O'CONNOR, J., dissenting This supposed "asymmetry" in the LHWCA is not something to be circumvented, however, since it is attributable to Congress' decision to place a strict 1-year time limit on the reopening of denied or terminated claims. Under the proper interpretation of the LHWCA, a worker's wageearning capacity is partly a function of his future ability to earn money, as proved by a preponderance of the evidence. This preponderance standard screens out claims where a worker cannot show a reduction in his future earning power. Accordingly, there is no need to engage in the sort of arbitrary line-drawing that brings us the "significant possibility" standard, in order to salvage some role for § 22's 1-year limitations period. III As a final matter, I believe that the ALJ's conclusion that Rambo "no longer has a wage-earning capacity loss," App. 55, should be upheld regardless of whether the standard for fixing a worker's wage-earning capacity is the one set forth by the Court or the one described in this dissent. I agree with the Court that Metropolitan, as the proponent of a modified compensation order, met its burden of demonstrating a "change in conditions" by proving that Rambo's actual earnings had risen significantly since he began steadily working as a crane operator. Ante, at 139. Upon that showing, §8(h) shifted to Rambo the burden of proving that his new earnings did not fairly and reasonably reflect his wage-earning capacity. Ibid. In other words, Rambo must show that his ability to earn wages in the future is more likely than not to dip below his preinjury levels. In his written ruling, the ALJ gave this issue his full consideration. As the ALJ observed, "higher post-injury gains/ losses are not necessarily determinative of an employee's wage-earning capacity. One has to consider wage-earning capacity in an open labor market under normal employment conditions." App. 53 (citation omitted). The ALJ then specifically commented on Rambo's future job prospects: "Claim O'CONNOR, J., dissenting ant no longer has a wage-earning capacity loss. Although Claimant testified that he might lose his job at some future time, the evidence shows that Claimant would not be at any greater risk of losing his job than anyone else. Moreover, no evidence has been offered to show that Claimant's age, education, and vocational training are such that he would be at greater risk of losing his present job or in seeking new employment in the event that he should be required to do so. Likewise, the evidence does not show that Claimant's employer is a beneficent one." Id., at 55. As I read this statement, the ALJ found that Rambo's current earnings adequately reflected his future job prospects-that is, he found that Rambo would not suffer any future economic loss due to his injury. The ALJ's findings must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. See 33 U. S. C. § 921(b)(3) (setting standard of review that Benefits Review Board must apply to ALJ's findings). The substantial evidence standard is extremely deferential to the factfinder: "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938). Based on the evidence submitted by the parties, a “reasonable mind" could undoubtedly have found that Rambo's current earnings accurately reflected his wage-earning capacity, with regard to both his present and future job prospects. Rambo testified that he had learned to operate cranes and heavy lift trucks (tasks that he can perform despite his injury), App. 30-31; that he had worked steadily as a crane operator for one shipping line for the last 21⁄2 years, id., at 37; and that his new job paid a much higher wage than he had received before his injury, id., at 38. The record clearly permitted a finding that, despite his injury, Rambo "no longer has a wage-earning capacity loss." Id., at 55. O'CONNOR, J., dissenting Because the ALJ properly found that Rambo's current earnings reasonably reflected his wage-earning capacity, I see no need to remand this case for further proceedings simply to demand of the ALJ a finding that he has already made. The Benefits Review Board's denial of compensation should be upheld and the Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed. Syllabus O'DELL v. NETHERLAND, WARDEN, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 96-6867. Argued March 18, 1997-Decided June 19, 1997 At the penalty phase of petitioner's state trial on capital murder, rape, and sodomy charges, evidence was presented that he had been convicted of a host of other offenses-including the kidnaping and assault of another woman while he was on parole and the murder of a fellow prisoner during a previous prison stint. The court denied his request for a jury instruction that he was ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison. The jury determined that petitioner presented a future danger, and he was sentenced to death. In subsequently granting federal habeas relief, the District Court concluded that this Court's intervening decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154—which requires that a capital defendant be permitted to inform his sentencing jury that he is parole ineligible if the prosecution argues his future dangerousnesswas not a "new" rule within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, and thus entitled petitioner to resentencing. The Fourth Circuit reversed. Held: Simmons' rule was new and cannot, therefore, be used to disturb petitioner's death sentence. Pp. 156-168. (a) Under Teague, this Court will not disturb a final state conviction or sentence unless it can be said that, at the time the conviction or sentence became final, a state court would have acted objectively unreasonably by not extending the relief later sought in federal court. Teague requires a federal habeas court to determine the date on which the conviction became final; to consider whether a state court considering the defendant's claim at the time it became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule he seeks was required by the Constitution; and if not, to determine whether that new rule nonetheless falls within one of two narrow exceptions to the Teague doctrine. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 527. Pp. 156-157. (b) Petitioner's conviction became final in 1988 and Simmons was decided in 1994. Simmons is an unlikely candidate for "old-rule" status. There was no opinion for the Court in Simmons, and the array of views expressed there suggests that the rule announced was, in light of this Court's precedent, "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 415. An assessment of the legal land Syllabus scape existing at the time petitioner's conviction and sentence became final bolsters this conclusion. Contrary to petitioner's position, the result in Simmons did not follow ineluctably from the decisions in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, and Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1. The seven opinions in Gardner produced a narrow holding that a death penalty procedure permitting consideration of secret information relevant to the offender's character and record-there a presentence report not provided to the defendant-violates the Eighth Amendment. Petitioner points to no secret evidence in his case. And the evidence he sought to present to the jury was not historical evidence about his character and record but evidence concerning what might happen, under then-extant law, after a sentence was imposed. In Skipper, too, it was evidence of past behavior that the defendant was unconstitutionally prevented from adducing. The distinction between information concerning state postsentencing law and evidence specifically related to the defendant was also at the heart of two other cases in 1988's complex legal landscape. In California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, the Court concluded that California had reasonably chosen to provide some, limited, postsentence information to the capital sentencing jury, namely, the possibility of pardon. But the Court emphasized that this conclusion did not override the choices of other States not to permit their juries to be informed of postsentencing proceedings, including parole. The general proposition that the States retained the prerogative to determine how much (if at all) juries would be informed about the postsentencing legal regime was given further credence in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320. The Court determined there that the prosecution and judge had improperly left the jury with the impression that a death sentence was not final because it would be extensively reviewed, with a plurality concluding that, Ramos notwithstanding, sentencing juries were never to be given information about postsentencing appellate proceedings, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR concluding that such information-if accurate-could be provided. In light of these cases, it would hardly have been unreasonable for a jurist in 1988 to conclude that his State had acted constitutionally by choosing not to advise its jurors as to events that would (or would not) follow their death sentence recommendation. Accordingly, Simmons announced a new rule that may not be applied here unless it falls within a Teague exception. Pp. 157-166. (c) Simmons' narrow right of rebuttal is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding under the second exception to Teague. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, distinguished. P. 167. 95 F. 3d 1214, affirmed. |