been vested in a general government, that government had been found inefficient, and incapable of resisting the great power that had been reserved to the respective States, and was constantly exerted by them. The difficulty was, that the constituent parties to the federal union were themselves political governments and sovereigns; the people of the States had no direct representation, and no direct suffrage, in the general legislature; and as in a republican government the representation and the suffrage must determine its character, it became obvious that, in order to establish a national government that would embrace the political rights and interests of the people inhabiting the States, the basis of representation and the rule of suffrage must be changed.

It being assumed that the new government was to be divided into the three departments of the legislative, executive, and judiciary, several questions at once presented themselves with regard to the constitution of the national legislature. Was it to consist of one or of two houses? and if the latter, what was to be the representation and the rule of suffrage in each?

The resolutions of Governor Randolph raised the question as to the rule of suffrage, before the committee had determined on the division of the legislative power into two branches. One of his propositions was, "That the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem

best in different cases." This was no sooner propounded, than a difficulty was suggested by the deputies of the State of Delaware, which threatened to impede the whole action of the Convention. They declared that they felt restrained by their commissions from assenting to any change of the rule of suffrage, and announced their determination to retire from the Convention if such a change were adopted. The firmness and address of Madison and Gouverneur Morris surmounted this obstacle. They declared that the proposed change was absolutely essential to the formation of a national government; but they consented to postpone the question, having ascertained that it would finally be carried.'

The committee thereupon immediately determined that the national legislature should consist of two branches, and proceeded to consider the mode of representation and suffrage in both. As the discussions proceeded, the members became divided into two parties upon the general subject; the one was for a popular basis and a proportionate representation in both branches; the other was in favor of an equal representation by States in both. The first issue between them was made upon the House, or what was termed the first branch of the legislature. On the one side it was urged, that to give the election of this branch to the people of the States would make the new government too democratic ;

1 Madison, Elliot, V. 134, 135. 2 Ibid. 135. The vote of Pennsylvania, in compliance with the

wishes of Dr. Franklin, was given for a single house.

that the people were unsafe depositaries of such a power, not because they wanted virtue, but because they were liable to be misled; and that the State legislatures would be more likely to appoint suitable persons. On the other hand, it was admitted. that an election of the more numerous branch of the national legislature by the people would introduce a true democratic principle into the government, and this, it was said, was necessary. It was urged that this branch of the legislature ought to know and sympathize with every part of the community, and ought therefore to be taken, not only from different parts of the republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it. The broadest possible basis, it was said, ought to be given to the new system; and as that system was to be republican, a direct representation of the people was indispensable. To increase the weight of the State legislatures, by making them electors of the national legislature, would only perpetuate some of the worst evils of the Confederation.

A decided majority of the States sustained the election of the first branch of the national legisla ture by the people. Great efforts were, however, subsequently made to change this decision; and the discussion which ensued on a motion that this branch should be elected by the State legislatures, throws much light upon the nature of the govern

1 Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, ay, 6; New Jersey,

South Carolina, no, 2; Connecticut and Delaware divided.

ment which the friends of an election by the people were aiming to establish. From that discussion it appears that the idea was already entertained of forming a government that should have a vigorous authority derived directly from the people of the States, one that should possess both the force and the sense of the people at large. For the formation of such a government one of two courses was necessary either to abolish the State governments altogether; or to leave them in existence, and to regard the people of each State as competent to withdraw from their local governments such portions of their political power as thev might see fit to bestow upon a national government. The latter plan was undoubtedly a novelty in political science; for no system of government had yet been constructed in which the individual stood in the relation of subject to two distinct sovereignties, each possessed of a distinct sphere, and each supreme in its own sphere. But if the American doctrine were true, that all supreme power resides originally in the people, and that all governments are constituted by them as the agents and depositaries of that power, there could be no incompatibility in such a system. The people who had deposited with a State government the sovereign power of their community, could withdraw it at their pleasure; and as they could withdraw the whole, they could withdraw a part of it. If a part only were withdrawn, or rather, if the supreme power in relation to particular objects were to be taken from the State governments, and vested

in another class of agents, leaving the authority of the former undiminished except as to those particular objects, the individual might owe a double allegiance, but there could be no confusion of his duties, provided the powers withdrawn and revested were clearly defined.

The advocates of a national government, besides and beyond the intrusting of a particular jurisdiction to that government, wished to make it certain that its legislative power, in each act of legislation, should rest on the direct authority of the people. For this purpose they desired to avoid all agency of the State governments in the appointment of the members of the national legislature. They held this to be necessary for two reasons. In the first place, they said that in a national government the people must be represented; and that in a republican system the real constituent should act directly, and without any intermediate agency, in the appointment of the representative. In the second place, they deduced from the objects of a national government the necessity for excluding the agency of the State governments in the appointment of those who were to exercise its legislative power. Those objects, they contended, were not fully stated by their opponents. The latter generally regarded the objects of the Union as confined to defence against foreign danger and internal disorder; the power to make binding treaties with foreign countries; the regulation of commerce, and the power to derive