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The second allows him to recover the price paid minus the actual value at the time of sale (that is, the difference between what the vendee gave and what he received). Chandler v. Andrews, 192 Fed. 543; Peek v. Derry, 37 Ch. Div. 541; Rice v. Olin, supra; Nelson v. Gjestrum, 136 N. W. (Minn.) 858. This is the rule in equity. Ryan v. Miller, 139 S. W. (Mo.) 128.

The arguments advanced for the first rule are that, if the second is followed, the defrauder could speculate on the outcome of his fraudulent enterprise without possibility of loss. Stoke v. Converse, 153 Iowa 274. And any advantage lawfully secured to the innocent purchaser in the original bargain inures to the benefit of the wrong-doer. Morse v. Hutchins, 102 Mass. 439. For the second rule it is claimed that the action is one in tort for fraud and that the defendant must make good the plaintiff's losses proximately resulting from the fraud, which include the excess paid over the value of the land, and reasonable expenditures made in reliance on defendant's representations, but not the expected fruits of an unrealized speculation. Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125. Also, persons would go around seeking to be duped, so that they might recover for advantageous bargains. Nelson v. Gjestrum, supra.

Still a third measure of damages was recognized in Pruitt v. Jones, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 84, where it was held to be the difference between the purchase price and a sum which bears the same proportion to that purchase price as the actual value of the land bears to the value if it had been as represented, but this case stands alone.

It would seem that the second is the best rule.

NEGLIGENCE IMPUTED NEGLIgence-NegligENCE OF PARent.—Denver CITY TRAMWAY Co. v. BROWN, 143 PAC. (COLO.) 364.-Held, the negligence of the parents of a child of tender years cannot be imputed to the child to defeat a recovery by the child for injuries from the negligence of a third party.

The doctrine of imputed negligence has no application where the infant is of sufficient age and capacity to exercise discretion in his own behalf. In such case, it is only his own contributory negligence which will bar a recovery. Louisville R. Co. v. Sears, 11 Ind. App. 654; Lafferty v. Third Ave. R. Co., 85 App. Div. 592. It is everywhere conceded that when the parent brings an action to recover for damages resulting from the loss of the child's services, the parent's contributory negligence is a bar to the action. Feldman v. Detroit United Railway, 162 Mich. 486; Davis v. R. R. Co., 136 N. C. 115; Philips v. Denver Co., 53 Colo. 458. Not all courts, however, agree that if the negligent parent is the real beneficiary there can be no recovery for death of the child. Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Grosclose's Adm'r., 88 Va. 267; Wymore v. Mahaska County, 78 Iowa 396. The leading case that is opposed to the holding in the principal case is Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615, which established the so-called New York rule which is still adhered to within that jurisdiction and a few other states. Pastore v. Livingston, 131 N. Y. Supp. 971; Leslie v. Lewiston, 62 Me. 468; Casey v. Smith, 152 Mass. 294. The theory

of the New York rule is that the parent is the agent of the child and for that reason imputes the negligence of the parent to the child. But any such theory of agency must rest, not on fact but on a pure fiction of law. To construct such an agency here does the child an injustice and does not accord with the usual solicitude and protection with which the law favors infants. The principal case is in accord with reason and the weight of authority.

NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF STATUTE OR ORDINANCE "NEGLIGENCE PER Se.”—Beaver v. Mason, Ehrman & Co., 143 Pac. (Ore.) 1000.—Under a statute forbidding the employment of persons under eighteen years of age in the operation of elevators, held, that a violation of such statute constitutes "negligence per se," and the employer is liable, as a matter of law, for a death resulting from such unlawful employment.

This doctrine, in so far as recognized at all, applies only to regulations protective either of persons or property. Zimmerman v. Baur, II Ind. App. 607. Its operation is limited to the benefit of those persons or things which the regulation is designed to protect. Gay v. Essex Electric St. R. Co., 159 Mass. 238 (case of trespasser); Woodruff v. Bowen, 136 Ind. 431; Williams v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 155 Ill. 491. No conflict arises when the act expressly awards damages to the party injured by the breach. Kelley v. Anderson, 15 S. Dak. 107. By the preponderance of authority the same effect is given in the absence of such a provision. Smith v. Milwaukee Builders' and Traders' Exchange, 91 Wis. 360; Karle v. R. R. Co., 55 Mo. 476; Queen v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 95 Tenn. 458; Osborne v. VanDyke, 113 Iowa 557. Identical in effect, though not in language, are numerous cases allowing a recovery as a matter of law, without raising the question of negligence. Wilby v. Mulledy, 78 N. Y. 310; Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R. I. 199. If, however, a qui tam penalty is provided, this is construed to exclude the action on the case. Brattleboro v. Wait, 44 Vt. 459. When a regulation is intended for the protection of the general public, a few cases illogically refuse the remedy to an individual member of the general public specially damaged. Taylor v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 45 Mich. 74. An important line of authorities treat the violation of a statute or ordinance as constituting merely a prima facie case of negligence. U. S. Brewing Co. v. Stoltenberg, 113 Ill. App. 435. Others regard it as merely competent and important evidence. Knupfle v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 N. Y. 488. In the majority of these cases the courts are not called upon to go farther than this in behalf of the plaintiff. Carrigan v. Stillwell, 97 Me. 247; Siddall v. Jansen, 168 Ill. 43. In one state the breach of law is merely competent corroborative evidence. Foote v. American Product Co., 195 Pa. St. 190. Under these views there is apparently no liability if the defendant was, without fault, destitute of the means of performance. Weise v. Tate, 45 Ill. App. 626. Or if a reasonably prudent man would have disregarded the regulation under the circumstances. Riegert v. Thackery, 212 Pa. St. 86. All of these doctrines obviously apply equally to the question of contributory negligence of a plaintiff. McCambley v. Staten I., etc., Co., 32 App. Div. (N. Y.) 346.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS OF AGENTEFFECT OF PROVISIONS OF CONTRACT.-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. BRAGDON, 106 N. E. (MASS.) 633.-Held, fraudulent representations by a vendor's agent concerning land did not vitiate a contract for the sale thereof, when the contract expressly provided that no agent had authority to make any representation or agreement not contained in the contract.

