members were anxious to get Brant out of office, for what purpose it is unnecessary to inquire. Brant testified that they, who had power to fill a vacancy in the office of treasurer, threatened him with personal violence if he did not resign, charged him with embezzling the funds of the district, and intimated to him that his farm would be taken to cover his shortage if he did not give up the office. These threats and insinuations were offered at different times, but particularly at a meeting of the board called by those two members for the announced purpose of considering the matter of employing a teacher, and which Brant attended for that purpose. But, if Brant's testimony is to be believed, the real purpose of the meeting was to intimidate Brant and secure his resignation. Brant further testified that he was frightened by the threats against him and signed the resignation under the influence thereof, but did not intend to relinquish his right to the office. He is corroborated in this by his subsequent conduct in refusing to surrender the office and books and papers pertaining thereto to Booth, who was appointed treasurer immediately after the resignation was signed. All this testimony is contradicted by the other members of the board, who insist that the only reason they suggested the resignation of Brant was that in their opinion his bond was insufficient, and he had refused to execute a new one. We have read the evidence carefully and are impressed with the entire honesty of Brant, and are satisfied that, whether the other members so intended or not, he was intimidated and coerced into signing his resignation, and did so only to avoid what seemed to him impending harm. Such being the case, the resignation was at least voidable, and Brant's conduct in at all times since insisting on his right to remain in the office, and his refusal to turn over the books and papers to Booth, was a sufficient repudiation thereof. Our conclusion, therefore, is that Gilbert Wilkes is chairman, Charles L. Freer is clerk, and Charles Brant is treasurer of the school district in question, and that Ladeen should be ousted from the office of clerk. Let judgment be entered accordingly. STATE v. B. F. BUDWORTH.1 May 15, 1908. Nos. 15,587-(27) Indictment for Sale of Liquor. Under section 1519, et seq., R. L. 1905, it is sufficient to charge in an indictment that the offender sold intoxicating liquors in quantities less than five gallons. Evidence. The evidence was sufficient to establish the venue as stated in the indictment and to justify the verdict. Defendant was indicted in the district court for Norman county for selling intoxicating liquor without a license. The case was tried before Grindeland, J., and a jury which found the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment. From an order denying his motion to set aside the verdict and discharge the defendant, or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed. Peter Matson, for appellant. Edward T. Young, Attorney General, Geo. W. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, and M. A. Brattland, County Attorney, for the state. LEWIS, J. Appellant was indicted for selling intoxicating liquor to one S. S. Moen without a license "in a quantity less than five gallons." The indictment is sufficient, and states the facts necessary to constitute a public offense. Section 1519, R. L. 1905, declares that any person who sells intoxicating liquors in quantities less than five gallons without a license shall be guilty of misdemeanor. It is not necessary that the indictment contain a statement of the particular amount sold. Appellant was sufficiently notified that he was charged with violating the statute, and the state is not required to furnish the party charged with a more specific bill of particulars than in the words of the statute. Reported in 116 N. W. 486. 104 M.-17 The objection that the evidence does not fix the situs of the sale is without foundation. The particular place where Moen claims to have received the liquor was unquestionably within the village, county, and state set out in the indictment. Appellant denies that he made the sale. Moen, who claims to have received the liquor, testified that the arrangement for its purchase was made by him with appellant, and that it was left for him at a designated place. The fact that Moen was in the habit of using intoxicating liquor and secreting it in bottles may have had some bearing upon the identity of the bottle in question, but such evidence was by no means controlling, and the jury were justified in their verdict. Affirmed. GEORGE ERHARD v. MORITZ WAGNER.1 May 15, 1908. Nos. 15,589-(47). Marshes-Deepening Natural Outlet. The proper method for securing complete drainage for low and marshy lands, where the natural outlet is not sufficient to carry off accumulated surface waters, is to deepen the outlet, provided such method is practicable and reasonable. The doctrine of Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 436, should not be extended to apply to a case where wet lands may reasonably be drained by deepening the natural outlet. Changing Watershed. The mere fact that the outlet is not owned or controlled by the party whose lands are to be drained, and that such party will be benefited more than another will be damaged, does not justify him in cutting a ditch across a watershed, and thus delivering the waters into another watercourse, to the damage of property contiguous thereto. Evidence. Under the evidence in this case and the facts as found by the court, respondent was not justified in digging and maintaining the ditch in question for the purpose of draining his lands, and delivering the water across a divide into another watercourse, to the damage of respondent. 