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contract between the original company and the re-insuring company was more than a mere contract of re-insurance. The court said: "This is not an ordinary case of technical insurance between two insurance companies. The facts found by the court of chancery appeals make it a contract for the use and benefit of complainants and other policyholders of the Traders for a valuable consideration, under circumstances entitling them to maintain this suit. The court of chancery appeals finds that the agreement and understanding was that the North British should assume all outstanding risks of the Traders and place itself in the same position toward said policyholders as if said policies had been its own; that the Traders went out of business, and all of its assets, amounting to about $85,000, went into the hands of the North British Company and the latter assumed all the fire risks of the former, and the North British dealt with the Traders policies the same as its own, canceling some, paying returned premiums, granting permits, adjusting and paying losses, and gave out statements, by letters and agents, that it had assumed all of said policies and that nothing was necessary to be done by the policyholders to make said contract binding on the North British Company."

The foregoing are the principal cases relied upon by plaintiff in error to sustain his action in this case against the re-insuring company. By the contract of re-insurance here involved defendant in error did not agree to assume any of the obligations of the Indemnity Company to its policyholders. The contract is one strictly of re-insurance for the sole benefit of the Indemnity Company. The material part of the contract is as follows: "Witnesseth, that the Norwich Union agrees to re-insure from 12 o'clock M., standard time, on above date, at the place where the property insured is located, all unexpired fire and lightning risks located in the United States, for the amounts not heretofore re-insured, now covered by policies and contracts is

sued by the Indemnity, according to their terms and conditions, and to pay all losses thereon occurring after the last mentioned hour, and to pay all adjusting and other expenses arising from such risks and all return premiums upon the cancellation of policies enumerated in the schedules."

We can give this contract no other interpretation than an agreement of defendant in error to re-insure all unexpired fire and lightning risks covered by policies issued by the Indemnity Company and to pay to said Indemnity Company all losses thereafter occurring upon such risks of the Indemnity Company. In consideration of this re-insurance contract the Indemnity Company agreed to pay defendant in error “a sum equal to the net amount of the pro rata unearned premium on all the risks thus re-insured, less a deduction of fifteen per cent (15%) from such pro rata premium, which is in lieu of any and all charges and allowances, including taxes, assessments of all kinds, and other charges of a similar nature for which the Indemnity is liable." There is no assumption of any liability of the Indemnity Company to the policyholders, nor any agreement on the part of defendant in error to pay any loss sustained by the policyholders. It is strictly a contract to indemnify the Indemnity Company against any losses it might sustain, but defendant in error assumed none of the liabilities of that company to its policyholders. The Indemnity Company continued liable, as before, to settle with its policyholders, and there is nothing in the contract to indicate that it was made for the benefit of the Indemnity Company's policyholders. It created no privity whatever between the Indemnity Company's policyholders and defendant in error, and therefore no right exists in plaintiff in error to maintain an action against defendant in error.

In our opinion the judgment of the Appellate Court is right, and it is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

MARY L. BARTLEY et al. Plaintiffs in Error, vs. THE PLEASURE DRIVEWAY AND PARK DISTRICT OF PEORIA, Defendant in Error.

Opinion filed February 20, 1913.

1. PARTIES when city is not a necessary party to suit against park district. Where a strip of land for an entrance to a park is conveyed in fee to a park district before the surrounding land is platted and the park district expressly excepts such strip from the dedication when the plat of the surrounding land is made, the city in which the platted land lies and to which the other streets shown on the plat are dedicated is not a necessary party to a suit by owners of property to compel the park district to care for and maintain the strip of land owned by it.

2. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-equity may, in a proper case, compel performance of agreement for benefit of third persons. A court of equity has power to compel specific performance of an agreement at the suit of third persons where the agreement is made for their benefit, provided it is such an agreement as the court would enforce between the parties to it; and such relief is not precluded by the fact that the agreement reserves the right of one party to declare a forfeiture of the estate conveyed for breach of a condition subsequent.

