sion as to the propriety of receiving evidence of this character on the grounds that it unnecessarily consumes time, serves to circulate petty neighborhood scandals, and brings the names of third persons into the dispute. But these objections have no great force, as the former applies to all cross-examination, and persons who circulate defamatory matter "in confidence" are not entitled to any special consideration. As well said by a learned writer, an effective mode of discrediting the impeaching witness is "to probe the grounds of the impeacher's knowledge as to the other's bad reputation, by requiring him to specify the particular rumors of misconduct, or statements of individuals, that have led him to assert the existence of the bad reputation. In theory, this rests upon the general principle that every witness may be discredited by exhibiting the inadequacy of his sources of knowledge. If a witness to another's bad reputation is speaking from a veritable knowledge of such a repute, he ought to be able to specify some of the rumored misconduct or some of the individual opinions that have gone to form that reputation. If he cannot do this, his assertions may be doubted." 2 Wigmore, Ev. § 1111. Similar language was used by Chief Justice Cooley in People v. Annis, 13 Mich. 517.

It has been held that the cross-examination should not be permitted to extend further than to require the witness to give the names of the persons who have made derogatory statements (People v. Mather, 4 Wend. [N. Y.] 239, 21 Am. Dec. 122; Bates v. Barber, 4 Cush. [Mass.] 107; Inhabitants of Phillips v. Inhabitants of Kingfield, 19 Me. 375, 36 Am. Dec. 760), although the reasons stated as justifying this rule seem to justify an even wider range of cross-examination. An examination of the following cases will show that the rule which requires the impeaching witness on cross-examination to give not only the names of parties but also their statements is very generally accepted: State v. Perkins, 66 N. C. 126; People v. Annis, 13 Mich. 511; Sonneborn v. Bernstein, 49 Ala. 168; Jackson v. State, 77 Ala. 18; Weeks v. Hull, 19 Conn. 377, 50 Am. Dec. 249; State v. Woodworth, 65 Iowa, 141, 21 N. W. 490; State v. Allen, 100 Iowa, 7, 69 N. W. 274; Hofacre v. City of Monticello, 128 Iowa, 239, 103 Ν. W. 488; Pickens v. State, 61 Miss. 563; State v. Howard, 9 N. H. 485; Newton v. Com., 102 S. W. 264, 31 Ky. L. 327. But, on the theory that it is evidently necessary to stop somewhere, it is generally held that the statement of the witness that he heard certain persons make such statements cannot be contradicted. Sonneborn v. Bernstein, 49 Ala. 172; McDermott v. State, 13 Oh. St. 332, 82 Am. Dec. 444; Robbins v. Spencer, 121 Ind. 596, 22 N. E. 660; Brower v. Ream, 15 Ind. App. 51, 42 N. E. 824; State v. Woodworth, 65 Iowa, 141, 21 N. W. 490; Hofacre v. City of Monticello, 128 Iowa, 239, 103 N. W. 488. Contra, Johnson v. State, 75 Ark. 434, 88 S. W. 905. 3. The respondent was permitted to testify that when he uttered the alleged slanderous language he did not intend to charge Mrs. Harms with the commission of any crime. The language was unambiguous and actionable per se (Reitan v. Goebel, 33 Minn. 151, 22 N. W. 291), and, under the rule announced in Davis v. Hamilton, 88 Minn. 64, 92 N. W. 512, the reception of the evidence was error.

The order of the trial court is therefore reversed, and a new trial granted.

Attachment.

THEO. ASCHER COMPANY v. AGNES LANYON.1

May 22, 1908.

Nos. 15,604-(132).

There being no clear preponderance of evidence against the finding of the trial court, the order vacating an attachment is affirmed.

In an action in the district court for St. Louis county defendant moved to vacate an attachment. From an order, Cant, J., vacating and dissolving the attachment, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

Ross & McKnight, for appellant.

J. W. Reynolds, for respondent.

ELLIOTT, J.

This is an appeal from an order vacating and dissolving an attachment. The only question is whether the trial court was justified in

coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not shown that the defendant had kept herself concealed within the state with intention to defraud and delay her creditors and to avoid the service of summons.

