HOWEVER, amongst this Variety of Names, differing in Extent and Etymology, the No

tion

Object of that folemn Appellation, and Adoration, a legal Oath. The Hutchinfonian Divines in England, if I am not mistaken, derive the Name from this Root for another Reason, and think it to refer, efpecially when in the plural Number, to the Perfons of the Trinity, as though it were thereby understood, that they were fworn to redeem Mankind.

a or ALLAH, the Arabick Name of GoD, ufed by the Mohammedans, is of the fame Original. For there is likewise in that Language, which anfwers And from the fame Theme

Adoration. And even the Verb a juvit (he hath helped or defended; which Attributes, faith Golius, especially belong to GoD) feems not to be the Root of this Name, but a Derivative from it, by reason of these being Properties in ALLAH or the DEITY. Schultens, in his Clavis Dialectorum, fuppofes A to be the fame with and the more em

phatical Form

X.

to be the fame with but then he derives it from a coluit, adoravit. If it be fo, this Arabick Name of GOD, and the correfpondent Hebrew, will fignify the Adorable, according to him, from an obfolete Radix which had Mappik in the laft Confonant. His Remark upon this is certainly very judicious. The Reader has his Choice of these Derivations: If they are various, he will thereby fee the Names of GoD ftill farther multiplied in the Oriental Languages. OEOZ, the Greek Name, reprefenteth only God's Providence and Circumfpection.

DEUS, the Roman or Latin Name, is no other than the Greek Name in Roman Letters; and therefore of the fame Meaning originally. This Word is retained, with fome Alteration, in all the Languages of Europe, where the Romans were Conquerors,

and

tion of a Deity seems in * general to be nearly this: That there is one Being, the Cause of all, and Supreme over all, eternal in Duration, who preferves and governs the Universe.

If this be the general Notion of a Deity, the Perfon, who undertakes to prove the Being of a GOD, is to prove at least thus much.

To proceed then, there is, in the first Place, ONE BEING, THE CAUSE OF ALL, AND SUPREME OVER ALL, &c.

and introduced their Language. For hence come
DIOS, DIEU, Duw, &c.

But the English, who, at the Time of the Roman
Conquefts, were Inhabitants of LOWER SAXONY,
and, like the other Germans, repulfed the Roman
Arms, nor ever received their Language, have a
Word of their own Original, the German Name of
BOD.

GDD. By which they fixed upon the most amiable Attribute in the Deity, his Goodness, God being the fame as Gode, or Good. It is eafy to collect, from these Obfervations, that there is not any Name of GOD, in any Language, fufficiently expreffive of what we conceive, when we think of the divine Nature; and therefore it was, that the Author, in fpeaking upon this interefting Subject, makes ufe of the fhort Definition above, to help out the Defect of any fingle Word.

+ Sunt autem alii Philofophi, & hi quidem nobiles, qui Deorum mente atque Ratione omnem Mundum adminiftrari, & regi cenfeant: neque vero id folum, fed etiam ab iifdem vitæ Hominum confuli & provideri.

de Nat. Deor. l. I.

EVERY thing in the vifible Creation (from the Observation of which we must begin our Reasonings upon this Subject) confeffeth that it did not make itself, and acknowledgeth something elfe for its Author. If we regard the feemingly immediate Caufes of Things, fuch as are of the fame Species with the Thing produced, they ftill refer us to a Superior, as being fupported in their Caufation by fomething above themselves, and affifted by the Concurrence of Joint-Causes, which they have not at their own Command. There is not any Individual, of any Kind, or Species, throughout the vifible Creation, that can be faid to generate of itself another Individual of the fame Species. For Inftance; Man cannot be faid of his own Power to generate Man, or a Tree a Tree, or a Particle of Matter another Particle of Matter; because there are more Things neceffary to the Generation of these, than is in the Power of any of them. As to Things of the invifible World, this is to be obferved of them; either that they bear a Refemblance in the Manner of their being produced to Things here in the vifible and terrestrial World, or they do not; that is, they were either framed immediately by fome Being distinct from, and fuperior to themselves, or by a Concurrence of Causes, of which he was

the

the Author and Director; or elfe they must be faid to have made themselves. And if fo, then Proof of this must be given, and the Manner of it demonftrated, before fuch an Opinion can be received. But, if this cannot be done, then the feveral Hierarchies of Angels and Spirits of the invisible World, must either be left out of the Question, or the same must be concluded of them, as of Things which we fee on Earth; namely, that there is not any Individual, of any Kind or Species among them, that is able to produce of itself another Individual of the fame Species. And then we may reafon thus: That fince it is not in the Power of Individuals, of any Kind throughout the Univerfe, purely of themselves to generate others for the Support of their Kind, it follows, that all Kinds of Beings derive their Existence from something diftinct from themfelves ; which Thing, because it is diftinct from all Kinds, can be of no Kind. There is

And far

one Being therefore, the Caufe of all. ther, because it is the Cause of all, it must be Superior to all. But one Being, fuperior to all Kinds of Beings, is one Supreme Being. There is therefore one Being, the Caufe of all, and Supreme over all,

ETERNAL IN DURATION.

If he were ever produced, he was produced by fomething diftinct from himself: For every Production being an Effect, fuppofeth some outward Caufe; but every Being, of every Kind, that is diftinct from the Supreme Being, is inferior to him, and supported by him, and confequently could not produce him. The Supreme BEING therefore was never † produced. But what was never produced, and yet is, it is evident hath always been. The Supreme Being therefore hath exifted from all Eternity, and ever will exift. For the Reason why any thing decays, is because it has not in itself a Principle of Existence, but depends upon another Thing for its Support; which Support being withdrawn, the Thing fupported falls of courfe. But the Supreme Being, as he was never produced by any other Being, or fupported by it, has in himself a Principle of Exiftence, and confequently can be fubject to no Decay; but as he never could be produced, fo can he never be destroyed.

THE SAME PRSERVES THE UNIVERSE.

Αι των Θεῶν ἐσίαι, ἐδὲ ἐγένοντο τὰ γαρ ἀεὶ ὄντα ἐδέποτε γίνονται. · ἀεὶ δεεἰσιν, ὅσα δυναμίν τε ἔχει τὴν πρώτην, καὶ πάσχειν ἐδὲν πέφυκεν. SALLUST. Philofoph. de Diis & Mund. cap. 2.

FROM