savings bank, and the only powers given to it were those we have mentioned, powers necessary to carry out the only avowed purpose, which was to enable it to receive deposits for the use and benefit of depositors, dividing the income or interest of all deposits among its depositors or their legal representatives. It is like many other savings institutions incorporated in England and in this country during the last sixty years, intended only for provident investment, in which the management and supervision are entirely out of the hands of the parties whose money is at stake, and which are quasi benevolent and most useful because they hold out no encouragement to speculative dealing or commercial trading. This was the original idea of savings banks. Scratchley's Treatise on Savings Banks, passim; Grant's Law of Banker's 571, where, in defining savings banks, it is said the bank derives no benefit whatever from any deposit or the produce thereof. Such are savings banks in England, under the statutes of Geo. 4, ch. 92, § 2, and 26 and 27 Vict., ch. 87. Very many exist in this country. Among the earliest are some in Massachusetts, organized under a general law passed in 1834, which contained a provision like the one in the act of Congress, that the income or profit of all deposits shall be divided among the depositors, with just deduction of reasonable expenses. They exist also in New York, Pennsylvania, Maine, Connecticut and other States. Indeed, until recently, the primary idea of a savings bank has been that it is an institution in the hands of disinterested persons, the profits of which after deducting the necessary expenses of conducting the business, inure wholly to the benefit of the depositors in dividends or in a reserved surplus for their greater security. Such very plainly, is the defendant corporation in this case. The complainants have therefore, no pecuniary interest in it, and no right to the relief they ask.

The decree of the Supreme Court of the District dismissing the complainants' bill is affirmed with costs.

New York Supreme Court.

SAMUEL V. MILLER, appellant, vs. ARTHUR O'KAIN respondent.

Proceedings in bankruptcy are not determined, within the meaning of § 5105, U. S. R. S., as amended in 1874, until an order to the effect has been entered in the Bankrupt Court.

A surety for the bankrupt, who has paid the claim after proof thereof, is subrogated to the position of the original creditor as to its enforcement by suit.

Appeal from judgment for defendant, entered on nonsuit directed by the Court.

Action upon a promissory note given by defendant to plaintiff, and also for moneys paid by plaintiff on account of a note which he had signed as surety for defendant.

On the 7th of February, 1872, defendant was adjudicated bankrupt. Plaintiff duly proved his note in the bankruptcy proceedings, and the holder of the note upon which plaintiff was surety also duly proved his note. Plaintiff, as such surety after such proof, paid the amount of such note, and the same was delivered to him.

Afterwards, and in February, 1873, the assignee in bankruptcy declared a dividend to the creditors who had proved their claims, and paid the amount of the dividends upon the two notes plaintiffs, who accepted the same.

After payment of said dividends, and before the commencement of this action, the assignee rendered his accounts to the register, and was discharged. No further proceedings have since been had in the bankruptcy case by or in behalf of the bankrupt or any creditor.

The Court held that plaintiff, by proving the note held by him, is to be deemed to have waived all right of action thereon until such time as the proceedings in bankruptcy are determined; that the holder of the other note, by proving the same, had likewise waived all right of action thereon in like manner; and that plaintiff, by paying the amount thereof to said holder and acceptance of the dividend thereon, elected to stand in the place of said, holder, and was precluded from

bringing suit for the money paid by him until the determination of the bankruptcy proceedings, and that such proceedings were not fully determined at the time of the commencement of this action.

Held, No error; that the proceedings in bankruptcy could not be considered determined under § 5105, as amended by the Act of 1874, until some order of the Court in Bankruptcy had been made declaring the proceedings to be determined. 10 Hun, 362. As to proceedings in bankruptcy in the Northern District of New York, we suppose a special order in each case would be necessary in order to bring the proceedings in bankruptcy to a close, so that the suspension of a right to sue, which results from the proof of the debt in bankruptcy, while the creditor is desirous of using the same as a cause of action, may be brought to an end. This probably should be on notice to the bankrupt, and on that motion both the bankrupt and the creditor can be heard.

As to the second note, plaintiff claimed that the debt was not proved by him, and consequently there is no suspension of the right of action.

Held, That under § 5070 of the Revised Statutes, if the creditor has proved the debt against the bankrupt, the surety who shall have paid the debt after that time is subrogated to the position of the original creditor as to the proof, the dividends, and the claim or debt. Plaintiff received the dividend, which he could not have done unless the debt had been proved in bankruptcy. He cannot be permitted to avail himself of the proof of the debt for the purpose of receiving the dividends and repudiate it so far as it operates to create a suspension of his right to sue on the demand.

Judgment affirmed.

Opinion by Talcott, J.

Recent U. S. Land Decisions.

In the matter of the official survey of the rancho Laguna de Los Palas Colorados the heirs and representatives of Joaquin Morago and Juan Bernal, executed by Boardman in 1875, approved by the Surveyor-General on December 20th, 1877, the Secretary, upon exceptions taken by Vandyke & Wells and Mullan & Hyde, counsel for the protestant, to the decision of the Commissioner, have decided in favor of the confirmees upon all' points, refusing to entertain the appeal, and holding the Boardman survey good. This grant having been confirmed in default of appeal, by the District Court in 1858, the first survey, known as the La Croye survey, was made. Objections were filed, and notice given to all parties interested, who appeared and were made parties, and default was entered against those who did not appear. After various stipulations were made the District Court rejected the La Croye survey, and the Boardman survey was made at its order. Certain setlers within the exterior limits of the tract from which three square leagues (Spanish) were selected by the confirmers, appeared before Commissioner Williamson on appeal from the Surveyor-General's approval of the Boardman survey. Among other points not at issue in the appeal, the Commissioner held that all parties not parties to the proceedings in Court have no standing except as protestants, and are not entitled to appeal; that the Boardman survey was correct; that the land confirmed was three Mexican and not English or American leagues. The Secretary holds that as the lands within the claimed limits of the grant were absolutely reserved from settlement, he is not enabled to see by what right the protestants can claim to have any standing in this case. They settled on lands reserved by law, and being presumed to know the law, have no just ground for complaint. The fact is clearly established that the southern boundary of this grant is south of the southern extremity of the Boardman survey, and the Secretary finds no error in the

survey of this boundary, and pronounces the Boardman survey as made substantial and in conformity to the decree of the district and civil Courts. It will be remembered that the western boundary of this ranch adjoins the rancho San Antonio on which Oakland is built.

WASHINGTON, August 13th-Commissioner Williamson has just made a decision in which the question of pre-emption rights upon school sections of land in California is involved. One Henry Meta, on January 2d, 1378, made application under the Pre-emption law for a quarter section of land in one of the townships in the Sacramento District. His affidavit, which accompanies the application, shows that he had been on the land twenty-one years, and prior to the survey of the land and had made expensive improvements upon it. Having deferred making his application beyond the year of the survey within which the law seems to require it to be filed, the Register and Receiver of the Sacramento Land Office rejected the claim, and an appeal was taken to the General Land Office. Commissioner Williamson reviews the facts in the case and the laws bearing on the subject, and reaches the following conclusion: "That he deferred making his application for so long a time after his settlement and survey cannot, in my opinion, affect his present right. The delay was of course made at his peril, but in the absence of any intervening right or claim his application must be allowed, provided he has in other respects complied with the law. Tnis it appears he has done. You will therefore reverse your decision and allow the application. The fact that the State has sold the land, if such be the fact, can have no bearing upon this base.”

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