Sidebilder
PDF
ePub

then be questioned until Monday morning before the detention becomes unlawful; thus any confession made during that time would not be rendered inadmissible because of the operation of the rule. These evading tactics will be a necessary result, although they would seem to be neither desirable nor logical.

The abuses which produced this rule can be traced, at least in part, to the fact that officers do not have the procedural apparatus to conduct effective interrogations openly and above board. This rule can be expected to lead to new abuses by police personnel in other fields of investigation. Similar situations have led to such results.00 Nevertheless, the rule is now firmly entrenched and it is not likely that it will be overruled, since the Supreme Court applied it in the Upshaw case in spite of the voluminous criticism of the rule. Any future change in the rule must be made by congressional enactment.

Professor Wigmore, in discussing the exclusion of evidence obtained by unlawful searches, quotes a passage which seems to fit the McNabb rule equally well," "Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius, you have confessedly violated the constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall let you both go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction. This is our way of teaching people like Flavius to behave, and of teaching people like Titus to behave, and incidentally of securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else.'

"Some day, no doubt, we shall emerge from this quaint method of enforcing the law."61 In view of the decision in the Upshaw case, it seems that we have not yet begun to emerge.

Harry Carver

Criminal Law: Recovery of Fines Paid for Violations of a Statute Subsequently Declared Unconstitutional

In United States v. Western Chemical and Manufacturing Co., 78 F.Supp. 983 (S.D. Cal. 1948) defendant company, which had been convicted of violating a war food-rationing order, moved to vacate the judginent imposing a $2,800 fine, and to withdraw its plea of nolo contendere. Defendant contended that the basis of this war food order had been declared invalid in a subsequent case and that therefore the sentence imposed was void. The Government admitted dismissing other pending prosecutions under the said ration order, but pointed out that the alleged violations in those proceedings were after September, 1945, when the quotas were raised, whereas in this case four counts of the information were concerned with a prior period and therefore they were still good. The court declared that even if the ration order involved in the suit were regarded as invalid

GO Waite, Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH. L. Rev. 679 (1944). Professor Waite relates some startling examples of lawlessness resulting from rules of exclusion. 61 8 WICMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940).

EXHIBIT 26

Opinion of FRANKFURTER, J.

WATTS v. INDIANA.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.

No. 610. Argued April 25, 1949-Decided June 27, 1949.

Petitioner was arrested on suspicion on a Wednesday and held without arraignment, without the aid of counsel or friends and without advice as to his constitutional rights, until the following Tuesday, when he confessed to murder. Meanwhile he was held much of the time in solitary confinement in a cell with no place to sit or sleep except the floor and was interrogated by relays of police officers, usually until long past midnight. At his tral in a state court, the confession was admitted in evidence over his objection and he was convicted. Held: The use at the trial of a confession obtained in this manner violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the conviction is reversed. Pp. 49–55.

226 Ind. 655, 82 N. E. 2d 846, reversed.

The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed petitioner's conviction for murder, notwithstanding his contention that his confession was procured under circumstances rendering its admission in evidence a denial of due process of law. 226 Ind. 655, 82 N. E. 2d 846. This Court granted certiorari. 336 U. S. 917. Reversed, p. 55.

Franklin H. Williams and Thurgood Marshall argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief were Robert L. Carter and Henry J. Richardson.

Frank E. Coughlin, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were J. Emmett McManamon, Attorney General. Earl R. Cox and Merl M. Wall, Deputy Attorneys General.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which MR. JUSTICE MURPHY and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE join.

Although the Constitution puts protection against crime predominantly in the keeping of the States, the

Opinion of FRANKFURTER, J.

