lity to their just influence in the community; of giving to the people a proper portion of political consequence, and a legitimate share of authority in electing their own representatives. If the contest with France be prolonged some years, Spain might probably become one of the most powerful countries in the world; in consequence of being obliged by the very necessity of her condition, to use and to improve her internal resources of agriculture; her vast maritime capacities; and the wealth of her trans-Atlantic possessions, whether they continue as colonies, or become independent nations, in political and commercial alliance with the mother-country.

See" Literary Panoruma,” vol. 3d, pp. 374–829. Vol. 4th, pp. 807-935-1022-1242-1243, and the authors and public documents there referred to, for a character of the Spanish nation, in its moral, religious, intellectual, political, military, naval, commercial, provincial, social, domestic, and individual capacity; for the base and dastardly conduct of the royal family and the courtiers of Spain, evidenced in their various falsehoods respecting the abdication of the crown, and their submission to Buonaparte; for the obstacles to Napoleon's conquest in the resistance of the Spanish people, and their anticipation of his designs upon the peninsula; in their exploits already performed, and in the universal spirit of opposition to Gallic tyranny, manifested by the escape of the Spanish troops under Romana from the Danish territory; by constant desertion from the French standard; and by the patient endurance of every evil that war, famine, and desolation can inflict, rather than submit to a foreign yoke.

It was the opinion of the late Sir John Moore, expressed in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated Salamanca, November 25th, 1808, that it would be impossible to defend Portugal long, on account of its narrow territory, scanty population, and the want of

valor in the people. This opinion however is not borne out by the facts of the case; for during the seven months in which Junot with a French army held Portugal, the Portugueze perpetually displayed feats of the most undaunted valor, in frequent insurrections against their oppressors, in the districts of Algarve, of Beira, and of Alentejo. And since that time, with the effectual aid of the British, they have successively beaten three of Napoleon's invading armies; namely, under Junot at Vimeira, in 1808; under Soult at Oporto, in 1809; and under Massena at Busaco, in 1810. The increasing courage and discipline of the Portugueze, as borne testimony to by Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford, throw additional and probably insuperable obstacles in the way of Buonaparte's attempts to subjugate the peninsula.

For a full and interesting account of the conduct and sufferings of the Portugueze, during Junot's reign of terror in their country, see the "Edinburgh Annual Register," for 1808, History of Europe, vol. 1. pp. 343–354. The Edinburgh Annual Register is one of the ablest periodical works which the present age, fertile in such productions, has ushered into the world.

Mr. Lingham, in his "Vindicia Lusitana," published in 1808, says, that the late Sir Charles Stuart used to declare, that he saw in the Portugueze army the materials, not raw, but well organized, of one of the most effective armies in Europe for its size. The common men which compose it are hardy, docile, and strongly attached to their commanders; and the officers, up to the rank of colonel, well versed in the details of military discipline. The most remarkable defect is the too great attention to high birth, occasioning young noblemen to be put over the heads of their superiors in knowledge and in years. And in the House of Lords, on 1st of May, 1809, the earl of

Buckinghamshire, in considering the importance of Portugal as a military station for the British, observed, that in 1763, the Count de la Lippe with seventeen thousand men, of whom three thousand were British, opposed a successful resistance to thirty-six thousand Spaniards and six thousand French. His lordship also stated that he had seen a plan for defending Portugal with twenty thousand against seventy-five thousand men.

For a succinct account of the fraud and violence by which the tyrant conducted his plans for the usurpation of Spain, consult the "Manifesto of the Spanish Nation to Europe," dated at the royal palace of the Alcazar, Seville, January 1st, 1809; and Walsh's "Letter," &c. pp. 30-48. If Spain should ultimately succeed in baffling the attempts of the usurper, the benefits resulting to herself, to Europe, and to the world, would be incalculable. It would permanently weaken the power, and materially diminish the bulk of the French empire, by encouraging and enabling the other vassal-states to throw off the yoke and break the fetters of Gallic despotism; would erect the Spaniards into a great and prosperous people; would give to Britain a main ascendancy in the councils of Europe; would augment the aggregate of civil liberty, of productive industry, and commercial enterprise throughout the whole world. The cause of freedom would be most essentially promoted; since it is impossible for the Spanish and Portugueze people, if they succeed in their present glorious efforts, tamely to submit as heretofore to the corrupted, despotic governments either of a king who like an idiot plunged himself headlong into the coarse and palpable snares of Napoleon, or of one who sneaked off from them in the hour of danger, and left them the unprotected victims of an invading foe; or of the whole herd of courtiers and of grandees who have sold themselves to the service of the

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usurper. In all probability, the absolute power of the crown will be restrained by the influence of popular representation, and the Cortes restored to those ancient privileges which prevailed in the better times of the peninsula; before the solid principles of liberty, originally interwoven in the constitution of Spain, and assisted by the spirit of the people, were corrupted and overborne by the vast influence of the executive; particularly in the reigns of Charles the Fifth, and of Philip the Second; and which, at length, swept away, under the dominion of the Bourbons, all the rights, natural and civil, of the Spaniards.

See the opinion of Mr. Burke on the degraded state of the Spanish nobility and people; the corruptions of the government; and the consequent national weakness of the peninsula, during the first French revolutionary war; in the 5th volume of Mr. Burke's Works, pp. 38-94, in his "Thoughts on French Affairs," and his "Heads for Consideration on the present state of Affairs."

Before this subject is closed, it appears necessary to notice one or two remarks of Mr. Walsh in his "Letter," &c. which do not appear to contain that depth and accuracy which so generally characterize the political researches of this gentleman. In page 23d of his "Letter," Mr. Walsh speaks in terms of the uttermost contempt of what he is pleased to call "the swaggering of the Portugueze and the tumultuary defence of the Spaniards," and most confidently decides on the forlorn hopelessness and folly of their pretensions to oppose the armies of Napoleon. Even the momentary and unmatured effusions of Mr. Walsh on all political subjects have great and deserved weight in this community; and therefore it were to be wished that he had spoken a little less contemptuously of the patriotic efforts of those men who have stood up, and do still stand up erect in effectual

resistance against the repeated military shocks of the whole French empire; those repeated military shocks, each single one of which has been found sufficient to beat down the mightiest monarchies of continental Europe. The Houses of Brandenburgh, of Lorraine, and of Russia, have each successively fallen prostrate beneath the weight of those blows, under the discipline of which Spain and Portugal are daily and hourly rising into a fiercer and more untameable spirit of opposition. If the people of the peninsula be so weak, dastardly, spiritless, and fallen, as Mr. Walsh appears to think, how comes it to pass that in the third year of the war, levies are raised, and battalions marshalled, and armies led, under the kindred banners of Spain and Portugal, in greater numbers, in better order, in more effective military discipline, to move against the Gallic squadrons, than have ever hitherto taken the field? If the Spaniards be indifferent to the fate of their country; if unconditional submission to France be in all their thoughts, words, and deeds; how is it that Blake has been able to re-assemble his scattered army; to protect Catalonia; and to keep the enemy out of Valencia? By what means has Romana created out of the dispersed peasantry of the north a respectable army, with which he has swept Gallicia and the Asturias clean of the invaders, and has marched at the head of ten thousand gallant Spaniards to the aid of the British and Portuguese under the command of Lord Wellington? How is it that Tarragona holds out; that Cadiz mocks all the efforts of the besiegers; and that Madrid itself is kept in constant alarm and terror by the incursions of the Spanish patriots, who scour the whole country round, up to the very gates and walls of the capital ?*

* Mr. Walsh, in No. 1. p. 27. of the "American Review," speaks in terms less contemptuous of the resistance of the Spaniards to Buonaparte; but he still confidently anticipates their speedy subjugation to the usurper.