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accident accidental according action active actual affirms already animal answer argument atoms become bodies bodily called causality common complete composite concept condition consequently considered constitution continuous demonstration dependence determined difficulty distinct effect efficient cause elements entity equally essence essential evidence existence experience fact faculty follows force forma former further given gives Hence human idea identity immediately impossible includes instance intrinsic Judgment limits Material Cause material substance means metaphysical mind motion nature necessary necessity object once operation particular passive perception perfection philosophy physical physical law possible potentiality preceding predicate present Primordial Matter Principle prior produced properties Proposition proved pure quantity question quod reality reason received relation remains representative requires sense sensile separate simple soul specific Subject substance substantial form supposed teaching term theory thing Thomas thought tion touching true truth ultimate union universal virtue whole
Side 44 - Again ; the mathematical postulate, that " things which are equal to the same are equal to one another," is similar to the form of the syllogism in logic, which unites things agreeing in the middle term.
Side 94 - As to those impressions which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the Author of our being.
Side 96 - Here is a kind of attraction, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and as various forms.
Side 95 - Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone would join them : and 'tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another.
Side 99 - If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable.
Side 101 - When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Side 100 - And thus, though every impression and idea we remember be considered as existent, the idea of existence is not derived from any particular impression. The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent.
Side 97 - ... between it and its supposed effect. The same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body- where we observe the motion of the latter to...
Side 96 - This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination.