only in the event of a new trial could an amendment of the answer be of any benefit to the defendant. The only question, then, here to be considered, is whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for a new trial.

A decision of this question depends very largely upon the issues made by the pleadings as to the second cause of action alleged in the complaint, which were litigated by the parties and settled by the verdict. Counsel do not agree as to such issues and the relation of the parties to each other. The allegations of the second cause of action are, briefly stated, to the effect that the parties hereto entered into a contract whereby they agreed that the plaintiff should deliver certain logs to the defendant to be sold by him for the plaintiff, the proceeds thereof to be paid to him, less all advancements of money and equipment for procuring, cutting, and delivering the logs, made by defendant to the plaintiff, and less one dollar for each thousand feet of logs sold by him for the plaintiff; that the plaintiff, pursuant to the contract, delivered to the defendant the logs, which he sold and received the full purchase price therefor; and, further, that the defendant had paid to the plaintiff only a portion of the money so received for him. Judgment was demanded for the balance unpaid. The answer denied the alleged agreement, and alleged, in effect, that the parties entered into a contract whereby the defendant purchased the logs which were delivered to him by the plaintiff at eight dollars per thousand feet, and that he had paid to the defendant the full purchase price for all logs delivered to him, less the amount of advances made by him to the plaintiff. On the trial the main issue related to the nature of the contract and the relation of the parties created by it. The verdict established that the contract was, as the plaintiff claimed, one of agency, and not of sale, as claimed by the defendant.

No claim is made that the alleged newly discovered evidence is relevant to the issue as to the terms of the contract and the relation of the parties, and in considering the merits of the defendant's motion for a new trial we assume, as we must, that the contract was one of agency, and that this action, in legal effect, is one by a principal against his agent for money received by him for his principal. The record herein and affidavits used on the motion strongly tend to show that the quantity of the logs delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff was based upon the deputy surveyor general's scale bills, which were delivered to the defendant, who believed them to be correct, and that the verdict in this case against him must have been based upon the quantity of the logs as shown by the scale bills; that he sold the logs in his own name, without disclosing his principal, to third parties upon the basis of the scale bills, and warranted them to be correct as to the quantity and quality of the logs; that he received from such purchasers the full amount of the purchase price for the logs as shown by the scale bills; that the purchasers of the logs, after they had paid for them in full, discovered, as they claim, that the defendant, in making the sale of the logs to them, was acting as the agent of the plaintiff, and that the scale bills were not correct, but that, by the fraud of the plaintiff and the deputy surveyor, such bills were padded and made to represent a much larger quantity of logs than in fact had been scaled and delivered to them, and thereupon they respectively brought actions against the plaintiff, as such undisclosed principal, to recover the damages sustained by reason of the alleged fraudulent and padded scale bills; that in such actions by the purchasers of the logs the defendant was duly garnished on account of the verdict against him in this action; and, further, that on motion of the defendant the district court stayed further proceedings in this action until the actions by the purchasers of the logs against the plaintiff and the defendant's liability as garnishee therein shall be determined. The alleged newly discovered evidence, which was the basis of the defendant's motion for a new trial of the issues in this action, relates solely to the alleged fraud of the plaintiff and the deputy surveyor in padding the scale bills. Not all of the facts which we have indicated are conceded by the defendant's counsel, but they are all supported by the weight of the evidence, as disclosed by the paper book and the complete return.

It is quite obvious from such facts that, as stated by the learned trial judge, the only right the defendant can in good conscience claim is that he be protected in paying the money received by him, which is now represented by the verdict against him, to the persons who may show themselves entitled to it, and that this right is conserved by the stay of proceedings in this action until the question is determined. This conclusion logically follows from the fact that the purchasers, with full knowledge of all the facts, have commenced actions for damages on account of the alleged padded scales, the correctness of which the defendant warranted, against the plaintiff, his undisclosed principal, to recover all the damages sustained by them by reason of the alleged fraudulent scales. If, then, it shall be determined in those actions that the scale bills were not padded, the plaintiff will be entitled to the full amount of his verdict in this action. If, however, it shall be determined that there was a fictitious scale, the purchasers will be entitled to recover the purchase price of the logs represented by such scale. In either event the defendant will be protected on his warranty of the scale bills. The order appealed from is right. Order affirmed.

