A. Yes, Sir; Mr. Halsey, and Mr. Stoughtenberg. It was burned up in the presence of Halsey & Stoughtenberg, I think. Mr. Halsey was present. Q. Was the object of burning it communicated to them?

A. I think so, Sir.

Q. How were you compensated for the loans you gave to Huntington? I take it for granted now that you gave those loans to make money. A. They are not paid.

Q. What were you to get? A. Seven per cent, per annum.

Q. And nothing more? A. Nothing more. (sensation.)

The District Attorney: It is my duty, at this stage of the examination, to object to a further consumption of time in showing the specialities or details of prior transactions between Mr. Harbeck and Mr. Huntington.

We

Te suppose we have a right to confine this inquiry to the res gesta of the case. We prove a specific uttering of forged paper by the defendant on the 6th of September, and we have a right to object to any evidence of previous transactions with the witness, as irrelevant.

Mr. Brady: So far as the learned District Attorney expresses a wish to economize time, of course I concur with him to the extent that, however serious or important an investigation may be, no more time should be assigned to it than is necessary for the development of the truth; but he will agree with me that no less time is adequate than what is due to the attainment of those ends. The importance of this case has not been exaggerated by him in his opening, and no one but my client can estimate how important it is to him that the whole of these transactions should be brought to light. I never put a question without having a definite purpose; and as I differ from the learned District Attorney on several propositions of law, it is necessary to advert to one or two, to show the relevancy of the testimony I now offer. My learned friend has stated in his opening that in a certain contingency, the jury will become mere puppets or automatons in the hands of the law: that is, that if certain facts or circumstances were developed in the case, the law would step in, and decide that the jury had nothing to do. I take issue on that proposition, generally and in detail; and I now claim that as to questions of fact the jury alone is to respond, and that your Honor has no right to express an opinion upon any of them. A great question in one branch of this case is, whether, if Mr. Huntington did utter this alleged forged paper, within the meaning of the law, there was any intention on his part to defraud Mr. Harbeck, or any other person, as charged in the indictment. That is exclusively a question of fact for the jury; and however lawyers may speculate, and whatever your honor may declare to be the legal presumption, that is a question, which so far as my humble abilities can prevent, no power on earth shall take from them. I say this because I am perfectly aware that it is stated in some elementary treatises, that, certain facts appearing, the law will infer certain things, as for example, if a man having forged paper in his possession, take it to another person, knowing it to be forged, and gets property on it, he shall not be allowed to say he did not intend to defraud. That is a position which I shall combat. I say that if twenty millions of dollars had been obtained on forged paper, and the party knew it to be forged, that is not enough to com. pel the jury to determine that he intended to defraud any one. Now if the learned gentleman wants this jury to infer the intent of Huntington to defraud from the fact that he did defraud, am I to be prevented from going

the

into all the transactions to prove, it may be, that he never owed Harbeck a cent in the world? How does my learned friend know? They call the witness to prove that he lent $21,000 to Huntington on the 6th September, upon those notes as security. Am I to leave the case in that condition -to let it appear that this man has been defrauded of $21,000, and have the jury infer from that that Huntington intended to defraud him? Can I be shut out from all the surrounding circumstances, to show the characteristics of the case? The learned gentleman says I am not to go back of this period. I propose to show that all those loans and transactions hinged and depended upon each other, so as to form one continuous dealing, the result of which is to show whether Mr. Harbeck was defrauded or not, or whether Huntington intended to defraud him. We have the singular fact in evidence, that on the 12th of October, immediately succeeding the arrest of Huntington, the witness destroyed a piece of evidence of immense consequence and value to himself and to Mr. Huntington, relating to the transactions between them. Whether it related to the transaction of September or not, we cannot ascertain, and I should like to know if I have not a right, when the witness confesses that he destroyed a certain piece of evidence, which might be might be of value to the person on trial, to submit to the jury evidence which may show true character of the transaction? The law imputes to a man who destroys a piece of evidence, an improper motive. Mr. Harbeck gives his explanation, and that can go to the jury, but we do not know what the jury may think of this matter. I am testing the witness's memory, and examining him with a view to show, in point of fact, whether or not he was defrauded; for I hope to make it appear as clear as the brightest ray of sunshine that has illuminated this room, that there never was the slightest intention on the part of Mr. Huntington to defraud any man, and in preventing me from showing all the circumstances, I think the learned gentleman is shutting out the light. I claim that the transactions between Mr. Harbeck and Mr. Huntington are open to my investigation, to overthrow the conclusion sought to be established by the prosecution, that a fraud was perpetrated on Mr. Harbeck. Your Honor will remember the way in which the question arises. It is this: I have been permitted to ask him about the nature and character of the loans, generally, about their amounts, whether he had securities for the previous loans, and what became of them; and now I have got down to the point, what was the compensation and mode of compensation he obtained on those loans? Is not that pretty essential? Suppose it turned out that these securities were deposited, not for a loan of $21,000, and not intended to be collateral security for anything: suppose they were nothing but forms and shadows, and so understood between the parties: suppose that Huntington and Harbeck had a perfect understanding with each other as to the mode of carrying on business, where they would stand in the relation of principals to third parties: I claim the right to cross-examine the witness to support any theory contrary to that of the prosecution. I want to find out whether there was any fraud, and we will consider before the jury whether the allegation that Mr. Huntington intended to defraud Mr. Harbeck is sustained by the proof,

