As to whether the Crown is by the common law such a corporation as can answer by the oath of its officers, that is ministers, see Bacon's Abridgment, title Corporations A. Grant on Corporations, pp. 626, 627; and as to the non-production of state papers in a court of justice, the judgment of Pollock, C.B., in Beatson v. Skene, 3 H. & Colt, 853.

By the Crown against the Suppliant.] That the Crown can obtain discovery of documents against a subject was decided in Tomline v. The Queen, L. R. 4 Ex. D. 252; 48 L. J. Ex. 453; 40 L. T. 542; 27 W. R. 651. Bramwell, L.J., in giving judgment, said as follows: "I have not the least doubt that the practice as to discovery is applicable' to petitions of right, when it is the Crown which seeks discovery from the suppliant. The case before us may be disposed of on this short ground. It is unnecessary to consider whether Thomas v. Reg. was correctly decided; but I will assume that technical reasons exist which prevent a suppliant from obtaining discovery; do these technical reasons make the practice as to 'discovery' less applicable as against a suppliant? I think not; the practice is as much applicable as to him as to the plaintiff and defendant in an ordinary action. I repeat that it is unnecessary to express any opinion as to Thomas v. Reg., but I may remark that if technical difficulties do exist in the way of obtaining discovery from the Crown, possibly the legislature has intentionally left those difficulties in existence, in order that it may be in the discretion of the Crown whether it will afford the information sought for by the suppliant."

Set-off.] "Sect. 7 of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34 extends to a petition of right set-off inter alia" (per Lush, J., in Rustomjee v. The Queen, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 487, at p. 491; 45 L. J. Q. B. 249, at p. 253). "Under sect. 7 of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34 the Crown is entitled to plead a set-off in answer to a petition of right" (per Kelly, C.B., in De Lancy v. The Queen, L. R. 6 Ex. 286, at p. 288; 40 L. J. Ex. 198, at p. 200; 19 W. R. 932, at p. 933).

Security for Costs.] "The Crown cannot be called upon to give security for costs, although the Petitions of Right Act, 1860, s. 7, incorporates the practice as to security for costs" (per Bramwell, L.J., Tomline v. The Queen, L. R. 4 Ex. Div. 252, at p. 254; 48 L. J. Ex. 453), but may call upon the suppliant to do so.

As to the time for making such application, see Wood v. The Queen (7 Canada, S. C. R. 631).

Special Case.] The rules as to seem applicable, see Percival and Others v. The Queen (33 L. J. Ex. 288; 10 L. T. N.S. 623), where a special case was stated by Judge's order under the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 46, and see also Burke v. Reg, Times, 29th of May, 1869. Nonsuit.] There seems to be no doubt that at common law the suppliant could be nonsuited upon his petition. This Staunford seems tacitly to admit when he goes on to discuss the question whether, after the nonsuit, the suppliant can have a new petition. "And learn," he says (Prerog. cap. xxii., fol. 76 a), "if a peticion be sued for landes and the plaintiff be nonsuite, whether it be pemptorie or not, because some saye that that suite is as it were his write of right, and hereof see the book: H. 11, H. 4, fol. 52, and M. 3, H. 7, fol. 14."

Upon the question whether a nonsuit is peremptory, i.e., final or not, see Manning, Exchequer Practice, 2nd ed. 85; Chitty, Prerog. 349, and cases there cited. The cases which seem to shew that it is not are Y. B. 4 H. 6, 12; Broke's Abridg., Travers. 16; Y. B. 11 H. 4, 52; Broke's Abridg., Nonsuit, 12; Y. B. 3 H. 7, 13; Broke's Abridg., Petition, 22. If it is not, then after a nonsuit a suppliant can bring a new petition. See also upon this subject, Staunford, Prerog. cap. xx.; Travers. fol. 65 b.

Suing in forma pauperis.] This seems allowable, at all events in the Chancery Division: "Any person who might be admitted to prosecute a suit in this Court in formá pauperis may be admitted to prosecute in formá pauperis a petition of right intituled in this Court." [Chancery Order, 1st Feb. 1862, rule 5; Morgan 201, 202. Notes to sect. 15 of this Act.]

Provided always that nothing in this statute, &c.] Referring to this provision the Court of Common Pleas said in a recent case: "The statute 23 & 24 Vict., c. 34, alters only the form of procedure to be adopted by suppliants resorting to a petition of right, and does not alter the law relating to the subjects for which the petition can be maintained, it being expressly declared by sect. 7 that no remedy was thereby given which was not before existing. (Per curiam, Tobin v. Reg. 16 C. B. N.S. 310, at p. 353; 33 L. J. C. P. 199, at p. 205; 10 Jur. N.S. 1029, at p. 1032; 10 L. T. 762, at p. 764; 12 W. R. 838, at p. 841.)

