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Lord De Grey and Ripon said it was not desirable that Her Majesty's Government should take any hasty action founded upon a single event, nor abandon too hastily a course adopted by Parliament after full discussion. Although the foundation of the forts at Spithead had been already contracted for and commenced, the Government had decided to suspend the works going on at these forts, and to refer the matter for re-consideration to the Defence Commission, which would then report on the subject. It must not be imagined that out of the money voted for commencing these works there would be any surplus for building iron vessels. The Government would, no doubt, when the Defence Commission had made their report, apply to Parliament for the necessary funds to carry out their suggestions, and would then state what course they proposed to take. He then proceeded to point out the exaggerated opinions which had been based upon the engagement between the Merrimac and the Monitor as to the invulnerability of ships and the inutility of forts. The recent experiments at Shoeburyness had sufficiently shown a steady average superiority of the gun over the iron plates. At the same time, it must be remembered there was a limit to the thickness of armour-plating for ships, while the power of artillery was capable of much greater development. He, therefore, thought it would be unwise entirely to suspend or abandon the erection of forts, especially as forts, in combination with floating defences, would be of the greatest value. He believed, however, that the result of the ex

periments would be to leave the relative qualities of ships and forts very much where they were previously.

The Duke of Cambridge agreed with Lord De Grey and Ripon that it was only by combined defences of forts and ships that Spithead could and ought to be defended, and that after the experiments at Shoeburyness we ought to continue the course of defence originally laid down, as those experiments had fully shown the power of guns of heavy calibre, when heavily charged with powder, to pierce the thickest iron plates. He thought Her Majesty's Government had acted wisely in not giving up the original plan, but in pausing for further consideration. He hoped, however, the pause would not be a prolonged

one.

Lord Ellenborough hoped the forts at Spithead would be proceeded with at once, as they would not cost more than three iron ships, would carry some 300 guns, and be a permanent defence. The result of experiments had established the fact that ships' sides, however plated, could be perforated, and though it might be possible to strengthen a ship's sides, such strengthening was limited, while the power of artillery would more than keep pace with improved plating. In conclusion, he urged the necessity of redoubling our efforts to increase our iron fleet and to place the country in a better state of defence.

The Duke of Somerset said that there were two great objects to be attained-the defence of the country against attacks from abroad, and from panics at home. He repelled the charge of Lord Ellenborough, that the Govern

ment were not moving sufficiently fast in building iron ships, by recounting the steps that had been already taken for that purpose. He also stated that he had given orders that one plated ship, at least, a-year should be built in each of our dockyards, and had done all in his power to further the construction of these vessels. Somewhat later in the Session the same questions as to the relative efficiency of iron-clad vessels and of fortifications were raised in the House of Commons. Sir Frederick Smith called attention to the engagement between the Merrimac and the Monitor, giving a detailed account of that action, and asked whether it would not, in the opinion of the Government, be prudent to suspend the construction of some of the proposed forts at Spithead, until the value of such ironroofed gun-boats for the defence of our ports and roadsteads had been fully considered.

Mr. Laird expressed hopes that the result of the late engagement would turn the attention of the Government seriously to this subject. Until our ships were built of iron it would not, he thought, be possible to reduce materially the expenditure in our dockyards.

Mr. Gregory believed that the money expended upon the fortresses would be worse than wasted, and called upon the Government to look the matter in the face; to be prepared for an entirely new state of things, that would revolutionize our navy, and to divert the expenditure intended for useless fortifications to the construction of iron Monitors.

Sir J. Hay said his opinion, as to the necessity of the forts at

Spithead, had changed. He now thought it would be better to spend the money on vessels of the new construction, moveable forts being more available than fixed fortifications.

After some further discussion, Sir G. Lewis observed that two questions had been raised in this discussion,-one, as to the expediency of stopping the construction of the forts at Spithead; the other, whether we should alter the whole character of our naval defences. Upon the latter question he warned the House against entering upon so large a discussion at present; the practical result of the suggested revolutionary change in our naval defences might be a supplementary Estimate of 10,000,000l. or 15,000,000l. With regard to the first question, it was identical with that brought before the Defence Commission, which, in a careful Report, expressed an opinion that the best plan of defence was a combined system of forts and iron-cased vessels. Had any addition been made to our knowledge which should alter that conclusion? Not speaking on his own authority, but from information he had received, he was led to think that the engagement between the American vessels threw little light upon the qualities of iron-cased ships. He expected, however, that the ingenuity of engineers would be stimulated to invent machines that would smash such ships attacking our coasts, and he hoped they would soon be able to attain that result.

Mr. Bright said the speech of Sir G. Lewis was not very satisfactory; he had said nothing to the propositions of Sir F. Smith.

However important the occur rence in America, it would be an unfortunate thing if it led to a naval reconstruction. There was a certain amount of proof that batteries would be of no use to prevent iron-cased vessels like the Monitor from entering Portsmouth harbour, and the question was whether it was right to spend more money upon fortifications that might be useless. He agreed that nothing appeared to have been concluded; but the probability was that something was concluded, and surely the Chancellor of the Exchequer might be appealed to not to commit the country further to the expenditure of millions.

Captain Jervis expressed a hope that the Government would reconsider the question of constructing the forts. Sir John Pakington also regretted that they intended to persist in that measure. He hoped they would at least pause before they carried it into effect.

Mr. Bentinck and Mr. Coningham likewise declared themselves opposed to proceeding with the forts.

Mr. Osborne called upon the Government to suspend works which would be not only expensive, but might prove unnecessary. The House should insist upon their not spending another shilling upon the forts until we were in a condition to know they would be able to hold their own against the new monsters of the deep.

