEROY-BEAULIEU, P. Les Impôts et les Revenues en France, en 181 MCMASTER, J. B. History of the United States, Vol. viii MEAD, E. S. The Careful Investor MILNER, VISCOUNT. The Nation and the Empire. 323 550 Clive Day. 512 194 schaft LIMA, M. DE O. The Evolution of Brazil and W. P. KER. Samuel Henry Jeyes MARKS, T. E. The Land and the Commonwealth 540 MARTIN, M. É. Histoire Financière et Économique de l'Angleterre. 199 195 République Argentine 180 MATTHEWS, N. Municipal Charters. Victor J. West. 169 MAYCOCK, SIR W. With Mr. Chamberlain in the United States MCCALL, S. W. Life of Thomas Brackett Reed. MCLAUGHLIN, A. C. and A. B. HART. Cyclopedia of American MITCHELL, S. K. MORLEY, E. J. Women Workers in Seven Professions. E. J. Hutchinson. 341 199 549 PERRIS, G. H. E. Porritt. 678 PIERSON, N. G. Principles of Economics. B. M. Anderson, jr. 145 183 POHLE, L. Die gegenwärtige Krisis in der deutschen volkswirth- REYNAUD, L. Les Origines de l'Influence Française en Allemagne. FOUGAN-BARANOWSKY, M. L'Evolution Historique, . . Traduit par J. SCHAPIRO TOUZET, A. Emplois industriels des métaux précieux. 195 E. W. Kemmerer. 332 TREITSCHKE. See HAUSRATH. TURGOT, Oeuvres de, et Documents le concernant. iste 196 VAN KLEECK, M. Working Girls in Evening Schools. S. M. Kingsbury. 515 VERRILL, A. H. South and Central American Trade Conditions WAGEMANN, E. Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Republik Chili The Socialists and the War. Zielenziger, K. WHITLOCK, B. Forty Years of it ZAWADZKI, WL. Les Mathématiques appliquées a l'Économie POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY THEORIES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE TH HE end of armed conflict is conceivable as the result of either of two achievements. Permanent peace may come either upon the establishment of successful means for the settlement of disputes or upon the elimination of the causes which produce disputes. This paper is limited to discussion of the second of these alternatives. Specifically, the inquiry here undertaken deals with three subjects. The first is a statement of theories concerning the conditions which must be present in order to produce and to maintain relatively harmonious organization among men. The second is a brief inquiry as to the extent to which such conditions now exist among the peoples of the world. The third is the suggestion of a certain principle of action and of certain practical policies which, if adopted, would tend toward the ultimate establishment of relatively harmonious relations among the various divisions of mankind. I From a very early time two rival theories have been put forward concerning the conditions which must be present if harmonious organization is to exist. These two theories had even become crystallized into proverbs as early as Aristotle's time. Aristotle himself pointed out how some men lay down the proposition that "men who are like one another are friends: whence come the common sayings, 'like will to like,' 'birds of a feather,' and so on. Others on the contrary say that all such come under the maxim, 'two of a trade never agree.' Again 399 Aristotle quotes the philosopher Heraclitus that "contrariety is expedient" and that "the best agreement arises from things differing." Empedocles, however, is quoted in direct opposition as affirming that "like aims at like." In modern theory the same rivalry between essentially the same notions appears; but the forms are modified. The modern economist, pointing to the successful operation of great business organizations, emphasizes the fact that differences among men permit division of labor and economy of production. He contends that when men perceive the utility of division of labor and the advantages of organization necessitated by division of labor, intelligent self-interest inevitably produces relatively harmonious organization-sometimes on an international scale. On the other hand, the sociologist sees that harmonious organization is a fact among organisms that cannot possibly realize the utility of organization. Birds, cattle and various varieties of fish are gregarious. Bees and ants have elaborate organizations which exhibit variety of function and division of labor. In these examples, something which McDougall calls gregarious instinct is evidently sufficient to produce harmonious organization. The gregarious impulse of any animal receives satisfaction only through the presence of animals similar to itself, and the closer the similarity, the greater is the satisfaction. . . . Just so in any human being the instinct operates most powerfully in relation to, and receives the highest degree of satisfaction from, the presence of human beings who most closely resemble that individual, those who behave in like manner and respond to the same situations with similar emotions. The sociologist, however, observes an additional fact. He sees that men deliberately choose to associate with individuals that are like themselves. He notes, for example, that Roman Catholics tend to admit to an organization that transcends national limits, only such persons as are alike in the holding of certain beliefs and in the observance of certain customs. He is impressed by the fact that resemblances in language, race, religion, habits and customs, when discovered to exist, produce |