The fraudulent representations of an agent made in the course of the business of his principal bind the principal. Teters v. Hinders, 19 Ind. 93. The vendor of land is responsible for material misrepresentations made by his agent, though unauthorized and the agent did not have actual knowledge whether the representations were true or false. Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238. An innocent vendor is not liable in an action of deceit brought for the fraudulent representations of his agent. Decker v. Fredericks, 47 N. J. L. 469. Of course where an agent makes false representations with intent to defraud the purchaser, an action for deceit will lie against him by the vendee. Hidden v. Griffin, 136 Mass. 229. The representations of an agent are not binding upon his principal unless they were made at the time of the contract and constituted a part of the res gestae. Cate v. Blodgett, 70 N. H. 316. Where a seller's agent misrepresents to a purchaser the meaning of ambiguous words used in the contract of sale, the purchaser may rescind the contract though it contained a stipulation that no other representations than those therein printed would be binding on the principal. Barrie v. Miller, 104 Ga. 312. Where a contract of sale declared that only agreements contained in the contract were binding, representations of the agent of the seller not included in the contract were of no effect. Bruner v. Kansas Moline Plow Co., 7 Ind. T. 506; Cook v. Whitfield, 41 Miss. 541. A provision in a contract procured by the agent of the seller, that the seller will not be held responsible for any agreement not expressed in the contract in writing, does not relieve him from liability for the fraudulent representations of his agent within the scope of his apparent authority. Smith v. Hildenbrand, 36 N. Y. Supp. 485. This last case cited must be deemed wrong on principle because the doctrine of ostensible authority can have no application where the authority of the agent is expressed in the instrument signed by the vendee. The principal case is in accord with the weight of authority.

PLEADING SUIT TO RECOVER FOR WORK DONE.-HENNESSY V. PRESTON, 106 N. E. (MASS.) 570.-Held, where a contractor sues, in debt or its equivalent, for the contract price, alleging in general terms complete performance, he cannot recover on proof of substantial performance, which is less than complete performance. His remedy is in special assumpsit.

Before the common counts can be used, all conditions required by law must be fulfilled; i. e., all express and implied conditions must be fulfilled. Carroll County v. Collins, 63 Va. 302; Independent Order of Mutual Aid v. Paine, 17 Ill. App. 572; Expanded Metal Co. v. Boyce,

233 Ill. 284. But in bills and notes, under an allegation of performance, plaintiff may show anything that will excuse performance. Spann v. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 301; Norton v. Lewis, 2 Conn. 478; Williams v. Cowen, 3 Cowen, 252. And there is a tendency to apply the bills and notes rule to insurance cases. German Ins. Co. v. Gumert, 112 Ill. 68; Levy v. Ins. Co., 10 W. Va. 560. When the express contract states no more than the law will imply, the common counts may be used. Davis v. Smith, 79 Me. 351; Pitkin v. Frink, 8 Met. 12; Gibbs v. Bryant, 1 Pick. 118. The majority of courts hold that substantial performance is sufficient, if it is done in good faith. Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648; Jones v. Davenport, 74 Conn. 418. The better rule seems to be that when the plaintiff has substantially performed, he can recover under the common counts. Peltier v. Sewall, 12 Wend. 386; Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648.

BOOK REVIEWS

Concerning Justice. By Lucilius A. Emery, New Haven. Yale University Press. Pp. 170.

This book consists of the Storrs Lectures delivered by Judge Emery at Yale University. Starting with various definitions of justice from ancient writers, it is found essential to first determine what are rights, and from this consideration, this definition of justice is evolved: "Justice is the according to every one his right, and that right is such freedom of action in gratifying one's desires as can be exercised in harmony with like freedom by others." The rest of the book deals with the securing of justice, and defends the system in this country as "in its general form and character it is best adapted to secure firmly as much individual liberty of action and equality of right as is consistent with the welfare of the whole number, or, in other words, best adapted to secure justice." In these days of criticism of our judicial system it is refreshing to find it vigorously and convincingly defended. It is most emphatically a book which, once read, is kept at hand for a re-reading.

H. W. C.

Outlines of International Law. By Charles H. Stockton, New York. Charles Scribners' Sons, 1914, pp. XVII and 616.

This is the newest work on a subject of special interest at the present time and which is susceptible of consideration from so many points of view that the public should welcome new books in this field even though they should in part cover the same ground. Admiral Stockton is well known as a writer and lecturer upon international law and his comprehensive knowledge has produced a work of wide compass, and which must prove useful as a general outline. We could have wished, however, a more abundant citation of cases and important treaties rather than the somewhat frequent reference in our author's pages to standard text-books or digests. In the science of international relations, the more closely one can approach ultimate sources. of information, the more accurate must be the knowledge acquired. In the appendix and in the "list of authorities consulted" some familiar names fail to appear while a number of

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