or not.

The District Attorney: I will come back directly to the question started from what is the relevancy of the evidence now sought to be obtained

from Mr. Harbeck. We have proved by him that on a certain day he gave his check to Mr. Huntington for $21,000, which money passed into Mr. Huntington's coffers; that he received certain notes and checks as collateral security; and we have presumptive proof that they are forgeries. We have allowed evidence to show that there was a large financial business established between Mr. Harbeck and Mr. Huntington; and that works in our favor to this extent, that it proves Mr. Huntington had established a confidence with Mr. Harbeck down to a certain point where he could defraud Mr. Harbeck by a skillfully planned forgery. The charge is, that Mr. Huntington intended to defraud Mr. Harbeck in the transaction of the 6th of September. Now, no matter how other matters stood on that daywhether Mr. Huntington was owed by Mr. Harbeck a million of dollars, or not, here is an entirely isolated and independent transaction, to which the intent to defraud relates; and the moment the jury come to contemplate other transactions, there is danger of confusing their mind with irrelevant matter. My learned friend says that the witness has destroyed certain evidence connected with the transactions between him and Huntington. We deny that that book could be evidence in this case. It was the most natural thing in the world that Mr. Harbeck should destroy that book. It was one of those disagreeable remembrances of confidence betrayed, of folly, one of those skeletons that every man desires to be rid of. But this whole transaction appears unclouded by any collateral matter, so far as the prosecution is concerned; and if we are to go into other transactions, there is no knowing how long a time we are to spend here.

The Court: The defendant is indicted for forging a particular note, in a particular transaction. Now the counsel for the prisoner desires to go back of that transaction, into other transactions, which existed before between these parties. I am unable to see how the state of business between those parties before this thing took place can have an effect in any way on the merits of this issue. I cannot see that this testimony can be used legitimately, except to test the credibility of the witness; then I can understand the rule to be that you may go into irrelevant testimony for that purpose. I do not want to shut out any testimony that I can see has a legitimate bearing, no matter how distant, on the issue; but I am unable to see how this can have any. Suppose it true that the defendant had loaned the witness money, and had been charged exorbitant interest, I cannot see how that can have any bearing on the question whether the defendant forged this particular paper. At this time I do not want to say what I think as to the question of actual damage to be sustained to prove the intent to defraud. That is not necessary. Suppose it necessary to prove, that in consequence of this particular forgery, the party had been damaged, it would be a damage resulting from this transaction, and not from former transactions. I think I am bound to shut it out.

Mr. Brady: The question I put is this:

What was the compensation agreed to be paid by Huntington to you for the loans which you made to him, as you have stated, prior to September 6th, 1856?

Now I wish to say to your Honor, to prevent any misunderstanding, that I understand the District Attorney to contend that the intent to defraud would be conclusively established when the actual defrauding was proved, and that it will not answer for a person who did defraud another, to say

that he did not intend to do it. I differ from him entirely, and will show that although you may in law infer an intent from a certain state of things, the Jury are not bound to draw any conclusion from any state of facts. That is an atrocious error.

The Court: There is this about it, that whether the jury have the right or not, if they do so we have no remedy.

District Attorney: The learned gentleman misunderstands me in think. ing I hold that, if a man is defrauded, that is evidence that the party intended to defraud. I merely say it is presumptive. There must be an intent to defraud shown, but we differ as to the extent. While, to show that a man intended to defraud, it is immaterial whether there was an actual defrauding or not, the fact of actual defrauding goes far to show the intent.

Mr. Brady: I say that the jury are not bound to any conclusion from any state of facts. I wish this offer to be narrowed down to the specific question. My learned friend objects to our showing the rate of compensation agreed on between Harbeck and the defendant, for loans made the latter previous to the 6th of September; and your Honor excludes that proof. The Court: I feel that I must.

