they had been previously employed may have been, and it is fair to presume was the chief, perhaps only inducement to the purchase by plaintiffs and their grantors. To authorize judiciously the diversion and material reduction of the waters would be a violation of the principle that they took with all the apparent benefits and easements belonging to their purchase. And in cases like the present the purchaser is entitled to the benefit of the easement without any express reservation or grant. (Pyer vs. Carter, 1 H. & N. Exch. and Exch., Ch. 916.) The word "appurtenances" is not necessary to the conveyance of the easement. The general rule of law is, that when a party grants a thing, he by implication grants whatever is incident to it and necessary to its beneficial enjoyment. The incident goes with the principal thing. The idea and definition of an easement to real estate granted is, a privilege off and beyond the local boundaries of the lands or tenement conveyed-in the present case, the privilege of conducting water through the lands retained by the Lugos, the common grantors of plaintiffs and defendants, by means of the zanja. (Angell on Water Courses, 153 a; 97 Mass., 133; 4 Gray, 379.) The parties at Cottonwood Row having acquired their lands with the use of water, by means of the zanja attached, and quasi appurtenant to them, no subsequent act of their grantor could divest them of their right. It is claimed by appellants, that inasmuch as the plaintiffs have alleged in their complaiut that they are owners of the ditch and have not averred that they are in possession of it, trespass cannot be maintained. But the complaint also avers the existence of the easement. The Court below found the existence of the easement only, and this will support the decree. In the plaintiff's answer to the cross-complaint there is an attempted denial of the adverse use by defendants, Leffingwell and Byrne. The case was tried in the District Court, upon the assumption that all the material allegations of the cross-complaint were denied. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that under such circumstances the point that a denial was insufficient could not be made here. Upon the question of adverse use, continuous and uninterrupted by appellants, Leffingwell and Byrne, or by them and their grantors, for the period of five years, the District Court found against them. An examination of the transcript does not satisfy us that the finding was against the evidencc. Judgment and order affirmed. We concur : CROCKETT, J. THE London Law Times says; "It is already anticipated that the acquisition of England will open an improved field fo. the legal profession in the East. The Consular Court of Constantinople has cradled more than one excellent English lawyer and it is probable that in the future it will afford practice for a considerable bar." If England cannot supply the increa sed demand in Cyprus for lawyers, we are sure that the United States can. Supreme Court Unwritten Opinions. [July Term, 1878.] [No. 6106. Decided Aug. 1, 1878.] M. C. PLUMMER. Plaintiff and Appellant VS. DAVID ALEXANDER and MARTHA BROWN, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from the 17th District Court, Los Angeles County. SEPULVEDA, Judge. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. Homestead claim-Injunction to restrain Sheriff from delivering tax deed. Plaintiff alleges that on July 19th, 1875, she was the head of a family and resided on the 14 section of land in contest situated in Los Angeles county, that on said day she filed her homestead declaration, that on April 12th, 1876, defendant Martha Brown filed a complaint against plaintiff and others for the survey of a certain piece of property. Judgment by default was taken therein June 13th, 1876 for $226.10, On January 25th. 1877, the defendant Alexander, being then Sherift of Los Angeles county, levied execution in persuance of said judgment upon the land in controversy, and advertised the said land for sale under such execution on Jan, 30th 1877. That on February 23d, 1877, plaintiff served notice on defendant, that said land was claimed by her as a homestead, that she then resided thereon and that her homestead claim was filed of record anterior to the rendition of the judgment above, that defendant was by said notice required to desist from advertising and selling such land; but on March 31st, 1877 defendant sold the land for $145, and delivered a certificate of sale therefor. That on September 29th, 1877, plaintiff paid to defendant the amount of purchase money, percentage and all costs thereon due, under protest, being the last day for redemption from said sale-plaintiff at the time notifying defendant that she claimed the property as a homestead, and paid the redemption money under duress and to prevent a deed from being executed by said defendant. Defendant in October 1877 re-advertised said land for sale under execution for the unpaid portion of said judgment. Plaintiff prayed for an injunction restraining said defendants from selling or in any manner interfering with said property, An injunction was granted on November 15th, 1877. Defendant in answer made a general denial and stated that defendant Brown on June 13th, 1876 obtained a judgment for $226.10 against plaintiff which became a lien on plaintiff's property, and on Scptember 26th, 1876, sold the same to J. H. Smith and A. M. Stephens. On October 3d, 1877. Smith caused execution for $189.73 to be issued and delivered the same to defendnnt Alexander to levy. On September 29th, 1877 plaintiff filed her homestead claim. That these defendants have no interest in the matters in controversy, that Smith is the real party in interest, as the assignee and owner of said judgment, that the land was plaintiff's separate property and was by her sold to E. R. Plummer subject to said judgment and that he is the real party in interest herein. After argument before the Court, an order dismissing the injunction was made February 11th, 1878. On Appeal the judgment and order was affirmed. H, T. Hayward, attorney ror appellant. Thos. H. Smith, attorney for respondent. [January Term, 1878.] [No. 5119. Decided March 14, 1878.] L. F. MOULTON, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS W. H. PARKS, ET AL., Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Colusa County. P. W. KEYSER, Judge. INJUNCTION. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. Plaintiff's complaint stated as follows: That plaintiff owns land on the east bank of the Sacramento River, in Colusa County, which partially overflows during the winter of every year. About two miles below plaintiff's land, on the same side of the river, the defendants, on October 17, 1874, erected on their own land, a dam or levee across a basin of low land, through which runs a slough or creek. The effect of said dam has been and will be to raise the water higher, and cause it to remain longer on the plaintiff's land than it otherwise would. Plaintiff prays for $1,000 damages, and perpetual injunction against the maintenance of the dam. The answer, among other things, denies that defendants erected said dam or that plaintiff has been injured thereby, and alleges that it was erected by Levee District No. 5, as authorized by Act of Legislature of March 25, 1868, and not otherwise. Admits that defendant, Parks, built said dam for said Levee District under special contract, and according to specifications expressed in said contract, and alleges that Parks had fully performed said contract, and had been discharged therefrom before any injury or damages resulted to the plaintiff from the work; and further alleges that on January 19, 1875 (six days after commencement of this action), said dam was abated. The Court found these facts substantially as above stated, except that it found that the dam backed and held water on plaintiff's land from November 6, 1874, until January 19, 1875, when it broke. The Court further found that in the Spring of 1875, Swamp Land District No. 226 was formed in Sutter County, under the Act of March 28, 1868, of which Parks was a trustee. That the trustees of District No. 226 entered into a contract to repair said dam, and the dam was re-built, and has ever since been maintained and protected, and will be so continued, unless restrained. On the above facts, judgment against defendants was given for $469 damages and costs, and a perpetual injunction was granted. Defendant's appeal is upon the judgment-roll from the final judgment and decree. Judgment affirmed. Belcher & Belcher, and Vanclief & Cowden, attorneys for appellants. [No. 5061. Decided March 14, 1878.] THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Appellant. VS. THE CITY GAS COMPANY, AND THE SAN FRANCISCO GAS LIGHT COMPANY, Respondents. Appeal from the Fourth District Court, San Francisco County. MORRISON, Judge. FRANCHISE.-FORFEITURE.-Demurrer. The defendant, the City Gas Co., was incorporated for the purpose of availing itself of certain privileges set out in a franchise granted by Act of the Legislature. Subsequently the City Gas Co. and the San Francisco Cas Co. conso lidated. Suit was brought by the City and County of San Francisco against them to forfeit certain property set out in the complaint, in accordance with the Act of 1863. Defendants filed a demurrer to the complaint, which was sustained. Plaintiff appeals from the order sustaining the demurrer. Appeal dismissed, and judgment affirmed. W. C. Burnett, attorney for appellant. R. P. & H. N. Clement, attorneys for respondents. [No. 5767. Decided Feb. 26th, 1878.] THOMAS KERNS, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS. P. F. DEAN, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Santa Cruz County, BELDEN, Judge. EJECTMENT.-NEW TRIAL.-ERROR. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. M. H. Patterson, owner of the premises in dispute, on October 25, 1867, entered into a contract with A. P. Sanford, by the terms of which Sanford was to pay the total sum of $3,336, with interest at 10 per cent., at stated times and in stated amounts, in consideration whereof Patterson agreed, upon full payment, to execute to Sanford a conveyance to the tract in dispute. It was therein provided that if default should be made in any payments, Patterson might declare the rights of Sanford forfeited, by depositing a written notice with the County Recorder of Santa Cruz County, and re-enter and re-possess said premises. It was further provided that Sanford should have possession, pending such payments or forfeiture. Sanford entered into and kept possession under this agreement until his death, September 4, 1874. Sanford during that time made three payments, amounting to $1,200. No other payments were made by him, nor have any been made since his death. On September 18, 1875, Patterson filed with the County Recorder a written notice, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, declaring Sanford's rights forfeited for nonpayment of installments. On September 20, 1875, Patterson entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, Kerns, by which he was to convey said tract to Kerns upon certain payments to be made by Kerns, and Kerns was to have immediate possession. Kerns entered into possession, and planted about 30 acres with grain. In September, 1874, P. F. Dean was appointed administrator of Sanford's estate. Dean, on application, received a statement from Patterson's clerk to the effect that the estate of Sanford owed $5,000 on the agreement. (This statement was made shortly before the declaration was filed declaring the con |