ing by Gibraltar; and in this case we should have held the key, as it were, of the whole system of telegraphs in the Mediterranean. He feared, however, that the opportunity for making such an arrangement had been lost. In a very able Treasury minute, dated February 22nd of last year, reasons were given for the decision which had been arrived at in favour of the Austrian line by way of Ragusa and Candia to Alexandria; but still he thought it of importance that no principle should be laid down which would prevent future independent communications from being made. Ile wished now to call their attention to the necessity of watching the extension of the system of subsidies and guarantees. The telegraphic system, and especially that of submarine lines was in its infancy. Although, owing to the failure of the Atlantic cable, such plans were now somewhat out of favour, and although it might at present be impossible to lay down cables of such length with safety and at a moderate expense, yet, looking to the progress of science, and the immense importance of such communications, it was not to be doubted that means would be found for overcoming all difficulties. If this were the case, of what importance did it become that the Government should not give premature guarantees, and should not for want of properly considering the lines laid down, prevent the future advantageous development of telegraphic communication! If the Government had no distinct plan upon which they proceeded they might find that they had not patronized the best lines, and what was still worse, that they had prevented more advantageous lines from being formed. We had already given a guarantee to the Mediterranean Extension Company-the Company which had laid down a telegraphic cable from Cagliari to Malta, and from Malta to Corfu. Then, since last Session a guarantee had been given to another and more important line of communication the Red Sea line. Here he might remind the noble Earl (the Earl of Donoughmore), that the answer given by him upon this subject at the close of last Session was not altogether accurate. The noble Earl stated that the Government had under their consideration the competing lines, and although no decision had been come to, it was possible they might choose that by the Persian Gulf, whereas it so happened that the very next morning the newspapers stated, and quite accurately, that the Government had decided in favour of the Red Sea line. He (Lord Wodehouse) did not complain of that decision. which was probably the best which could be arrived at under the circumstances; and, looking to the difficulty of getting any company to undertake the work, and to the state of the money-market at that time the Government were probably justified in the guarantee they had given. It was said that the Turkish Government would proceed with their line to Bussorah, and it would then, no doubt, become a question whether some assistance should not be given to connect it with Kurrachee. Again, negotiations were in a forward state with a view to a guarantee to the Ragusa, Corfu, and Candia line; and another guarantee had been given to the Atlantic Telegraph Company. He did not know precisely what was the agreement at present existing between this last Company and the Government. The original subsidy was £14,000 from the English and one of a similar amount from the American Government; but he understood that the Company had applied for a considerable increase, and he should be glad to hear what conditions had been agreed upon with regard to it. Whatever might be the result, their Lordships would observe that these guarantees were already of considerable magnitude, and he did think that if we were to increase them some definite system should be adopted on the subject. It might be doubted how far it was politic to give any guarantees at all. In certain exceptional cases they might be necessary; but upon the whole he believed the Government would act wisely if they declined, as far as possible, to involve themselves in any such engagements. He might add that it would have been a most excellent management if some means had been found of connecting the telegraphic system with the Post Office; but he feared the time for that had gone by. He would now conclude by asking the question of which he had given notice-Whether it is true that the Proposal of a Company to lay a Submarine Telegraph from Naples to Malta has been refused by Her Majesty's Government; and, if so, upon what Grounds: Also, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to grant Assistance, either by way of Guarantee or Subsidy, to other Companies beyond those which have already received such Assistance. THE EARL OF DERBY said, he should be able to give a short and conclusive He answer to the questions of the noble Lord. | them, a line would be carried by way of With regard to the first question that had Ragusa. He would not enter into any disbeen put by his noble Friend, Whether any cussion relative to other lines adverted to proposal made by any company to the Go- by the noble Lord, but he would proceed vernment to lay down a submarine telegraph to answer his question with regard to the from Naples to Malta had been refused by Atlantic telegraph, and he was glad the Her Majesty's Government, and, if so, question had been raised, because it gave upon what grounds, he might state that him an opportunity of stating generally there had been three applications made the principles on which Her Majesty's upon the subject by different parties for Government thought they ought to be establishing a submarine telegraphic com- guided in their dealings with these various munication-not between Naples and Malta, companies for telegraphic communication. but between Cape Passaro and Malta. Two The noble Lord had stated that under a of these were made by private individuals. former arrangement Her Majesty's GovernThey were made to Her Majesty's late ment had agreed to give the