creasing both her capital and her revenue of wealth, population, and productive industry?

And thirdly, it is evident that Buonaparte despairs of subduing Britain by force of arms; otherwise he would never indulge himself in a long train of sophistical reasoning to prove, what is in direct opposition to the fact; namely, that a continuance of the war for fourteen years will destroy her foreign commerce. And if it shall; what then? By the very terms of the proposition Buonaparte acknowledges, that continental Europe will be entirely ruined, during this period of warfare which is to destroy only the foreign commerce of Britain; leaving all her vast internal, all her home-trade undiminished. By what means then shall impoverished and depopulated France, her trade internal and external, her agriculture and manufactures being ruined; her capital of men, money, and industry being squandered; subdue Britain whose internal resources will be then unimpaired?

How far we in this country are practical believers in the national bankruptcy of Britain, may be inferred from this fact; that there is no individual in the Union who would not as readily purchase a bill drawn on the British government, as he would one drawn on our own Federal government. Whereas, so entire is our faith in the insolvency of Napoleon's treasury, that no bill drawn thereon could find a single purchaser within the whole circumference of the United States. Mr. Walsh, in his "Letter," &c. p. 166, very correctly observes, that "their (the rulers of France) bad faith has been productive of the consequences which may always be expected when the same course is pursued. This policy is at all times, not that of economy, but of extreme prodigality. The French rulers, whatever may be their power, are unable to obtain supplies at home, but by sacrifices equivalent to the risk which is incurred by contracting them. Their credit abroad may be estimated

by the fact which is so well known to us all, that no intelligent merchant in this country can be induced by any consideration to make advances in their favor, or to accept a bill on their treasury from their highest accredited agent.

Some few months since, a French govornment-bill of only one thousand dollars in value was offered for sale in New-York, and could not be disposed of at、 any price. The English traders laughed at the tender of a French money-bill to them; the Americans doubted the paper of his imperial and royal majesty; and at length it was declined by a respectable Swiss merchant, who said, "he could not afford to buy it, because the French government were not in the habit of paying their bills. The man who hawked about this bill for sale, was finally obliged to transmit it at his own risque to France, where of course (see Mr. Walsh's "Letter," &c. pp. 159-160,) it was never paid. He knew that it was in vain to apply to the French merchants in New-York; for they were too well acquainted with the custom of their government respecting money-matters. The few French mercantile houses that had ever ventured to purchase bills drawn upon the government of the Great Nation had long since been ruined; there being very rarely any instances of such bills, when bought by merchants in the United States, having ever been paid. For further details on the notion of British bankruptcy, see "Hints," &c. pp. 1-7.

A well-founded hope is entertained, that in the course of the following pages it will be proved by incontroverible facts, that Britain is now, at the close of the year 1810, positively in herself, and relatively as to the world at large, far more wealthy and powerful than she ever has been during the whole period of her national career. But grant for a moment, and for the sake of argument, that she will speedily become a bankrupt. Will she, in consequence, have a

single blade of grass, an ear of corn, a ship, a soldier, a statesman, less than she has now; will she be less efficient as a nation? France was bankrupted three times during her revolution; was she less powerful on that account? Was she not most formidable when she had no credit at home; nor could borrow a single dollar within the circle of the habitable globe? If the French were not destroyed, not weakened as a na tion, (no mention is now made of individual happiness,) by bankruptcy, why should the British be rendered less terrible to their enemies by the same occurrence? These United States also were entirely bankrupted during the revolutionary war; their continental paper-currency was sold at a thousand for one; it equalled the French assignats themselves in worthlessness; yet did that bankruptcy ruin the United States? Why then must such an event “infallibly ruin Britain?"

Perhaps, on no points relating to the British empire, are the people of the Union more thoroughly misinformed, than on her finances and national resources. On all sides we perpetually hear that the weight of taxation grinds her people down to the dust; and must infallibly soon stop the operations of her government. To refute this error; and to prove that "England is more lightly taxed than any other country in Europe; with a system of collection infinitely less vexatious and oppressive;" we need only refer to the very valuable account of the French system of finances contained in Mr. Walsh's "Letter," &c. pp. 74-83-101-140-196; in the page last cited, Mr. Walsh observes, "I have noticed among intelligent persons both in this country and in England, a belief that the burden of the taxes is more oppressive in the latter than in France. The details which I have already given are sufficient to refute this error; but it may not be improper to suggest a few additional remarks on this subject," &c.

&c

Both the "details" and the "remarks" of Mr. Walsh contain an abundance of important information respecting the finances and interior condition of Britain and France. See "Hints," &c. pp. 7-12.

For information upon the following subjects; namely, the taxes, public income and expenditure, trade and navigation, and public debt funded and unfunded of Britain, the reader may have recourse to "A brief examination into the increase of the revenue, commerce, and navigation, of Great Britain, during the administration of the Right Hon. William Pitt," &c. by the Right Hon. George Rose, M. P. published in London, in 1806; to "Observations respecting the public expenditure, and the influence of the crown, by the same author, published in London, 1810; to an "Inquiry into the state of national subsistence, as connected with the progress of wealth and population," by Mr. Comber, published in London, in 1808; and to Mr. M'Arthur's "Financial and political facts of the eighteenth and present century," published in London, in 1803. These books are referred to as containing much very valuable political, financial, and statistical information respecting the British empire; and also as being cheap and easy of access. The following facts however are taken directly from the "Finance Accounts of Great Britain," for the years 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809, and from the "Finance Accounts of Ireland," for the years 1808, 1809; as ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, on the respective dates of 14th, 17th, 18th, 24th, 25th March, 20th, 30th May, 1806; 2d, 16th, 20th, 23d, 24th, 25th, 26th March, 1807; 10th, 16th, 17th, 21st, 22d, 24th, 25th March; 14th, 26th April; 13th May, 1808; 22d, 23d, 24th March; 18th May, 20th June, 1809; 7th, 8th, 14th March, 1808; 6th, 14th March, 1809.

The public income of Great Britain for the year ended on 5th January, 1806, was