40 degrees; that at said places and throughout said distances, where said contra dipping limbs of said vein are found to intersect and form a juncture, as aforesaid, there has been a mingling of the mineralizations of said two limbs of said vein within the angle beneath the juncture of the said two limbs; that at such places and throughout said disstances the footwall of said two limbs of said vein, within the angle beneath their said juncture, by the process of replacement, has been converted into mineralized quartz for considerable distances below said juncture, said replacement quartz extending from limb to limb."

Appellant bases its appeal from the decision of the trial court on the following grounds:

A. Erroneous Findings of Fact.

ly, and that extralateral rights in two opposite directions, attaching to the same mining claim and the same vein, are not contemplated by this statute.

(2) The trial court found that the northerly and southerly dipping limbs or sides of the vein were united and joined at the crest of the roll for a considerable distance within the West End claim. Appellant contents that the court should have denied the appellee the right to follow the vein extralaterally where such a condition exists, and that no extralateral right whatsoever attaches to an anticlinal occurrence in a vein, since the latter does not constitute an apex within the meaning of the Federal Mining Statute.

(3) The westerly end line of the West End claim is a broken line. Appellant contends that no extralateral right whatsoever may be exercised under such circumstances, since such right attaches only to mining claims possessing straight end lines.

(2) That the finding of the trial court, giving the occurrences of quartz in the "A" series of, raises the dignity of a vein, is not justified by the evidence, and, further, that no matter what may be its character, it admittedly dips to the north, and has no bearing on a claimed extralateral right extending to the south.

B. Errors of Law.

(1) The trial court found that the discovery in the West End claim was on the northerly dipping portion or slope of the vein, and in spite of this finding awarded an extralateral right to appellee on the southerly dipping limb or slope of the vein. Appellant contends that this is an erroneous construction of the Federal statute, granting the right to follow a vein extralateral

The following diagram represents a cross section of the vein where the two limbs have been shown, by de

crest of the anticlinal fold.

Messrs. Curtis H. Lindley, William E. Colby, Hugh H. Brown, and J. H. Evans for appellant.

Messrs. Peck, Bunker, & Cole, Cheney, Downer, Price, & Hawkins, H. H. Atkinson, and Dickson, Ellis Ellis, & Schulder, for respondent:

He who by his labor and enterprise brings into circulation the hidden treasures of the earth is entitled to his reward.

2 Lindley, Mines, § 335; Lawson v. United States Min. Co. 207 U S. 1, 13,

1. The location would embrace a full claim of 1,500 feet by 600 feet, excepting for the excluded area embraced within the two triangles 3, 3a, 4, and 7, 7a, 8. The lines 4, 5, and 1, 8, are parallel. While the plat and field notes accompanying application for the patent are not in the record, it is probably that they would disclose that the surface boundaries of the claim, as located, would include the two triangular pieces of ground above mentioned, and that the same were excluded from the patent application because in conflict with prior existing locations. In every great mining district, locations are made from time to time in every direction, and a map of such a district presents a confusing mass of conflicting boundaries. In locating a claim the locator may lay his lines upon or across portions of prior existing claims, in order to secure parallelism of end lines, and thus secure to himself extralateral rights. Del Monte Min. & Mill. Co. v. Last Chance Min. & Mill. Co. 171 U. S. 55, 43 L. ed. 72, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895, 19 Mor. Min. Rep. 370.

While a locator, prior to patent as well as after patent, may have no greater extent of extralateral rights than the extent of the vein within the boundaries of his surface rights (2 Lindley, Mines, § 574), he may, prior to patent, have its extralateral rights determined by planes parallel to planes passing through his located end lines, even though one or both of such located end lines are upon the surface ground of contiguous prior claims owned by other parties. This is the rule of the Del Monte and other cases. What reason, then, can exist in support of a proposition that, because such owner obtained a patent for his claim, he must forfeit extralateral rights because, in his application for patent, he excludes areas in conflict with prior claims, resulting in patented surface boundaries of irregular shape. There is, it seems to us, no reason why such a thing should be. Certainly the securing of a pat

to exclusions of conflicts, extralateral rights are lost, is to place upon the statute a construction contrary to its purpose, as that purpose has frequently been enunciated. Lawson v. United States Min. Co. 207 U. S. 1, 52 L. ed. 65, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15, 2 Lindley, § 584.

Even if this is a more liberal construction of the statute than is warranted, which we think it is not, nevertheless, so far as this particular case is concerned, it cannot, we think, be said that the patented surface area of the West End claim does not present parallel end lines. The end lines 1, 8, and 4, 5, are each part of the original located end lines. They should, we think, still be considered end lines, and the true end lines of the patented claim. To so hold requires that the line 3, 4, be regarded as a side line rather than as a part of a so-called broken end line. We think it should be so

regarded. Side lines are not required to be parallel. No rule can well be applied governing courses and distances of side lines, other than that they shall not be so laid as to increase the statutory width or length of a claim. The line 1, 8, is conceded to be an end line. But if the line 4, 5, is not also an end line, but rather a part of a broken end line, it is drawing a rather fine distinction to say that the lines 3, 4, and 4, 5, are parts of a broken end line, and that the lines 7, 8, and 8, 1, are not. The difference is only in the degree of the angle and the length of the lines, a difference which has no reasonable basis upon which to support a distinction. We think the ruling that the line 4, 5,

V.