Atlantic TeleGovernment, and were refused by them. graph Company a subsidy of £14,000 a The overtures have been repeated to Her year, the same sum to be received from Majesty's present Government, and they the United States Government, but under had been equally refused by them. The certain conditions; and the noble Lord third overture had been made to the Go stated he understood that negotiations vernment by the company to which the were at the present moment going on noble Lord had referred--the Mediter- between the Atlantic Telegraph Company ranean Telegraph Company, established and Her Majesty's Government, by which for carrying out a proposed small line it was to be agreed that a much larger from Malta to Cape Passaro, a distance guarantee was to be given to that Company. of seventy miles, if the company suc- Now, in making that statement the noble ceeded in making proper arrangements Lord confounded two things together which with the Neapolitan Government, Her Ma- were entirely and absolutely differentjesty's Government would not offer, upon namely, subsidies and guarantees. their part, any opposition to carrying out wished to call attention to the distinction, the telegraph proposed; but that, on the because it affected the basis on which other hand, they were not prepared to offer the Government proceeded. The Atlantic any aid or assistance to the Company. He Telegraph Company made very praisethought the noble Lord laboured under a worthy efforts to establish a telegraphic misapprehension when he spoke of what line of communication between England and would have been the case if Malta had America, but most unfortunately sank the been made the great centre of telegraphic whole of their subscribed capital in the communication in the Mediterranean, and attempt, and they were consequently unin expressing his belief that the accom- able, contrary to their expectations, to plishment of that object had been pre- prosecute their undertaking effectually; vented by the refusal of Her Majesty's and, if they were to continue their attempt, Government to sanction a line of telegraph it became necessary for them to enter into between Naples and Malta, and partly by an entirely new arrangement. That being their adopting the line of telegraph esta- the case the arrangement previously entered blished by the Austrian Government by into fell to the ground, and became inopeway of Trieste. Now, so far as Malta was rative, seeing that it was granted so long concerned, he did not hesitate to say, that only as the Company's line of communihe thought it ought to be the central point cation was in process of working, and it of communication for the various submarine therefore naturally and entirely fell to the telegraphic lines radiating to and from the ground. The Company then requested Continent; but for all that, he did not that Her Majesty's Government would think it by any means followed, that be- either grant an additional subsidy for the cause Malta should be the central point of purpose of raising new capital, or that they telegraphic intercommunication, that there- would give a guarantee on such capital as fore the Government should avoid availing should be raised. Now, there were two itself of other means of telegraphic con- kinds of guarantees, and there was also a munication that presented themselves with system of subsidy, and these three modes the East, and consequently the Government of assisting telegraph companies were enhad made a negotiation with the Austrian tirely and absolutely distinct from one Government, by which, in conjunction with another. In the first place, propositions legitimate to guarantee a considerable and high rate of profit on the outlay, in consideration of the great amount of risk originally run by the company. In such a case he did not think it at all illegitimate to give a guarantee to a great undertaking, which if it failed the Government were not in any way responsible for, and which, if it succeeded, was likely to produce great results to the public, and great pecuniary advantage to the company. Take, for instance, the Atlantic Telegraph Company. The Government were negotiating at the present moment with that company, and the company had asked the Government for a sum of money to be expended under the supervision of the Government, and that they should have from the Government a guarantee for a certain number of years at 8 per cent on the outlay, so long as the telegraphic communication was in working order and capable of performing its functions. Now, it was highly probable that if telegraphic communication were established between this country and America by means of a submarine cable-if the company formed for that purpose, after incurring considerable risks, succeeded-he thought there was every reason to expect that the profits might ultimately become 8 or 10 per cent, or even more. If they amounted to 8 per cent-and in saying so, he was supposing that the terms were acceded to by the Government, which was not the case at that moment-but if the profits reached 8 per cent, the Government were subject to no payment whatever, while if they reached 6 per cent the Government then, on the attainment of the great and important national object, were subjected to the payment of 2 per cent and no more on the guaranteed capital. In cases where the risk of failure was great, but where the profits and pecuniary advantages in cases of success were considerable, the Government, he thought, exercised a wise and a judicious course and discretion in guaranteeing a considerable amount of interest. Then there was a third class of cases and in these cases he alluded, not only to submarine telegraphs, but to other large matters of expenditure in connection with the Post Office and Packet Service. thought no subsidy ought to be given, except in cases where the object in view was one of great political and commercial importance, and where it is clear that, as a mercantile