Mr. Brady: Very well, Sir, we take exception.

The usual hour for adjournment having arrived, the Court, after administering to the jury the caution of yesterday, adjourned to 10 o'clock, on Thursday morning.

Thursday, Dec. 18, 1856.*-William H. Harbeck's cross-examination continued by Mr. Brady.

"The trial of Huntington was resumed to-day before a small public audience. The smallness of the attendance was attributable in some measure to the stern refusal on the part of the officers at the door to give admission to mere quid-nuncs, but chiefly to the fact that there were very few quid-nuncs at the door to trouble them. The weather, in the first place, was too cold; and in the next place the Huntington affair, which, at the best, must pale its ineffectual fires before the revelations of Dr. Thrasher Lyons' more recent adventures, is now rather passé. Everybody knows everything about it that anybody wants to know anything about. Hence the collapse in public curiosity as to the trial. The proceedings to-day, however, had an interest per se."-Extract from The N. Y. Daily Times of Dec. 19.

"THE HUNTINGTON TRIAL-If carelessness and confidence be synonymous terms, then certainly it would seem that the money-dealing fraternity of Wall-street must be the most confiding class of this entire Christian community. The evidence elicited at the trial of Huntington, yesterday, exhibits, on the face of it, a mode of doing business which, if universal, stamps Wall-street either as an Arcadia of innocence and simplicity, or a phalanstery of careless capitalists. Mr. Huntington seems to have carried on his most gigantic operations by a series of coups de main. "Here," he says to a broker, "lend me twenty or thirty thousand dollars on my note at three days, and these checks, amounting to thirty thousand dollars, as collateral security." He thrusts into the broker's hand his note, and half a dozen checks on well-known houses-all of these checks being filled up in the same handwriting and on the same printed forms, and the signatures such palpable forgeries as to bear little or no resemblance to the originals—and yet, will it be believed, the money is lent without a shadow of hesitation! The full report of the testimony given on Huntington's trial yesterday, which is published elsewhere in the TIMES of to-day, cannot fail to arrest public attention, if not excite public astonishment."-From the same: an Editorial.

"TRIAL OF HUNTINGTON, THE WALL-STREET MAN.-One of our criminal courts is occupied at the present time in the trial of that distinguished operator, Charles B. Huntington, and the case is exciting all the interest that is due to the fame of the

Q. On the 6th of September, when you say this loan of $21,000 was made, was Huntington in good credit with you ?-A. Yes.

2. Had he established a credit with you? Had he any?

A. I would loan him money on securities.

Q. Well, had he so far gained a credit that you would have loaned him any money without securities?-A. No, Sir.

2. Had your brother and you separate and distinct business affairs? A. We had some.

Q. Some? 4. Some, Sir.

Q. How was it as to these loans of money?
Witness: These loans of $21,000?

Mr. Brady: Yes.

Witness: That belongs to Harbeck & Co.

Q. The firm composed of you and your brother? A. Yes, Sir. Q. Are you sure it was on the 6th of September that that loan was made? A. Yes, Sir.

2. Can you now remember whether you had at that time in your Witness: Any what?

hands any securities of any kind which Huntington had deposited with you Mr. Brady: Any securities.

Witness: For other loans ?

Mr. Brady: Yes.

Witness: Yes, Sir; I had other securities for other loans.

Q. How long had your firm been in the habit of lending money on in Wall street?

papers

A. We never did a great deal before the year 18

Q. Well, how much?

A. I could not tell you. We never did much before the year 1856.

Q. You know there was such a firm in New York as Phelps, Dodge

& Co. A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How long have you known that firm?

A. A number of years.

Q. Where is their place of business?

A. I cannot say properly where their place of business is.

Q. Have you ever seen their paper in Wall street?

A. I have from Mr Huntington.

Q. Of no others? A. No, Sir.

2. Did you ever receive it except from Huntington in course of business? 4. Not to my knowledge.

man and the notoriety of his exploits. It is not becoming that we should say any thing at this time which could influence the judge or the jury, but, when we recollect the escape of Schuyler, and the secret efforts which were made to prevent his recapture and return, the abortive attempt recently made to administer justice to a man who openly killed a fellow creature in a bar-room, the hundred and fifty to two hundred indictments against the faro establishments, and the two thousand indictments against offenders of various grades, which lie on the calendar covered up with the dust of years, there seems very little improbability of the public deciding erroneously in this case. Huntington is charged with forgery. But he was also well known as a distinguished bull operator, and he is ending his career as many other bull operators have done, both here and elsewhere."-From the New York Herald, Dec. 19: Editorial extract.