Decrees or VIII. In case of a failure on the behalf of her Majesty, judgments by default. or of any such other person as aforesaid called upon to

answer or plead to such petition, to plead, answer, or demur in due time, either to such petition or at any subsequent stage of the proceedings thereon, the suppliant shall be at liberty to apply to the Court or a Judge for an order that the petition may be taken as confessed; and it shall be lawful for such Court or Judge, on being satisfied that there has been such failure to plead, answer, or demur in due time, to order that such petition may be taken as confessed as against her Majesty or such other party so making default; and in case of default on the behalf of her Majesty and any other such person (if any) called upon as aforesaid to answer or plead thereto, a decree may be made by the Court, or leave may be given by the Court, on the application of the suppliant, to sign judgment in favour of the suppliant: Provided always, that such decree or judgment may afterwards be set aside by such Court or a Judge, in their or his discretion, on such terms as to them or him shall seem fit.

In case of a failure to plead, &c., on behalf of the Crown.] This enactment seems only to be declaratory of a rule which existed in suits where the king was plaintiff, thus: "If the defendant pleads and Attorney-General does not reply or

demur in reasonable time, the Court may give judgment for defendant as if plea confessed; but the Attorney-General should first be attended: Parker, 50 (Com. Dig., tit. Prerog. D. 85).

The application for the order mentioned ought, it would seem, to be made by motion after notice to the AttorneyGeneral for the form of the judgment to be signed: see next section. It should be noticed also that in a recent case the Court thought that the judgment could only be signed in favour of the suppliant when there had been a joint default by the Crown and another person (Kinloch v. Reg. and Secretary of State for India, W. N. 1884, p. 80).

IX. Upon every such petition of right the decree or Form of judgment judgment of the Court, whether given upon demurrer or decree. upon the pleadings or upon a default to answer or plead in time, or after hearing or verdict, or in error, shall be that the suppliant is or is not entitled either to the whole or to some portion of the relief sought by his petition, or such other relief as the Court may think right, and such Court may give a decree or judgment that the suppliant is entitled to such relief, and upon such terms and conditions (if any) as such Court shall think just.

This section introduces a change in the old form of procedure. Hitherto the judgments upon petition of right were, if for the Crown a nil capiat (Tidd's Practice, 9th ed. 1076), if for the suppliant, an amoveas manus (see notes to next section); by this section the form is altered, and it is: "This Court doth declare that (the suppliant) is entitled to, &c." (Seton on Decrees, 59). This alteration in form corresponds with an alteration in substance, the "relief" (sect. 16) which the subject may claim (sect. 1) and the Court may adjudge him entitled to under this section, including things which could not be recovered under an amoveas manus. A question naturally arises how far any judgment which professes to be something more than an amoveas manus can be given against the Crown, consist

Effect of judgment

of amoreas

manus.

ently with the proviso in sect. 7, by which the subject's remedies under the Act are restricted to those which he had before it. The answer seems to be this: that if the case is one in which he could have recovered before the Act, the mere alteration in the form of the judgment will not be considered any extension of his remedies, otherwise in cases where no remedy existed previously to the Act; which brings us back to what has been so fully discussed in the previous pages, viz., whether previous to this Act the suppliant had any remedy in a case in which any other judgment than that of amoveas manus was required to give him relief, which is discussed in the chapter dealing with contracts.

Forms of judgment will be found amongst the precedents appended. The question whether the form of judgment given in this section is appropriate where the suppliant recovers against a third party will be found discussed in the

notes to sect. 14.

X. In all cases in which the judgment commonly called a judgment of amoveas manus has heretofore been pronounced or given upon a petition of right, a judgment that the suppliant is entitled to relief as herein before provided shall be of such and the same effect as such judgment of amoveas manus.

This section perhaps needs a short explanation. Formerly the only judgment which was given for a successful suppliant upon a petition of right was what was called a judgment of amoveas manus or ouster le maine. "Ouster le maine is the judgment that is given for him that sueth a petition; for when it appeareth upon the matter discussed that the king hath no right nor title to the thing he seized then judgment shall be given in the Chancery that the kings handes be amoved" (Staunford, Prerog. cap. xxiiii. fol. 77 b). The form of this judgment appears to have been as follows: Quod manus domini Regis amoveantur et possessio restituetur petenti salvo jure domini regis" (Chitty, Prerog. 345, 356); or in English: "That her Majesty's hands be amoved from the possession of the premises mentioned in the (petition), and that the said

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