speculation, unaccompanied by any subsidy, the project must inevitably fail of success. In that case I think it is per had been made at various times from various companies, and among others from the Atlantic Telegraph Company, for what he would call an unconditional guarantee; that was to say, supposing the Company undertook to expend a certain sum of money for the prosecution of certain works, that the Government should guarantee to them the receipt of a certain amount of interest on the amount so expended. Now, although this had been done in one case, he held it to be an indefensible arrangement, because it was quite clear that if they guaranteed a company 4 per cent for 25 or 50 years, they had no security that the work undertaken and stipulated for would be properly carried out, and they ran the risk of being compelled for a length of time to pay a very considerable sum of money for a service that after all might not be accomplished; and although the money might be expended and actually lost, the company would be receiving 4 per cent upon its capital; so that the company would gain, while on the other hand the Government, in the event of failure, would lose, and in the event of success would have no portion of the profit, and derive no profit or advantage from the result. He thought under these circumstances, and that if this were to be the case, that it would be much better (though it was not a plan that he recommended) the Government should take entirely into their own hands the construction and carrying out of the works and the arrangement generally; because then, instead of paying 4 per cent upon the company's capital, they would probably raise the money at 3, and if the undertaking were unsuccessful they would lose no more by it than by the system of absolute guarantee; while if they were successful, they would derive all the profits over and above the outlay of capital. But in the other case of guarantee, the Government would run all the risk without any possibility of profit. He did not concur in the view that had been taken with regard to unconditional guarantees, as a principle upon which Government ought to proceed in reference to a national enterprise which was at present only in the cradle of its infancy. But a conditional guarantee was a very different thing. A conditional guarantee he took to be perfectly legitimate in a case where there was a considerable prospect of success, but where at the same time there was considerable risk of failure; and where, in the event of success, it was perfectly He trol. It appeared to him to have been a very great mistake in the original arrangement with the Atlantic Telegraph Company, that the line which went from one part of the British dominions, Valentia in Ireland to another, Newfoundland, was to be in any way connected with a foreign Government. He thought that allowing the United States Government any control whatever over any line from one part of the British dominions to another, was one of the greatest possible errors; but he inferred from what had been stated by the noble Earl, that such an error was not likely to be repeated. He concurred with what the noble Earl had said as to the conditional guarantees; but there was one precaution that had not been mentioned; that if they secured to the Company a certain profit on their capital, it was absolutely necessary that the Government should have some control over their working expenses, and so have the means of ascertaining that jobs were not perpetrated or extravagance permitted. He could not help concurring with the noble Lord who had put the question in thinking that it was of great importance that they should, as soon as possible, have an independent sea-line of telegraph to Malta-a line from some point near the Land's End to Gibraltar, and brought up to that central point in the Mediterranean, Malta-and it ought to be accomplished as soon as circumstances permitted. fectly legitimate on the part of the govern- | a preference would be given to those lines ment, for great political and commercial pro- that would be entirely under British conjects to make a payment wholly irrespective of the profit and loss that the company would otherwise sustain, and to pay a certain sum of money in aid of the company to carry out the object. In that case the Government knew the full loss the public had to sustain in case of failure; the loss was known, and whether the object was equivalent to the probability of loss was a matter for consideration. With regard to submarine telegraphs and cables, and Post-office and packet communication, he thought that absolute and unconditional guarantees could hardly be consented to by the Go. vernment. A conditional guarantee-that was to say, not a payment made but assured to the company, in addition to the interest given by the Government was legitimate where the risk was great and the prospects of profit in case of success considerable; but a subsidy ought to be granted only where the prospects of remuneration in any other way were not such as to justify the matter being undertaken as a mercantile speculation, and when the attainment of important political and commercial objects justifies the payment of such subsidies from the public funds. In every proposition that may be submitted to the Government for electric telegraphs, he thought when projects were in other respects equal, the Government ought to give a preference to those schemes which provide that the whole line of telegraphic communication shall be, if not upon British territory, at least exclusively and absoutely under British control. Having stated the rules upon which he thought these propositions ought to be considered namely, the solvency of the company, the magnitude of the object to be attained, the prospect of better offers, the risk to be run, and the interests to be served-the terms must always be a matter of calculation in each separate case; but it was impossible to lay down any rule as