3. SAME when complainants are asking for something beyond the agreement. Where a park district accepts a deed to a strip of land upon condition that it shall keep the strip open as a street as a means of access to land abutting upon the strip and that the abutting land shall never be specially assessed or taxed for improving such strip, the owners of abutting lands have no standing to compel the park district to care for and maintain the strip in such condition that it will be ornamental and attractive as a driveway.

4. PARKS-duty to maintain park property is not a duty owing to property outside of the district. The duty of a park district to maintain the park property in proper condition is not a duty owing to the public at large nor to the owners of property outside of the park district, and a court of equity will not compel tax-payers in a park district to pay for improvements for the benefit of the owners of property outside the district.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the Second District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. N. E. WORTHINGTON, Judge, presiding.

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CHESTER F. BARNETT, and JOSEPH L. BARTLEY, for plaintiffs in error.

W. T. WHITING, for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the court:

The circuit court of Peoria county sustained the demurrer of defendant in error to the bill filed against it by plaintiffs in error to compel it to take care of and maintain Columbia Terrace, with its grass plots, trees, shrubbery and plants, a monument of Christopher Columbus located thereon, and the cement sidewalks and asphalt pavement, as a pleasure driveway and entrance to defendant's park, and dismissed the bill for want of equity. The Appellate Court for the Second District affirmed the decree, and a writ of certiorari was allowed to permit a review of the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The facts alleged in the bill, which were to be taken as true in the consideration of the demurrer, were as follows: On February 23, 1895, and August 6, 1896, Lydia Bradley conveyed lots lying north and west of what was afterward known as The Uplands addition to Peoria to the defendant, to be improved and maintained for a free public park, called Laura Bradley Park. The defendant accepted the deeds and improved the premises as a public park in accordance with the gift. On the same day that the first deed was made Lydia Bradley also conveyed to the defendant a strip of land 100 feet wide and 1084.80 feet long, extending from the entrance to the park to the city, to be used as a park driveway and entrance to the park, subject to the right of use by the owners of the adjoining lands for access to said lands the same as though it were a public street, and the defendant was never to levy or collect, or attempt to levy or collect, any special taxes or assess

ments upon the abutting or contiguous property for sustaining, ornamenting or improving the driveway, and in the event of a breach of any of said conditions the title was to revert to the grantor, her heirs or personal representatives. The defendant entered into possession of the strip and improved it, and it is and has been known as Columbia Terrace. On or about May 17, 1899, Lydia Bradley conveyed the lands through which Columbia Terrace ran, and which are now known as The Uplands, to the Bradley Polytechnic Institute. On or about August 8, 1902, the defendant entered into an agreement with the Briggs Real Estate Company, under which Columbia Terrace was improved by placing cement sidewalks on both sides; laying out grass plots between the sidewalks and curb lines and planting trees thereon; laying out grass plots in the center, surrounded by cement curbing; erecting upon it a monument with a bronze statue of Christopher Columbus, with a receptacle at the base for flowers and plants, and paving the roadways on each side of the grass plots with asphalt. On November 11, 1902, Lydia Bradley, the institute and the Briggs Real Estate Company joined in a plat of The Uplands, which was filed for record on that day. The plat showed Columbia Terrace, and the defendant made on the plat a separate dedication of the streets and alleys shown thereon, "excepting and reserving, however, complete ownership and control of Columbia Terrace as designated thereon," which was the land owned in fee by the defendant. On November 25, 1902, the institute, the real estate company and Lydia Bradley conveyed to the Title and Trust Company, a corporation of Peoria, the lands comprising The Uplands, "with the exception of Columbia Terrace, owned and controlled by Pleasure Driveway and Park District of Peoria," in trust, for the purpose of making sales of lots in The Uplands. The complainants purchased lots in The Uplands abutting on Columbia Terrace on the strength of the agreement between Lydia

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