Mr. CONYERS. I think you are quite correct in your view that a reckless or a negligent standard would probably reach out and affect more in the corporate sector than actual knowledge. We have a problem of whether there are a sufficient number of members on the committee and in the Congress who would be supportive of that expansion of liability. However, it is being explored, and that theory will be given continuing, careful, consideration. Once again, we thank you both for joining us here today. I express on behalf of the subcommittee our appreciation to your organization for all the work that they have done in following and preparing for this testimony. Thank you very much. The subcommittee will now stand adjourned. [Whereupon at 1:02 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] Testimony was presented before your Subcommittee on 14 In the interest of accuracy, I am writing to set the ALLEGATION: St. Joe "withheld from the employees FACT: Prior to the November 1978 promulgation of 69-943 0 81 45 employee's private physician. Since promulgation of OSHA's lead regulations, it has been St. Joe's policy, as required by those regulations, to give each employee a written report setting forth the result of his blood lead determination. ALLEGATION: When St. Joe employees "went to a private doctor, the company would challenge the results of such diagnoses and thereby delay any Workmen's Compensation claim for several months." FACT: To the best of our knowledge, that is completely untrue. ALLEGATION: "The company doctor used a chelation drug to reduce lead levels in employees' blood ... The use of these injections was commonplace to reduce levels to so-called safe levels or to prevent elevation of lead levels." FACT: Contrary to the assertion of Mr. Sweeney, chelation has never been practiced at St. Joe as a routine, prophylactic measure. In the years prior to 1976, when chelation was widely regarded as an acceptable medical practice, the physician retained by the company personally administered chelation therapy when, in his medical judgment, such treatment was necessary. In mid-1976, chelation therapy temporarily was suspended pending review of new medical studies which indicated that this therapy had possibly adverse side effects. Since August of 1977 no employee of St. Joe, to our knowledge, has received chelation therapy of any sort (oral or intravenous). ALLEGATION: St. Joe did not tell its employees "the facts that: FACT: 1) They were being exposed to excessive levels For many years St. Joe monitored levels of lead in air throughout its Herculaneum plant using a network of low volume stationary samplers. Results from these samplers were used primarily to identify areas where engineering controls would be required or to monitor performance of installed control facilities. Sampling results were not reported to employees as these numbers would have been meaningless in terms of an individual employee's air lead exposure. Since promulgation of the OSHA lead standard, St. Joe has been monitoring individually each of its employee's air lead exposure by using personal exposure monitoring equip- ALLEGATION: St. Joe did not tell its employees "the facts that: FACT: 2) This exposure was harmful to their health St. Joe has always counseled its employees that they are exposed to a potentially toxic substance and that such exposure could have serious adverse health effects. ALLEGATION: St. Joe did not tell its employees "the facts that: FACT: 3) The exact nature of the treatment the workers St. Joe did inform employees when chelation drugs were being used. As mentioned earlier, physicians retained by St. Joe administered chelation drugs in the belief that they were safe. Acting on information which suggested the possibility of adverse side effects, chelation was discontinued in August, 1977. Supporters of Corporate Criminal Liability Legislation (HR 7040) have on a number of occasions suggested that The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company's actions with respect to the Firestone 500 tire represented an example of the kind of business conduct that should be proscribed by legislative action. It has been alleged that Firestone's management had reason to believe that Firestone 500 tire failures would cause an unreasonable number of automobile accidents and accident-related injuries, but that Firestone's management nonetheless failed to act effectively to protect the public. Firestone's management at no time considered the Firestone tire to constitute a safety hazard. Firestone agreed to a negotiated recall of the tire with NHTSA, in addition to continuing consumer satisfaction efforts under its warranty and adjustment programs, because of the intensity of the adverse publicity associated with controversies over the tire. While Firestone's management has long been persuaded and has long maintained that the 500 tire was not unsafe, it is now able to demonstrate that cars equipped with the Firestone 500 tire were significantly less likely to have been involved in accidents than were identical vehicles equipped with other manufacturers' steel belted radial tires. In a paper titled "An Engineering Safety Analysis of the Steel Belted Radial Tire" delivered February 25, 1980, at a meeting of the Society of Automotive Engineers, Dr. Roger McCarthy, quoting from a study conducted by Dr. B. J. Campbell, concluded that: "In sum, while original equipment manufacturers' tires |