Question for Jury.

Where such instructions have a vital bearing on the rights of litigants, and are the subject of dispute in testimony, their existence and import are for the jury.

Questions for Jury.

When the employee is at work in a dangerous or improper position which has no tendency in the ordinary course of nature and affairs to result in harm unless changed by the employer's act in putting a dangerous agency into motion, and when it is customary before so doing for the master to give warning so as to avoid injury, the questions whether the employer was actionably negligent in starting that agency into motion without the usual signal and whether the servant was guilty of contributory negligence are for the jury.

Customary Signals.

A servant, especially a minor, engrossed in work, has a right to rely on customary signals, and is not bound to anticipate negligence on the master's part in failing to give them.

Contributory Negligence.

There are two essential elements of contributory negligence, want of ordinary care and causal connection between the act and the injury complained of. When the act and the injury are not known, by common experience, to be actually and usually in sequence, and the injury does not, according to the ordinary course of events and affairs, follow from the act, then the act and the injury are not sufficiently connected to make the act the proximate cause of the injury.

Verdict not Excessive.

Plaintiff, a minor under sixteen years of age was engaged in splicing a broken strand of flax on a machine at rest. The jury found that the foreman started the machine in motion. There was evidence that the warning usual before starting it in motion was not given. Plaintiff's wrist was caught between a bed of revolving needles and a bar. The jury returned a verdict of $4,000. It is held that defendant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence were questions for the jury, that the foreman was not the fellow servant of the plaintiff in starting the machine, and that the verdict was not so excessive as to justify reversal or amendment.

Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $15,000 damages for personal injuries. The case was tried before Brill, J., and a jury which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $4,000. From an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.

Plaintiff and respondent was employed by defendant and appellant to assist in the operation of spinning flax. In the room in which she was at work were sixteen machines of different designs and make. The machine upon which respondent was injured was thirty feet long, four feet eight inches high, five feet wide, and consisted of some eight sections connected in an iron frame or bed. In the rear of the machines there was a row of buckets about three feet in depth. In each was a strand of flax. Each strand passed from the bucket over a roller in the rear of the machine which was about four feet above the floor. From this roller it passed over a steel plate, known as the "sliver bar" or "plate," and between two steel guides or conductors about an inch or two apart just beyond the sliver bar or plate. From these guides the strands passed down between the guides and a revolving shaft immediately in front of them, then under this shaft, and up between it and another iron roller, known as the "retaining roller," then over this retaining roller and down between it and a revolving shaft immediately in front of it, and then in front of this revolving shaft to a bed of needles, known as the "gill bars." The operation of the needles carried the strands to the front end of the gill bars, where they passed over a "boss roller" and under a roller known as a "drawing roller" which pressed the flax down onto the boss roller. From this boss roller they passed to the spindle. This side of the machine was called the front side. On each side of the machine there was a rod about five feet two inches above the floor. It was admitted that the rod on the front of the machine would either stop or start the machine. The rod on the rear of the machine could certainly be used to stop the machine, and for present purposes it may be assumed that it could also be used to start the machine. The rollers over which the strands of flax passed after leaving the buckets or cans were so placed as to aid in keeping the operator from the machine. Between the rollers and the sliver bar, and some inches forward from the rollers, was a steel guard or shield which came down toward the floor a distance of twelve or fourteen inches below the level of the sliver bar. This shut out entirely the working machinery from the operator at the back of the machine. The operation of all parts of the machine was essential to proper spinning. The flax could not be spun into twine by running it directly from