2. We come now to a consideration of the question whether extralateral rights exist upon a vein in the form of a single anticlinal fold. It is the contention of counsel for appellant that such rights do not exist, for the reason, among others alleged, that the Federal statute does not contemplate extralateral rights in opposite directions. It is the contention that only veins dipping in the same direction as the discovery vein may be followed extralaterally; that where, within the same location, a secondary vein is found dipping in the opposite direction as that of the discovery vein, extralateral rights thereon cannot enjoyed. We think the statute is not susceptible of this construction. The statute given to the locators "the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of such surface lines although such veins, lodes, or ledges may so far depart from a perpendicular in their course downward as to extend outside the vertical side lines of such surface locations."

Same-extralateral rightsopposite directions.

be

late to but one direction, that of the dip of the discovery vein. We are unable to see the force of this contention. The direction of an end line depends upon which end of the line it is viewed from. The courses given in a patent of the two end lines of a claim usually, and doubtless invariably, are in opposite directions. It would be a strained construction, and one, we think, not within the letter or spirit of the statute, to hold that end lines may be considered as having but one direction. If a vein in the form of a single anticlinal fold may be said to have an apex, we think there is nothing in the statute which militates against extralateral rights upon such vein in opposite directions, the same as though it were two veins with separate apices, instead of one vein.

3. The most serious question presented in this case is whether the vein in question may be said to have an apex. The vein is in the form of a single anticlinal fold, and the precise question presented by a vein in such form appears never, heretofore, to have been determined. Counsel for appellant, in their brief, say: "The definition of the term 'apex,' as employed in the mining statute, involves the elements of terminal edge of a vein and downward course extending therefrom. According to this definition, the horizontal sheet 'a' on figure 3 here inserted and the anticlinal fold 'b' have no apices, while the synclinal fold 'c' has two apices. . . [See page 412.]

It is apparent that no extralateral rights could attach to a horizontal vein, as represented in sheet "a," because such vein has no "course downward," as prescribed in the statute. Such a vein has a top, if not an apex, in the strict sense of that word, and will support a valid location. Why a synclinal fold should be said to have two apices and an anticlinal fold have none is not so easy to find a reason for, unless we accept as conclusive appellant's contention that a terminal

edge is essential to a true definition of the word "apex," as used in the statute. The words "terminal edge" are not used in the statute, nor have they been of universal use in defining an apex. The great majority of veins have terminal edges, and in all such cases the apex of the vein is its terminal edge. If veins in the form of a single anticlinal roll were the rule rather than the rare exception, we are of the opinion that a contention that a terminal edge was essential to an apex would be as rare as the character of the vein now in question. It has been repeatedly said by courts and textwriters that the words "top" and "apex" were not a part of the miner's terminology, prior to the adoption of the Federal Mining Statutes. They were words used by legislators to convey the intent of the framers of the statute. There is no controversy regarding the general purpose and intent of the Mining Statutes. The government, as a matter of public policy, was interested in the development of the mining re

sources of the nation. It offered to the prospector and miner the most liberal reward for his enterprise in discovering and developing the hid-den treasures of the earth. It gave him the exclusive possession of the surface of every valid location made, placed no limit upon the number of such locations, gave him all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which were within his surface lines. It exacted no price for the land as a condition precedent to mining operations, and placed no restrictions upon him that were not consistent with the public purpose, such as requiring a minimum of annual labor as an evidence of good faith. To say that a miner, fortunate enough to discover a valuable vein in the form of a single anticline, shall not have extralateral rights upon each limb of his vein because, forsooth, the summit or crest of the anticlinal fold does not present a terminal edge, as is the case of the ordinary form of a fissure vein, in our opinion, would do violence to the spirit if not the very letter of the statute. The well-set

tled policy of the courts is to construe the statutes liberally, in the interest of the miner. It has been determined that if the locator, by inadvertence, places his location crosswise instead of lengthwise of his vein, he does not lose his extralateral rights, but his side lines will be regarded as end lines, and vice versa. So, too, if his vein crosses an end and a side line, he will be given a new side line for purposes of determining the extent of his extralateral rights. So, too, in the matter of discovery, the first essential to a valid location, the extreme liberality of the courts has been manifested in hundreds of cases.

If a locator finds his surface boundaries embrace the apices of two or more valuable veins, he is simply fortunate, the same as the locator whose single ledge is more valuable than the one of his neighbor. The statute makes no distinction between rights of locators,