to him by will, first accrues (r) on the death of the grantor.

In the case of a forfeiture, (s) or breach of a condition, the right of the remainder-man and of the reversioner (t) first accrues (u) upon the estate or interest coming into possession; and provided the estate or land has not been recovered by reason of the forfeiture or breach of condition. In other cases the right of the reversioner first accrues at the time of his estate first becoming an estate or interest in possession, by the determination, from effluxion of time (w) or otherwise, of the estate in respect of which the lands or profits have been held, or the rent has been received; (x) where the land has been recovered by some person by reason of a right limited on or in defeasance (y) of the estate in possession, a person claiming, though barred as to an anterior right, may claim upon any other right consequent on such reco

very. (z)

This limitation as to the claimant bars all in remainder, (a) and all others (b) whom he could, if in

(r) James v. Salter, 5 Dowl. 496; 4 Scott, 168; 3 Bing. 544. (s) West's Symb. Part I. lib. II. s. 156.

(t) Plowden, 151; 1 Inst. 183 b.

(u) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 4, Appendix.

(w) Villers v. Handley, 2 Wils. 49; Smith v. Parker, 2 W. Bl. 1230; Doe d. Hinton v. Role, 3 Nev. & P. 648.

(x) Sect. 5, Appendix; Chudleigh's case, 1 Rep. 121.

(y) Sect. 20, Appendix.

(z) Albany's case, 1 Rep. 107; 3 Comm. 20, 119.

(a) Sect. 21, Appendix.

(b) Sect. 22, id.; and see 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74.

possession, have barred; (c) and where the parties claim under an assurance from a tenant in tail, (d) but not sufficient per se to bar the entail, (e) the limitation runs against the parties claiming after or in defeasance of such estate tail. (ƒ)

Where rent to the yearly amount of 20s. (g) has been received under a valid lease in writing, the limitation runs from the time of the first receipt of it by the adverse party; but where the rent was less, then from the expiration of the lease; upon a tenancy from year to year without writing, (h) it arises at the end of the first of such years, or the last receipt of rent under it, which ever happens the last; and on a tenancy at will, the right first accrues at the end of the tenancy, or at the expiration of one year afterwards. (¿)

When the right accrues to an archbishop, bishop, dean, prebendary, parson, vicar, master of an hospital, or other spiritual (k) or eleemosynary (1) corporation (m) sole (n), the limitation is thus: the period during which two persons in succession have held the office or benefice, and six years after a third person

(c) Hudson v. Benson, 2 Lev. 28; T. Raym. 236.

(d) Driver v. Hussey, 1 H. Bl. 269; Breden's case, 1 Rep. 76. (e) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, ss. 20, 23, Appendix.

(f) Id. s. 3.

(g) Sect. 9; 29 Car. 2, c. 3, ss. 1-3.

(h) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 8, Appendix.

(i) Sect. 7; Doe d. Thompson v. Thompson, 6 Ad. & El. 721.

(k) 1 Kyd, 23; Burn, Eccles. Law, Monast, s. 5.

(l) 1 Kyd, 26; Cowel.

(m) Id. 13; King v. Amery, 2 T. R. 515.

(n) Sutton's Hospital, 10 Rep. 1; Fulwood's case, 4 Rep. 64.

has been appointed thereto, if amounting to sixty years; and if not, then such further time as will make up the sixty years.

These statutes extend to the right of the lord of the manor upon the forfeiture of a copyhold estate; (0) and a possession, in order to create a right, must be actual; and not constructive merely, (p) e. g. with respect to mines, by the possession of the manor only; and where it clearly appears that the title of a claimant is barred by the statutes of limitation, the Court of Queen's Bench will not grant a mandamus for his admission to a copyhold estate. (q)

3. Actions upon judgment debts (r) in courts of record, and for interest thereon, (s) must be brought within twenty years next after a present right to receive the same accrues ; (t) and there is the same limitation as to actions and proceedings for the recovery of money secured by lien upon land. Such a lien signifies (u) a right to possess and retain,” and a covenant (a) to apply a certain portion of the rents and profits to a particular use gives a specific lien.

66

4. Arrears of rent, in respect of monies charged

(v) Doe v. Hellier, 3 T. R. 162; Doe v. Danvers, 7 East, 299. (p) Cullen v. Johnson, 2 Stra. 1142.

(q) Rex v. Coggun, 6 East, 431; 2 Smith, 417.

(r) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, ss. 18, 19.

(s) Sect. 17; Pit v. Knight, 1 Lev. 222.

(t) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 40, Appendix.

(u) Ex parte Heywood, 2 Rose, 355.

(x) Legard v. Hodges, 3 Bro. C. C. 421; 1 Ves. 477.

upon, or payable out of land, or any damages in respect thereof, can only be recovered, whether by action or distress, within six years next after they become due; (y) or after an acknowledgment in writing, signed by the person by whom it was payable, was given to the person entitled, or his agent. Arrears of interest upon a legacy, or damages in respect of such interest, can only be recovered within six years after they become due, or an acknowledgment was given. But where a prior incumbrancer has been in possession of the land, or in the receipt of the profits, within one year next before an action brought by a second or other incumbrancer, the subsequent incumbrancer may recover the arrears · for the whole term during which the first incumbrancer was so in possession, or in receipt of the profits.

5. A landlord may, within six calendar months (2) next after the determination (a) of the lease, pur auter vie, for years, or at will, (b) and during the continuance of his interest, and during the possession (c) of the tenant, make a distress upon the lands demised, and as

if the term had not ended. And the executor or administrator of the landlord may, within six calendar months next after the determination of the term, and during the possession of the tenant, distrain upon the lands demised, for any term, or at will, for arrearages

(y) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 42, Appendix.

(z) 8 Anne, c. 15, ss. 6, 7, id.

(a) 1 Inst. 45 b; Walker v. Richardson, 2 M. & W. 882.

(b) Oland's case, 5 Rep. 116.

(c) Savage v. Dent, 2 Stra. 1064; Nuttall v. Staunton, 3 B. & C.

due; (d) and actions concerning arrears of dower, and damages in respect thereof, must be brought within six years. (e)

6. There are certain disabilities and exceptions which, if existing at the time of the right accruing, suspend the operation of the statute (ƒ) until ten years after the removal of the disability or impediment, so as it does not altogether exceed forty years from the accruing of the cause of action. (g) If a claimant while under disability or an impediment dies, proceedings must be had within ten years next after the accruing of such disability or impediment, or the death of the party. (h) The instant in which the disability is removed, the statute begins to run, but it is not affected by any subsequent disability. (i) And the disability of or an impediment to one or more of joint claimants, such as coparceners, will not impede the operation of the statute. (k) The rule is, that the statute begins to run so soon as there is in existence in England a plaintiff capable of suing, and that having begun to run, no subsequent interruption to the right of suing, even from causes beyond the controul of the plaintiff, will stop it; and therefore it has been held no answer, that after the statute had begun to run, and within the six years, the

(d) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 38, Appendix.

(e) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 41, id.

(f) S. 16, Appendix.

(g) S. 17, id.

(h) S. 16; Doe v. Jesson, 6 East, 80; 2 Smith, 236.

(i) Doe v. Jones, 4 T. R. 300; Salisbury v. Byolt, 2 Swanst. app. 609 1 Cha. Cases, 278; Cotterell v. Dutton, 4 Taunt. 826; Doe v. Shaen, 1 Selw. N. P. 148, (n).

(k) Roe v. Rowlston, 2 Taunt. 441; Perry v. Jackson, 4 T. R. 516.