ADMINISTRATOR. the diocese of C., was not parcel of page 247 AFFIDAVIT. AGENT. See DEED. contract by A. to let, and by B. to 3 D ALIEN. See HEIR. 2. A. a native of America, and B. a native of England, had dealings by 1. mutual consignments previous to 1812. In June, 1812, war was declared between the two countries, and on 24th December, 1814, preliminaries of peace were signed at Ghent. A cargo of goods consigned on account, by A. to B, arrived in England in November, 1814, and were sent by B., to France, and there sold, and he received bills for the amount, which he got discounted. Another cargo, so consigned, arrived in England in January, 1815, and was sold by B. before the 15th February. In March, 1815, B. became bankrupt, and was appointed by his assignees their agent to wind up his affairs; in the course of which employment he received the proceeds of the second cargo, and transmitted accounts to A., in which he admitted A. to be his creditor for a balance 30000 in respect of the proceeds of both cargoes. In an action by A. against the assignees of B. to recover such balances :-Held, that A. was entitled to prove under B.'s commission for the balances due to him upon the second cargo only. Ogden v. Peel, E. 7 G. 4. page 1. -X ALIMONY. See BARON AND FEME, 2. AMERICA, See ALIEN.-HEIR. ANNUITY. A joint obligor of a bond for the payment of an annuity, who has been discharged under the Insolvent Act, cannot be arrested on the bond for arrears of the annuity ac crued since his discharge. Collins v. Lightfoot, T. 7 G. 4. page 339 ARBITRATION. Where a cause was referred to arbitration by an order at Nisi Prius, and the arbitrator after a notice of revocation in writing, made an award directing a verdict to be entered for the defendant, the Court set the award aside, even assuming it to be a nullity. Doe d. Turnbull v. Brown, E. 7 G. 4. 100 A judge's order enlarging the time for an arbitrator to make his award, should shew on the face of it that the time was enlarged with the defendant's consent, before the latter can be attached for not performing the award; but it seems that the defendant's consent may be collected from other circumstances so as to cure the objection. 3. A cause, and all matters in differHalden v. Glasscock, E.7 G.4. 151 ence, between a plaintiff and two defendants, were referred by order of Nisi Prius to an arbitrator, with power to enlarge the time for making his award by indorsement on the order of reference; the costs to abide the event. The arbitrator did enlarge the time for making his avard, by indorsement on the order of reference, and awarded "that there is nothing due to the plaintiff." One of the defendants attended before the arbitrator. The Master taxed the costs of the cause and the reference in one sum, to that one defendant, who made the order of reference, with the arbitrator's indorsement thereon, a rule of Court, and demanded the costs from the plaintiff, who refused to pay them-Held, first, that the award determined the right of action between the parties, and was sufficiently final. Second, that the rule of Court was a sufficient foundation for an attachment for not performing the award, without an affidavit that the time was duly enlarged. And, third, that an attachment would not lie for the non-payment of the costs to the one defendant only. Semble, that the Master had not power to tax the costs separately to the several defendants. Dickins v. Smith, T. 7 G. 4. page 285 4. Improper conduct of an arbitrator in making his award, without allowing the defendant further reasonable time to bring forward and examine his witnesses, cannot be pleaded in bar to an action on the bond, conditioned for the performance of the award; though one of the terms of the submission is, that the arbitrator shall examine the "for value received" against the executor of the maker. No consideration was proved. The Judge directed the jury that the words "for value received," implied an existing legal consideration, and that affection for the payee, or friendship for his father, or a desire to avoid the legacy duty, would be sufficient:-Held, that neither of these was a sufficient consideration; and, that as the jury had been misdirected in that respect, a new trial must be had, though, without that direction, the jury might have presumed an existing legal consideration. Holliday v. Atkinson, E. 7 G. 4. ATTACHMENT. page 163 witnesses to be produced by the See Costs.