The matter was submitted on affidavits. It appeared that the defendant had been engaged in business in Virginia, Minnesota, and had become indebted to the plaintiff for goods purchased. About August 3, 1907, she wrote to the plaintiff at Chicago, stating that she was forced to give up her business and had stored her goods, and that she intended going to another town, but would pay her account as soon as possible. It appeared that she went to Duluth and was soon afterwards married. Hearing nothing from her, plaintiff wrote her several letters, and addressed them to her at Duluth in the name by which she had been known to it. The letters were never delivered. The plaintiff, through attorneys, then attempted to locate the defendant, but was unable to do so. It appears that they made every effort to find her, and under the circumstances were possibly justified in believing that she was keeping herself concealed. But that is not sufficient. There is nothing whatever in this record to show that Mrs. Lanyon kept herself concealed for the purpose of avoiding the service of summons, or that she did anything to mislead the plaintiff. She was living with her husband in Duluth, and, while she made no effort to find her creditor, it does not appear that she made any effort to prevent it from finding her.

The question determined by the trial court was one of fact, and under the rule stated in First Nat. Bank v. Randall, 38 Minn. 382, 37 N. W. 799, and numerous subsequent cases, the order must be, and is, affirmed.

STATE ex rel. FREDERICK KRON v. JOHN B. HODAPP.1

May 22, 1908.

Nos. 15,620—(94).

Mandamus-Duty of City Recorder.

In June, 1906, the city council of Mankato entered into a contract for the purchase of certain property for park purposes. The indebtedness thereby contracted, together with other outstanding obligations, exceeded the limit authorized by the city charter. Subsequent to the purchase of the property the city council created a fund of $3,500 for the payment of interest on the purchase price and the improvement of the property as a park. A tax was levied and assessed accordingly, and the same has been paid into the treasury of the city voluntarily and without objection by the taxpayers, and a considerable portion thereof is now on hand for the purposes for which it was raised. The city council thereafter, in May, 1907, by proper action ordered an instalment of interest paid. The city recorder refused to issue the order on the treasurer therefor on the ground that the contract for the purchase of the park was illegal and void, because the indebtedness thereby created exceeded the charter limit. In mandamus proceedings to compel him to issue the order it is held (1) that appellant's duties as city recorder were purely ministerial; (2) that as the money for the payment of the claim in question was voluntarily paid into the treasury by the taxpayers, and was on hand at the time the city council ordered the interest paid, the recorder is in no position to set up in defense of his refusal to issue the order the alleged illegality of the contract of purchase.

Alternative writ of mandamus from the district court for Blue Earth county directed to respondent requiring him to execute and deliver to relator an order on the treasurer of the city of Mankato for the sum of $241.20, or to show cause why he has not done so. The case was tried before Quinn, J., acting for the judge of the Sixth judicial district, who made findings and as conclusions of law found that relator is entitled to a peremptory writ as prayed. Affirmed.

W. R. & C. D. Geddes and Wm. F. Hughes, for appellant.
S. B. Wilson, for respondent.

BROWN, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the district court of Blue Earth county commanding and requiring appellant, the city recorder of the city of Mankato, to issue and sign a warrant or order on the treasurer of the city in payment of a claim which had been duly allowed by the city council. The facts are as follows: In June, 1906, at the solicitation of a number of the citizens of Mankato, the city council thereof entered into a contract for the purchase of a tract of land in the central part of the city to be devoted to park purposes. The purchase price agreed upon was $8,500, to be paid in annual instalments, with interest, of $500, and a general tax was levied to meet the payments as they became due. The first payment of $500 was raised by popular subscription, several citizens contributing the amount. Subsequent to the purchase a further special tax upon all the property of the city in the sum of $3,500 was levied and assessed for the purpose of improving the park property and to meet the payments of interest to accrue upon the purchase price. This tax has been paid by the taxpayers into the city treasury, and, so far as the record discloses, voluntarily and without protest, over $900 of which has been expended in the improvement of the property, and over $1,500 was on hand for the purpose for which it was levied and paid at the time of the trial. An instalment of interest became due, and a claim therefor was presented to the city council in May, 1907, the auditing board of the city, and duly allowed and ordered paid. Appellant is the city recorder, and it is his duty to draw and issue the proper order for all claims allowed by the council; but he refused to issue the order for the payment of this claim, on the ground that the contract for the purchase of the property was illegal and void, for the reason that the indebtedness thereby created exceeded the limit authorized by the city charter.

In view of the conclusion we have reached on one branch of the case, it becomes unnecessary to consider or determine the numerous questions raised by appellant.

If it be conceded that the contract for the purchase of the property was void for the reason urged by him, still we are clear that he is in no position to raise the question. The fact, as found by the trial court and already mentioned, that subsequent to the purchase of this property a fund was created by the city council to be devoted exclusively