to the proportionate assistance which Her Majesty's Government ought to give, but he hoped he had stated distinctly the principles by which, in dealing with the subject, he thought Her Majesty's Government ought to be guided. EARL GREY said, he had heard with great satisfaction the noble Earl's statement, and thought that the principles he had enunciated were perfectly sound and right; and, above all, he had heard with great satisfaction the intimation that LORD STANLEY of ALDERLEY said, he also concurred in the desirableness of having the telegraphic system placed under English control, and as far as possible on English territory. The monopoly that had been conferred on the Atlantic Telegraph Company had prevented any others from entering into competition with them, and that being the case he had hoped that the Government would hesitate in giving any pledge or promise of guarantee or subsidy until the Company had given up that monopoly. If the aid demanded was to be entirely contributed by the English Government, it was all the more essential that the Government should cancel the privilege of monopoly, and that the line should be under the entire control of England, and irrespective of American control altogether. He wished to know whether, in the case of the Red Sea line, there was an absolute or a conditional guarantee. From what he had heard he was rather inclined to believe that there was an absolute guarantee irrespective of its operation. He had always expressed an opinion that the whole of the electric telegraph communication of this country and its connection with foreign countries should be brought under the general postal arrangements, and that the expense should be defrayed by the Government. Great advantages in the shape of concentration and a saving of expense would result from such a system. THE EARL OF DERBY said, he was quite ready to admit, that the terms obtained by the Red Sea Company, owing to circumstances, were of a very favourable character. In one sense the guarantee might be considered absolute on a certain amount, but, on the other hand, the Company contracted to the Government to have the line laid and placed in working order; so that it was not until the line was in that state that the guarantee of the Government came into operation. As to the Atlantic Telegraph Company, he was glad to say the Government had insisted as a first condition in the negotiations now pending that the monopoly of the Company should be abolished, and that the Government should be at liberty to sanction and assist any company which might be disposed to undertake to lay down other lines. If the Government guaranteed a particular Company, it was not the interest of the Government to diminish the profits of that Company by encouraging a number of competing lines. But the principle adopted was to repudiate any monopoly, and to hold the Government free to agree with any other Company if they should think it desirable to do so. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR BILL. COMMITTEE. House in Committee (according to order). Clause 1 (Arrest in Execution restrained) LORD WENSLEYDALE objected to the clause and the clauses which followed, because they would totally abolish imprisonment for debt except in certain specified cases. He thought it was often the fear of arrest which prevented non-traders running into most extravagant expenditure, and he was supported in his objection to the total abolition of imprisonment for debt, not only by the petition which he presented to-day, but by the Reports of Royal Commissions composed of many learned men, who, in 1832, 1840, and 1854 had considered the subject. He wished to render the measure as effective as possible, and would refrain from moving the omission of the clause, but would leave the matter to be dealt with by his noble and learned Friend (the Lord Chancellor) in considering some Amendments which he intended to propose hereafter. Clause agreed to. Clause 2, (Present Power of Arrest unaffected in certain Cases). LORD TEYNHAM expressed his opinion that in no instance ought the personal liberty of the subject to be vested in his fellow-subject, but should only be taken away under the immediate supervision of the law. In a Return just made of the proceedings of County Courts in 1857, he found that the total number of warrants of commitment issued by the registrars of County Courts was upwards of 27,000, while the actual arrests were only 10,620. So that upwards of 17,000 warrants had been held against debtors which had not been put in force. If a creditor had at his option the power of arresting a debtor, he might sell that power not only for money, but for any and everything that the covetousness of the human heart desired. That power ought never to be left in the hands of any man. He trusted that the noble and learned Lord would reconsider the clauses relative to the power of arrest, so that this power might remain from first to last in the hands of the Court. THE LORD CHANCELLOR said, the law was not altered by this clause. LORD TEYNHAM said, his desire was that it should be altered. THE LORD CHANCELLOR said, it was proposed by this Bill to abolish arrest in execution, except in certain cases. There were three classes of cases in which there was arrest in execution-first, where judgment had been obtained in actions of tort: that was the law under the Insolvent Act; second, where the Judge at the time of trial, or a Judge afterwards, certified that the debt had been incurred under false pretences or breach of trust, or that the defence had been vexatious and frivolous: that was the law under the 7 & 8 Vict., by which arrest on executions for less than £20 was abolished; and third, where a creditor had reason to believe that his debtor was about to abscond; which also was the law under the 1 & 2 Vict. He could not understand, therefore, why the noble Lord should desire an alteration in the Bill for the purpose of taking from the |