-PRACTICE, 3, 4, 5, 6, parties, and though the whole of the time limited for the making of the award is occupied in the examination of the plaintiff's witnesses. Grazebrook v. Davis, T. 7 G. 4. 295 5. Where an award was published in the interval between the essoignday and the first day of full Trinity term-Held, that a motion might be made for setting it aside in the following Michaelmas term; the essoign being considered the first day of the term within the meaning of 9 & 10 W. 3, c. 15. In re Burt, T. 7 G. 4. 421 ARBITRATOR. See ARBITRATION. ARREST. See ANNUITY. ASSIGNOR AND ASSIGNEE. See LEASE, 3, 4. ASSUMPSIT. See AGREEMENT.-CARRIER, 2.EVIDENCE, 3.-LEASE, 4. Assumpsit by the payee, an infant. nine years old, of a promissory note 7, 8, 12. ATTORNEY. See AUTHORITY.-JUSTICES, 4. If an attorney's bill is reduced on tax- AUTHORITY. 1. An authority to an agent to execute an indenture under seal, must also be under scal. 2. The execution of an indenture by an attorney, must be in the name of the principal, in order to be binding upon the latter. 3. A deed inter partes can only be available between the parties thereto; therefore, where in covenant upon an indenture of lease, it appeared, that the landlord by writing not under seal, authorised his attorney to execute the lease for and on his (landlord's) behalf, and the attorney signed and sealed the 3D 2 J. Where a servant received on behalf of his master, in payment of goods sold, country bank notes at one o'clock on a Friday afternoon, and paid them to his master after banking hours on Saturday evening, and between three and four in the afternoon of Saturday the bank stopped payment:-Held, that the master was not guilty of laches in not presenting the notes before the bank stopped on the Saturday. James v. Holditch, E. 7 G. 4. 40 2. A customer drew upon his banker a check for 31., and paid it away. The amount of the check was altered by the holder to 2001., in such a manner that no one in the ordinary course of business could have observed it, and presented, and the 2001. paid by the banker: -Held, that the banker was liable to the customer for 1971., the difference between the amount of the genuine and the altered check. Hall v. Fuller, T. 7 G. 4. page 464 BANKRUPT. See ALIEN, 1.-BARON AND FEME, as petitioning creditors, to support | the commission. Gregory v. Hur. rill, T. 7 G. 4. page 270 BARON AND FEME. See EVIDENCE, 2. 1. A feme sole trader who kept a horse and chaise to visit her customers, before marriage, by deed conveyed to trustees "all her household furniture, goods, and chattels," (specified in a schedule in which the horse and chaise were not included), and "all her stock in trade, materials, and other articles, belonging to her, in and about her said business." After marriage she used the horse and chaise as before:-Held, that the horse and chaise passed to the trustees by the deed, and were not liable to be taken in execution for the debts of her husband. Dean v. Brown, E. 7 G. 4. 2. A husband is liable for necessaries supplied to his wife pending a suit between them in the ecclesiastical court, until alimony is assigned: nor does a decree, directing the alimony to be paid from a date preceding the time when the necessaries were supplied, remove his liability. Keegan v. Smith, E. 7 G. 4. 35 118 Where A. gave certain creditors a bond in the common form conditioned for the payment of a sum certain; and at the same time executed a deed of the same date, reciting the bond, and declaring that it should be lawful for the obligees to commence an action thereon, and proceed to judgment whenever they should think fit; and that upon judgment being obtained they should be at liberty, at their will and pleasure at any time, to sue out execution thereon; and that it was farther agreed, that any judgment obtained on the bond, should stand as a security for payment to the obligees on demand, of all such sums of money as then were or might thereafter to them become due from the obligor :-Held, 1. That this was a contrivance to defeat the provisions of the Warrant of Attorney Act, 3 G. 4, c. 39, and therefore void as against the other creditors of the obligor, who had become bankrupt;-And, 2. That the obligee having entered up judgment in pursuance of the deed, and taken out execution without assigning breaches, and executing a writ of inquiry, the case was within the provisions of the 8 and 9 Wm. 3, c. 11, s. 8; and the execution was set aside. Jennings, T. 7 G. 4. BOROUGH. Hurst v. page 424 TOP |