1 Reported in 116 N. W. 577. Action in the district court for Carver county to enjoin defendant from maintaining a certain drainage ditch and to recover $350 damages for injury to plaintiff's land. The case was tried before Morrison, J., who made findings and ordered that the action be dismissed upon its merits. From an order denying his motion for a new trial, plaintiff appealed. Reversed and new trial granted. Thos. F. Craven, for appellant. John J. Fahey and Brown, Albert & Guesmer, for respondent. LEWIS, J. Respondent was the owner of the west one half of the northeast quarter and the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section 28, township 116 north, of range 25 west. On the northerly portion of this tract of land was a natural marsh, consisting of about seventy acres. Respondent also owned the northwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section 27, which immediately joined his other land upon the east. On the forty located in section 27 there was a natural watershed of considerable width, the easterly side of which sloped toward appellant's land, which consisted of the east one half of the northwest quarter of section 27. This action was brought for the purpose of enjoining respondent from maintaining a sewer ditch running in a northeasterly direction from the marsh, across the dry land, and which discharged a large amount of water into a ravine on respondent's land, and finally reached and damaged appellant's meadow land. The court found that there was no natural drainage for the waters accumulating in the marsh upon respondent's land, except when the waters became excessively high, at which time the waters flowed in a southerly direction away from appellant's lands. The court also found "that plaintiff's lands aforesaid are separated from the defendant's said marsh and slough lands, and the other lands to the west and northwest thereof, by a natural watershed and wide expanse of high, hard land, which naturally forms, and has at all times naturally formed, a barrier and protection to plaintiff's said lands aforesaid from the waters which naturally accumulate in said marsh, slough, and low lands of the defendant aforesaid; that said watershed and wide expanse of hard land aforesaid is located in the westerly half of the northwest quarter of said section 27, and is own ed and occupied by said defendant; that the easterly side of said watershed forms a side hill, and slopes rapidly down to the westerly line of this plaintiff's said lands, and the westerly side of said watershed slopes off to the marsh and slough lands so owned by said defendant; and that said watershed and wide expanse of high, hard land as aforesaid extends in width about eighty rods and in length from the northern boundary line of said section 27 to the southerly boundary line thereof." The court also found that respondent constructed a ditch about eight hundred feet long across the dry land east of the marsh to a point on respondent's land about forty five rods from his easterly line; that this ditch was eleven and one half feet deep through the watershed, and by reason thereof respondent drained seventy acres of his slough lands through such net work of ditches and drain through such watershed to the hill slope at the point indicated, where the water ran down the hill upon the meadow land of appellant, causing damage to the extent of $75 in the years of 1904, 1905, and 1906. "That at the easterly end of said ditch, and on the side of said side hill or slope, there is a ravine in which said network of ditches and drain deposits the waters from said defendant's land and other lands adjacent thereto, through which ravine said water, when so deposited, runs down upon the said meadow lands of the plaintiff; that said ravine is the only accessible natural drain into which defendant could deposit said waters so accumulated upon his said lands; that said system of drainage so made and constructed by the defendant is the only practicable and feasible means by which his said lands can be drained with the least injury to his neighbor; and that while the plaintiff, during excessive rains and wet seasons, may suffer some damage by reason of said system of drainage so depositing water in said ravine that it flows upon his said meadow lands, the amount of benefits to the lands of defendant and other lands adjacent thereto far exceed the amount of injury sustained by the plaintiff, and the said plaintiff is not unreasonably and unnecessarily injured thereby." The petition was dismissed upon its merits, and it is necessary to consider whether the order of dismissal was justified by the evidence and the findings of fact. Reading the second and third findings together, in connection with the evidence bearing upon the subject, it |