Lord C. Paget observed that all Sir G. Lewis had said was that nothing decisive was known as to the merits of iron-cased vessels sufficient to set aside what had been determined upon

after the maturest consideration. The engagement on the other side of the Atlantic had demonstrated only what had been known before. As compared with ships, forts must be the strongest.

The discussion here terminated for the present. The policy of constructing the fortifications in question was, however, more fully canvassed and vigorously contested on a subsequent occasion, when the Government came to propose to the House of Commons the mode of raising the necessary supplies for constructing the works. This duty devolved on Sir George Lewis, as Secretary of State for War, who, on the 23rd of June, moved in a Committee of the whole House the following Resolution :

"That, towards providing a further sum for defraying the expenses of the construction of works for the defence of the Royal dockyards and arsenals, and of the ports of Dover and Portland, and for the creation of a central arsenal, a sum not exceeding 1,200,000l. be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, and that the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury be authorized and empowered to raise the said sum by annuities, for a term not exceeding 30 years; and that such annuities shall be charged upon and be payable out of the said Consolidated Fund."

Sir G. Lewis began his argument in support of the Resolution by remarks upon the general policy of defensive works, which were not merely of the nature of insurance, but had, he observed, a tendency to prevent the evil to be provided against, like an internal police. There were other

circumstances to be borne in mind, with reference to provisions for the defence of the country, which would explain the increase of our military expenditure, and he had come to the conclusion that it would be impossible to maintain the general efficiency of the War Department without maintaining the existing expenditure, or to increase its efficiency without increased expenditure, efficiency being only another word for increase of expense. He then compared the military expenditure in 1858-59 with that of the present year, the amount of the former being 12,677,000l., and that of the latter 14,573,000, subject to a reduction for stores and volunteers, which made the real excess for the present year 1,255,000l., which, although large, was less than some supposed. The number of men voted in 1858-59 (rank and file), was 113,974, and the number in the present year 124,795, an increase of 10,821. He then stated the number of rifles which had been manufactured, and the number in store at home and abroad, and that of Armstrong guns of all sizes, and after these preliminary observations proceeded to explain the nature and the estimated cost of the proposed fortifications. If the works were completed upon the largest plan, the total cost, he said, would be 6,700,000l.; but, with respect to the Spithead forts, those works had been suspended, and the Government had thought it the most prudent course in present circumstances not to proceed with them in the present year, but to postpone their decision until the subject had

received additional light. They would, therefore, not resume the practical consideration of the question till next June, when they would communicate their decision to the House, and afford it an opportunity of expressing an opinion upon the subject. In conclusion, he expressed a hope that the Committee would not alter the decision of the last year.

Mr. Osborne expressed surprise at the version given by Sir G. Lewis of the word "efficiency "-that it meant a draught upon the Treasury; this was not, he said, his translation of the word. He thought this was a proper time to consider the whole plan of these national defences, which had, in an evil hour, been brought before the House. The sum originally estimated for those defences was 11,500,000l., and the House had been told by the First Minister, in a hobgoblin speech, that money for these defences must be voted at once; that they were necessary for the immediate safety of the country; and he had suggested 9,000,0007., while the then Secretary for War (Lord Herbert) asked for only 5,000,000l. The House resisted; but it had voted 2,000,000l., and it was now asked for 1,200,0007. more. After making a critical examination of the results of the experiments at Shoeburyness, and of the conclusions drawn by the Defence Commissioners and the Government, and urging the superfluity of forts for the protection of dockyards, since ships would never attack forts, but would shell the yards at a distance, he called attention to the position of the country as to naval artillery,

observing that we had no naval gun for close quarters at the present moment but the old 68pounder. He examined the evidence taken by the Commissioners on the subject of the Armstrong guns, including that of Sir W. Armstrong himself, who confessed that he had had no experience of their effect beyond 200 yards. He insisted that the House had yet no approximate estimate of the cost of the forts, which would come to something like 20,000,0007., and asked whether it would sanction such a profligate expenditure of money. Then, by the original plan, the forts were to be of granite; now they were to be of iron. As to the land defences, under the new conditions of war, while we had the command of the Channel, the landing of a military force upon our shores was an impossibility, and to garrison these forts would require 95,000 men. He alleged specific objections to some of the fortifications, particularly to those at Dover, contending that, so far from those forts being national defences, they would be national robberies of the public purse. He moved, as an amendment to the Resolution, that, "considering the changes and improvements now in progress affecting the science of attack and defence, it is not at present expedient to proceed with the construction of the proposed forts on the shoals at Spithead, or the additional defences at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Dover, recommended by the Commissioners appointed to consider the defences of the United Kingdom; and that, in any general system of national defence, the

navy should be regarded as the arm on which the country must mainly depend.”

Sir G. Lewis, in reply to Mr. Osborne, invited the attention of the House to the precise practical effect of the Resolution and that of the amendment, which he considered the worst of the several courses which might have been adopted by the Government. He cited opinions of eminent authorities to show that Mr. Osborne had greatly overestimated the number of men necessary to garrison the forts. Sir F. Smith supported the amendment, and urged the Government to stop all the works they could. If we had a sufficient fleet, as we ought to have, why, he asked, should we crouch behind walls? He would stop all useless works, and proceed only with those in a forward state, and which it would be discreditable to stop. To keep down our fleet and to increase our army in order to man fortifications was a bad policy.

Mr. H. A. Bruce agreed with Sir G. Lewis that the course for the Government to take in this matter was to obtain the best advice, and to act upon it, for the protection of our naval arsenals. They had appointed a Commission of competent men, whose Report had been adopted by the Government, and their proposition, founded upon it, was assented to by the House, and it would be unworthy of it to recede from its opinion. If there was a temporary superiority on the part of the French navy, it was impossible to say what might happen; and he wished to see a permanent system of defence in this country, which, if invaded,

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