Bill. When the peers saw that such a creation would take place, they yielded and passed the bill, rather than have an accession to their ranks from the plebeian orders.

The lord high chancellor is the presiding officer of the House of Lords. He is a cabinet officer, and holds office during the continuance of the administration of which he is a member. He is said to occupy the woolsack. The richly wrought cushion on which he is seated when presiding over the House is filled in with wool, a symbolical allusion to the manufacturing interest of the kingdom. The chancellor is always a peer of the realm, and, as such, a member of the House.

Art. 1, § 3, 6. "The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the chief justice shall preside, and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.

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By this provision of the Constitution, the Senate is clothed with judicial power for a certain purpose. An impeachment, as has been stated, is a written accusation against persons in office, for the purpose of bring. ing them to trial for misconduct. By the Constitution, the House of Representatives must bring the accusation, that is, present articles of impeachment, and the Senate must try the case and give judgment.

If a public officer, say a judge of the Supreme Court, is guilty or is supposed to be guilty of bribery, a motion is made in the House of Representatives to impeach him. Witnesses are called, and if the house think there is ground to authorize a trial, they prepare and send to the Senate articles of impeachment. The Senate, while trying the judge thus impeached, sit as a court of justice, and take a solemn oath to try the case faithfully, and a vote of two-thirds is necessary to conviction.

If the President of the United States is impeached, and found guilty and removed from office, the VicePresident succeeds to his place. The Vice-President should, therefore, not take part in the trial. The chief justice, as the highest judicial officer of the country, is the proper person to preside on so important an occasion, especially as he can have no personal interest in the issue of the trial.

As the offences for which men are commonly impeached are official misdemeanors, the Senate can, with greater propriety, try the offender than a court of justice. The courts of justice are accustomed to examine and decide questions of law.

If a judge of the Supreme Court were impeached, t would not be desirable that he should be tried by his associates in office.

The provisions of the Constitution relative to impeachment, are borrowed from the English Constitu

tion. By the English Constitution, the power of im peachment is vested in the House of Commons, and that of trying the impeached, in the House of Lords. In the House of Lords conviction or acquittal is by a mere majority.

Art. 1, § 3, 7. "Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law."

The Constitution thus provides that no person can be put to death except by indictment, trial, and judginent according to law. In prohibiting a legislative body from inflicting the penalty of death, our fathers were in advance of the legislation of the world. The House of Lords, in addition to removal and disqualification, may inflict banishment, forfeiture of goods, imprisonment, and death. This provision of the Constitution prevents unprincipled partisans from destroying those who may be opposed to them, and stand in the way of their wicked schemes. History shows that men have often been the victims of party hate.

A person impeached and condemned for a crime punishable by law, can also be indicted, tried by a court of justice, and punished. Suppose the President of the United States should be guilty of murder.

He would doubtless be impeached and removed from office. The Senate could not condemn him to death as a murderer. But he could be indicted for murder by a grand jury, and tried, and if found guilty of murder, executed.

Art. 1, § 4, 1. "The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof: but Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators."

The propriety of this provision rests upon "this plain proposition, that every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation." If a State executive and legislature should become disloyal and neglect to make provision for the election of representatives to Congress, Congress has power to make the necessary regulations. The exception with respect "to the place of choosing senators" was added because it was not thought becoming in Congress to prescribe the place where the legislature should meet.

Art. 1, § 4, 2. "The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day."

The disuse of Parliaments for many years under the Stuarts, and the tyranny consequent thereon, caused

the English people to insist on annual Parliaments. The Colonial Legislatures were accustomed to meet annually, and the provision requiring Congress to meet annually was adopted as a matter of course. It furnishes a check to executive and other official corruption, and prevents the country from suffering from the lack of legislation relative to events which may have taken place during the recess of Congress.

Art. 1, § 5, 1. "Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members in such manner, and under such penalties, as each house may provide."

This is necessary to the independence of each house. If some other department of government had the power of determining who are entitled to seats, the character of the house might depend upon that department. Suppose that department to be strongly partisan. Partisan claimants only would be admitted

to seats.

A similar provision exists in the English Parliament, and has been adopted by all constitutional gov.

ernments.

If less than a majority could enact laws, and wield the power of the house, a small number of intriguing