may be reëxamined in regular course on an appeal from the final decree.

The power of this court, under § 234 of the Judicial Code, to issue writs of prohibition to the District Courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty, to prevent an unlawful assumption or exercise of jurisdiction, is not debatable. But this power, like others, is to be exerted in accordance with principles which are well settled. In some instances, as where the absence of jurisdiction is plain, the writ goes as a matter of right. Ex parte Phenix Insurance Co., 118 U. S. 610, 626; Ex parte Indiana Transportation Co., 244 U. S. 456. In others, as where the existence or absence of jurisdiction is in doubt, the granting or refusal of the writ is discretionary. In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 485; In re New York & Porto Rico S. S. Co., 155 U. S. 523, 531; In re Alix, 166 U. S. 136. And see Ex parte Gordon, 104 U. S. 515, 518-519; The Charkieh, L. R. 8 Q. B. 197.

Here the most that can be said against the District Court's jurisdiction is that it is in doubt; and in other respects the situation is such that we deem it a proper exercise of discretion to refuse the writ. Nothing need be added to show that the request for a writ of mandamus is on no better footing. In re Morrison, 147 U. S. 14, 26; Ex parte Oklahoma, 220 U. S. 191, 209; Ex parte Roe, 234 U. S. 70.

Rule discharged and petition dismissed.

Opinion of the Court.

ST. LOUIS & SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

No. 117. Submitted December 9, 1920.—Decided January 17, 1921.

An order of a state public service commission requiring an interstate railroad to detour two of its through passenger trains from its main line over a branch for the benefit of a small city already adequately served by local, connecting trains, held, void as an undue burden on interstate commerce. P. 536.

277 Missouri, 264, reversed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. William F. Evans and Mr. Edward T. Miller for plaintiff in error.

Mr. James D. Lindsay for defendant in error. Mr. R. Perry Spencer was also on the brief.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff in error's main line extends from St. Louis to Memphis 305 miles. As originally constructed it turned sharply southeastward at Hayti, Missouri-220 miles from St. Louis-ran thence seven miles to Caruthersville, a city of four thousand people, thence southwestward nine miles to Grassy Bayou and thence south. A "cut-off" between Hayti and Grassy Bayou-six miles-became part of the main line in 1904 and thereafter through freight and night passenger trains passed that way. The through day passenger trains-Nos. 801 and 802-continued to

move along the old line until August, 1913, when they were routed over the "cut-off." At the same time two new daily passenger trains were put on and operated between Blytheville, Arkansas, and Cape Girardeau, Missouri, by way of Caruthersville.

The Missouri Public Service Commission directed the Railway Company to restore trains 801 and 802 to the route followed prior to 1913 and the State Supreme Court approved this action. We are asked to declare the order invalid because it unduly burdens interstate commerce. The point is well taken.

Fourteen local daily passenger trains move in and out of Caruthersville-seven each way. Some of these make close connections with all through trains at Hayti. These locals do not carry equipment of the highest class, but apparently they afford fair facilities for reaching and leaving Caruthersville without serious delay or great inconvenience. If deficient in schedule or equipment there is an easy remedy by means other than detours of the through trains.

The applicable general doctrine has been often considered and in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Wisconsin Railroad Commission, 237 U. S. 220, 226, this court said:

"In reviewing the decision we may start with certain principles as established: (1) It is competent for a State to require adequate local facilities, even to the stoppage of interstate trains or the re-arrangement of their schedules. (2) Such facilities existing-that is, the local conditions being adequately met-the obligation of the railroad is performed, and the stoppage of interstate trains becomes an improper and illegal interference with interstate commerce. (3) And this, whether the interference be directly by the legislature or by its command through the orders of an administrative body. (4) The fact of local facilities this court may determine, such fact being necessarily in

volved in the determination of the Federal question whether an order concerning an interstate train does or does not directly regulate interstate commerce, by imposing an arbitrary requirement. Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427; Lake Shore R. R. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; Atlantic Coast Line v. Nor. Car. Corp. Comm., 206 U. S. 1; Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262; Cleveland &c. Ry. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514; Mississippi R. R. Comm. v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 203 U. S. 335; Atlantic Coast Line v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328."

Considering the facts disclosed we think it plain that the fourteen local passenger trains meet the reasonable requirements of Caruthersville and that the Commission's order unduly burdens interstate commerce. Compliance with it would require the Railway to maintain sixteen more miles of track at the high standard essential for the through trains, and to move the latter ten miles further with consequent delay and inconveniences all along the line. The burden certainly would not be less serious than those which were condemned in some if not all of the causes above referred to.

The judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE PITNEY and MR. JUSTICE CLARKE dissent.

PERE MARQUETTE RAILWAY COMPANY v. J. F. FRENCH & COMPANY.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

MICHIGAN.

No. 105. Argued November 19, 1920.-Decided January 17, 1921.

1. Upon arrival of a carload of goods at destination, the carrier at the direction of the person in possession of the bill of lading turned over the car to another carrier for further carriage, the old waybill being retained with the names of the new carrier and new destination inserted in lieu of the old. Held, a delivery under the original consignment. P. 542.

2. Under the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, a carrier is justified in delivering the goods to the person in physical possession of the order bill of lading properly endorsed, unless it has information that such person is not lawfully entitled to them. P. 543.

3. A delivery to a person holding such a bill as the agent of another person is tantamount to a delivery to the latter if ratified by him. P. 544.

4. The exoneration of the carrier resulting under the act from a delivery in good faith to a person in possession of the bill of lading properly endorsed, is not defeated by failure of the carrier to take up the bill, if no loss is occasioned by such failure. P. 545.

5. Where a carrier delivered the goods to one who had without right acquired possession of the bill of lading apart from a draft originally attached by the shippers, held, that the shippers, upon buying back the bill and the draft with full knowledge of the facts did not become bona fide purchasers of the bill within §§ 10-12 of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, since the purpose of those sections is to give bills of lading the attributes of commercial paper, and they protect only purchasers who are entitled to assume that the goods have not been delivered and that they will not be except to a holder of the bill of lading. P. 545.

6. The Uniform Bills of Lading Act does not impose upon the carrier a specific duty to the shipper to take up the bill of lading. P. 546. 7. Noncompliance with a clause of a bill of lading requiring its surrender before delivery of the goods will not render the carrier liable to the shipper for conversion. when the delivery is to the holder of