agreeable to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive, and it is a general rule that they should have no retrospect. But there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and also of individuals, relate to times antecedent to their commencement, as statutes of oblivion or pardon. They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facts committed. Every law that is to have an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time, or to save from statutes of limitation, or to excuse acts which are unlawful and before committed, and the like, is retrospective. But such laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be."

§ 166. None of the instances cited by Judge Chase, with a single exception, come within our definition of the term retrospective laws, in the sense in which we use the term; and in the excepted instance, to wit: "Laws to commence at an antecedent time," the nature of the law thus referred to, is not stated. Acts of "oblivion" and "pardon," are not rules prescribing or ordaining what conduct shall be observed by the citizen as a rule to him; they only operate upon the government itself, and even as to it, as a rule of conduct, they are in effect prospective. The same may be said of acts, excusing acts which have been before unlawfully committed. The commandment given in such instances does not direct how the individual citizen who may have sinned shall in future conduct himself, or regulate his conduct, but how the government in its future action, shall regard and treat the sinner. Thus such acts, so far as the same are mandatory or directory, are purely prospective. It is true such statutes, as a future rule to be observed by the government in defining to what particular acts its action shall in that respect be confined, do by way of definition refer to past events, but it is only by way of

definition such reference is had. Statutes of limitation, as rules of conduct, may be placed on the same ground. They are directory to the judiciary, one department of the government, as to the rule it should observe in all future cases coming before it; hence, to it as a rule, they are in EFFECT prospective. The legislature enact that no action shall be maintained, unless commenced within a given time. That is purely a commandment to the judiciary, not to give a remedy. So long as that commandment stands, it is true, as to it, it is a rule; but it is one which is wholly prospective. It is only to be a rule for the judiciary, until that department of government whose right it is in this respect to ordain, shall see fit to revoke it, and when revoked it ceases to be a rule, even to that department upon which it was enjoined, and is only prospective in either event. Its operation as to those to whom the commandment as such is given, is not even RETROACTIVE. Such acts are not construed as extending to actions previously instituted. Although in the observance of this command as an effect proceeding from this cause, the citizens of the government may incur the loss of a particular remedy, which in its inception originated in a mere PERMISSION of government.

§ 167. The difficulty which has arisen in the minds. of many on this subject, and which has induced them to imbibe the idea, that statutes of limitation were retrospective laws, has originated in a misconception of the true nature and extent of the commandment in such acts contained, and to whom as a rule of conduct such acts are directed. Instead of viewing them as to the citizen merely as permissive, provided their conditions were on his part complied with, they have regarded them as mandatory to him, whereas in truth and in fact, they are merely mandatory as an imperative rule to the government, and to it, as such, prospective merely. It is in this way, and from this misconception, many have reared a

superstructure upon a false and baseless foundation, for the purpose of demolishing our position by arguments which are necessarily fallacious, and which lose their force the instant the foundations upon which they rest are consumed by the torch light of truth.

§ 168. Such statutes, it may also be claimed, do not create the remedy, but are simply restrictions upon that which before existed by mere tacit acquiescence on the part of the government, not resting on the foundation of any positive enactment; hence whenever the government deems it expedient to refuse further to yield its assent to such a remedy in future actions, such refusal does not in any respect interfere with any vested right; for a right to a REMEDY, when not expressly created by positive enactment, partakes rather of the nature of a right at will, subject to be terminated at any moment when the government shall see fit to change its mind in this respect; and which, when changed, only affects by way of definition, contracts antecedently made, when the same shall thereafter come up for adjudication by that department of the government to which such acts, in all future cases, are a law or commandment. They do not even then touch any essential element in the constitution of the contract itself, but leave all its vital principles unimpaired. To such a change of mind on the part of the government, before any absolute right becomes vested in the citizen, he may be deemed as having yielded an implied assent. There seems no principle essential for protection, that demands any inhibition of such acts. The people when they founded the government, only needed to secure rights of property and of person; that being done, they, in making provisions for a redress of grievances, saw fit to and have founded a compact or body politic, as the common arbiter between them, to whose decision as to the mode of redress, they must be deemed to have tacitly yielded their assent, subject to

this qualification only-that under a pretext of a remedy, the government should not give a death-going stroke to contracts between the parties, or vested rights of property, or to personal rights.

§ 169. If the view which we have presented is a correct one, then it seems to us, that instead of such statutes being, as they have by some been understood to be, infringements upon or exceptions to the rule, that the legislature should not pass retrospective laws, they are in no sense as a rule prospective; and are not either an encroachment upon the rule, nor are they in fact exceptions to it; but on the contrary, when properly understood, are in perfect harmony with the position, that laws ought not to be either retrospective in their enactment, nor retroactive in their effect. Hence, the fact that such laws have received judicial sanction, is not conclusive as an argument in favor of the position that the enactment of laws clearly retroactive is within the legitimate powers of the legislature.

§ 170. Is it asked what we have gained by establishing the point, that statutes of limitation are not exceptions to the rule, that retrospective laws cannot be passed by the legislature, as they are not, in any proper sense, to be regarded as prospective. We answer, that in almost every instance in which the right to pass such laws has been attempted to be vindicated, and this power in the legislature sustained, such statutes constitute the great chain of precedent, by which it is attempted to bind down the intellects of men to a forced concession of such power; nay more, they, and other statutes of the same nature and standing upon the same basis, constitute the only links in the chain of evidence, or arguments deduced on this subject. If we have successfully destroyed that chain of precedent-if we have shown that such statutes are not precedents in support of this right, or instances of the exercise of such power by the legislature,

then we have effectually annihilated the strongest fortress which the human intellect, and the most subtle sophistry, has as yet been able to rear in defence of the absurd position, that the legislature have a legitimate right to pass laws retrospective in their nature, and retroactive in their effects.

§ 171. A learned and eminent counsellor, as well as highly respected author, has, in our opinion, fallen into an error as to the real nature and effect of such acts of legislation, and thus been led to entertain an opinion opposite to the one we have expressed. He has endeavored to support it on the authority of such acts having been held valid acts of legislation. In view of various cases of this character, in which such acts have been sanctioned, he remarks: "From the preceding review of the opinion of eminent jurists, and of adjudged cases, it manifestly appears that there are by the law of all states many cases in which the sovereign power may enact laws which, theoretically speaking, are retrospective. And whence, it may be asked, does this arise? From the necessary imperfections in human society. If society were so perfect, as never to be in need of occasional remedial and equitable regulations, by means of retrospective laws, it would perhaps hardly need any laws. But, we shall be asked, perhaps, if there is no limitation to this power of enacting retrospective laws? Unquestionably there is, in all communities, by that tacit consent, which has been before mentioned; and to what particular such consent is given must be learned from the habits and principles of the particular people who compose any such community. When, therefore, it is once admitted, that there are certain limitations of the absolute rights of men, it becomes a mere question of expediency with the sovereign power of the state, to what extent such limitation shall be carried, subject only to this restriction, that the retrospective provisions of