GINSBURG, J., dissenting not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners' Rule 60(b) motion. We have declared that lower courts lack authority to determine whether adherence to a judgment of this Court is inequitable. Those courts must "follow the [Supreme Court] case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions." Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989); see also ante, at 237-238. The District Court would have disobeyed the plain command of Shearson/ American Express had it granted petitioners' Rule 60(b) motion based upon a view that our more recent Establishment Clause decisions are in tension with Aguilar. Without the teaching of Shearson/American Express, Rule 60(b) might have been employed in a case of this kind. Before that firm instruction, lower courts sometimes inquired whether an earlier ruling of this Court had been eroded to the point that it was no longer good law. See, e. g., Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F. 2d 709, 714 (CA4 1967), aff'd, 391 U. S. 54 (1968); Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F. 2d 208, 217-218 (CA2 1942), aff'd, 317 U. S. 501 (1943); Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110, 1117 (ED La. 1973), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 421 U. S. 772 (1975) (per curiam); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 716-717 (MD Ala.), summarily aff'd, 352 U. S. 903 (1956). Shearson/American Express now controls, however, so the District Court and Court of Appeals in this case had no choice but to follow Aguilar. Of course, "[a] district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law," Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 405 (1990) (cited ante, at 238), but the District Court made no legal error in determining that Aguilar had not been overruled. And our appellate role here is limited to reviewing that determination. The Court says that the District Court was right to "entertai[n]" the Rule 60(b) motion and also right to reject it, GINSBURG, J., dissenting leaving to this Court the option of overruling our previously binding decision. See ante, at 238. The Court thus acknowledges that Rule 60(b)(5) had no office to perform in the District Court, given the no-competence instruction of Shearson/American Express. All the lower courts could do was pass the case up to us. The Court thus bends Rule 60(b) to a purpose-allowing an "anytime" rehearing in this case-unrelated to the governance of district court proceedings to which the Rule, as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is directed. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. In an effort to make today's use of Rule 60(b) appear palatable, the Court describes its decision not as a determination of whether Aguilar should be overruled, but as an exploration whether Aguilar already has been "so undermined . . that it is no longer good law." Ante, at 217-218; see also ante, at 222-235. But nothing can disguise the reality that, until today, Aguilar had not been overruled. Good or bad, it was in fact the law. Despite the problematic use of Rule 60(b), the Court "see[s] no reason to wait for a 'better vehicle."" Ante, at 239. There are such vehicles in motion, and the Court does not say otherwise. See, e. g., Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Secretary, U. S. Dept. of Ed., 942 F. Supp. 842 (EDNY 1996) (PEARL II); Helms v. Cody, 856 F. Supp. 1102 (ED La. 1994); cf. Brief for U. S. Secretary of Education 45 (noting that a school district other than New York City could bring an action against the Secretary to challenge an Aguilar-based Title I funding decision). The Helms case, which has been appealed to the Fifth Circuit, involves an Establishment Clause challenge to Louisiana's special education program. In PEARL II, the District Court upheld aspects of New York City's current Title I program that were challenged under the Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal in that case, but the parties later stipulated to withdraw the appeal, without prejudice to reinstatement, pending our decision in this case. GINSBURG, J., dissenting See Stipulation of Withdrawal of Appeal in Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Secretary, U. S. Dept. of Ed., No. 96-6329 (CA2) (filed Mar. 20, 1997). Unlike the majority, I find just cause to await the arrival of Helms, PEARL II, or perhaps another case in which our review appropriately may be sought, before deciding whether Aguilar should remain the law of the land. That cause lies in the maintenance of integrity in the interpretation of procedural rules, preservation of the responsive, non-agenda-setting character of this Court, and avoidance of invitations to reconsider old cases based on "speculat[ions] on chances from changes in [the Court's membership]." Illinois Central R. Co., 184 U. S., at 92. Syllabus IDAHO ET AL. v. COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 94-1474. Argued October 16, 1996-Decided June 23, 1997 Alleging ownership in the submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene and various of its navigable tributaries and effluents lying within the original boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation (the submerged lands), the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and various of its members (collectively, the Tribe) filed this federal-court action against the State of Idaho, various state agencies, and numerous state officials in their individual capacities. The Tribe sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment establishing its entitlement to the exclusive use and occupancy and the right to quiet enjoyment of the submerged lands, a declaration of the invalidity of all Idaho laws, customs, or usages purporting to regulate those lands, and a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from taking any action in violation of the Tribe's rights in the lands. The District Court dismissed the suit, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. As here relevant, the latter court agreed with the District Court that the Eleventh Amendment barred all claims against the State and its agencies, as well as the quiet title action against the officials. However, it found the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, applicable and allowed the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the officials to proceed insofar as they sought to preclude continuing violations of federal law. The court reasoned that those claims are based on Idaho's ongoing interference with the Tribe's alleged ownership rights, and found it conceivable that the Tribe could prove facts entitling it to relief on the claims. Held: The judgment is reversed in part, and the case is remanded. 42 F.3d 1244, reversed in part and remanded. JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and III, concluding that the Tribe's suit against the state officials may not proceed in federal court. Pp. 267-270, 281-288. (a) Because States enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits by Indian tribes, Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 782, the present suit is barred unless it falls within the exception this Court has recognized for certain suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers in their individual capacities, see, e. g., Ex parte Syllabus Young, supra. The Court does not question the continuing validity of the Young doctrine, but acknowledges that questions will arise as to its proper scope and application. In resolving these questions, the Court must ensure that the sovereign immunity doctrine remains meaningful, while also giving recognition to the need to prevent violations of federal law. In a suit commenced against such officials, even if they are named and served as individuals, the State itself will have a continuing interest in the litigation whenever state policies or procedures are at stake. See, e. g., Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 114, n. 25. Pp. 267-270. (b) The Tribe may not avoid the Eleventh Amendment bar and avail itself of the Young exception in this action. In support of Young's applicability, the Tribe alleges an ongoing violation of its property rights under federal law, seeks prospective injunctive relief, and attempts to rely on the plurality decision in Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670. The latter case is not helpful because the state officials there were acting beyond their state-conferred authority, id., at 696-697, a theory the Tribe does not even attempt to pursue in this case. Moreover, although a request for prospective relief from an allegedly ongoing federal-law violation is ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young fiction, this case is unusual in that the Tribe's suit is the functional equivalent of a quiet title action implicating special sovereignty interests. This is especially troubling when coupled with the farreaching and invasive relief the Tribe seeks, which would shift substantially all benefits of ownership and control of vast areas from the State to the Tribe, and thereby entail consequences going well beyond those typically present in a real property quiet title action. Furthermore, the requested relief would divest the State of its control over lands underlying navigable waters, which have historically been considered uniquely "sovereign lands," see, e. g., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U. S. 193, 195-198, title to which is conferred on the States by the Constitution itself, see Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U. S. 363, 374. Indeed, Idaho law views its interest in the submerged lands in such terms. Under these particular and special circumstances, the Young exception is inapplicable. The dignity and status of its statehood allows Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment immunity and to insist upon responding to these claims in its own courts, which are open to hear and determine the case. Pp. 281-288. KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and III, in which REHN |