338 U.S.

Fourteenth Amendment severely restricted the States in their administration of criminal justice. Thus, while the State courts have the responsibility for securing the rudimentary requirements of a civilized order, in discharging that responsibility there hangs over them the reviewing power of this Court.' Power of such delicacy and import must, of course, be exercised with the greatest forbearance. When, however, appeal is made to it, there is no escape. And so this Court once again must meet the uncongenial duty of testing the validity of a conviction by a State court for a State crime by what is to be found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This case is here because the Supreme Court of Indiana rejected petitioner's claim that confessions elicited from him were procured under circumstances rendering their admission as evidence against him a denial of due process of law.' 226 Ind. 655, 82 N. E. 2d 846. The grounds on which our review was sought seemed sufficiently weighty to grant the petition for certiorari. 336 U. S. 917.

On review here of State convictions, all those matters which are usually termed issues of fact are for conclusive determination by the State courts and are not open for reconsideration by this Court. Observance of this re

1 Of course this Court does not have the corrective power over State courts that it has over the lower federal courts. See, e. g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332. In the main, the proper administration of the criminal law of the States rests with the State courts. The nature of the Due Process Clause, however, potentially gives wide range to the reviewing power of this Court over Statecourt convictions.

* In the petitioner's statements there was acknowledgment of the possession of an incriminating gun, the existence of which the police independently established. But a coerced confession is inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements in it may be independently established as true. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 236-237.

49

Opinion of FRANKFURTER, J.

striction in our review of State courts calls for the utmost scruple. But "issue of fact" is a coat of many colors. It does not cover a conclusion drawn from uncontroverted happenings, when that conclusion incorporates standards of conduct or criteria for judgment which in themselves are decisive of constitutional rights. Such standards and criteria, measured against the requirements drawn from constitutional provisions, and their proper applications, are issues for this Court's adjudication. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659, and cases cited. Especially in cases arising under the Due Process Clause is it important to distinguish between issues of fact that are here foreclosed and issues which, though cast in the form of determinations of fact, are the very issues to review which this Court sits. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589-90; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 510.

In the application of so embracing a constitutional concept as "due process," it would be idle to expect at all times unanimity of views. Nevertheless, in all the cases that have come here during the last decade from the courts of the various States in which it was claimed that the admission of coerced confessions vitiated convictions for murder,' there has been complete agreement that any

3 The validity of a conviction because an allegedly coerced confession was used has been called into question in the following cases: (A) Confession was found to be procured under circumstances violative of the Due Process Clause in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143; Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547; 544; Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 547; 530; Canty v. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629; 631; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278; and see Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U. S. 274.

Lomax v. Texas, 313 U. S.
White v. Texas, 310 U. S.
White v. Texas, 309 U. S.

(B) Confession was found to have been procured under circumstances not violative of the Due Process Clause in Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, and Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219.

Opinion of FRANKFURTER, J.

338 U. S.

conflict in testimony as to what actually led to a contested confession is not this Court's concern. Such con

flict comes here authoritatively resolved by the State's adjudication. Therefore only those elements of the events and circumstances in which a confession was involved that are unquestioned in the State's version of what happened are relevant to the constitutional issue here. But if force has been applied, this Court does not leave to local determination whether or not the confession was voluntary. There is torture of mind as well as body; the will is as much affected by fear as by force. And there comes a point where this Court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men. See Taft, C. J., in the Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 37. This brings us to the undisputed circumstances which must determine, the issue of due process in this case. Thanks to the forthrightness of counsel for Indiana, these circumstances may be briefly stated.

On November 12, 1947, a Wednesday, petitioner was arrested and held as the suspected perpetrator of an alleged criminal assault earlier in the day. Later the same day, in the vicinity of this occurrence, a woman was found dead under conditions suggesting murder in the course of an attempted criminal assault. Suspicion of murder quickly turned towards petitioner and the police began to question him. They took him from the county jail to State Police Headquarters, where he was questioned by officers in relays from about 11:30 that night until sometime between 2:30 and 3 o'clock the following morning. The same procedure of persistent interrogation from about 5:30 in the afternoon until about 3 o'clock the following morning. by a relay of six to eight officers, was pursued on Thursday the 13th. Friday the 14th. Saturday the 15th. Monday the 17th. Sunday was a day of rest from interrogation. About 3 o'clock on Tuesday morning. November 18. the petitioner made an incriminating statement after continuous

28412 0-58- -40

« ForrigeFortsett »