admits that "perhaps the weight of authority supports this view." Cruger v. Phelps, 47 N. Y. Supp. 61; In re Haight's Will, 64 N. Y. Supp. 1029. On the other hand the intention on the testator's part to bring about a divorce will not be presumed. Coe v. Hill, 201 Mass. 15; Winn v. Hall, 1 Ky. Law Rep. 337. Hence a provision of a will by which a bequest in trust was to become absolute on the termination of the beneficiary's' marriage relations was held not to be void where the testator's purpose was shown to be to protect his daughter (the beneficiary) from possible depredations of her husband and not to incite her to a separation. Snorgrass v. Thomas, 166 Mo. App. 603. When the wife is already living separate from her husband at the time the will is made, a bequest in it giving property to the wife provided she remains separated from her husband was held void as against public policy and the legatee took the property freed from the condition. Witherspoon v. Brokaw, 85 Mo. App. 169. Where, however, the wife is not absolutely deprived of the property upon resuming marital relations, but retains all the beneficial interest therein as cestui qui trust and at her death the principal goes to her children, the condition has been held valid. Wright v. Mayer, 62 N. Y. Supp. 610. The doctrine of the principal case is supported by Ransdell v. Boston, 172 Ill. 439, 43 L. R. A. 526.

WITNESS-PRIVILEGE-SELF-INCRIMINATION.-COMMON Wealth v. SOUTHERN EXPRESS Co., 169 S. W. (Ky.) 517.—Held, the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to corporations and the privilege may not be claimed for the corporation by its officers and agents.

The privilege above referred to contained in the fifth amendment to the Federal constitution is personal, and is based upon the consideration of the law for the individual in his capacity as a witness. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591; Commonwealth v. Shaw, 4 Cush. 594; Hale v. Henkle, 201 U. S. 43. Therefore this privilege is not available to a witness on the ground that some third person might be incriminated by his testimony, even though he may be the agent of such person. Hale v. Henkle, supra. A corporation is a "citizen" within the fourteenth amendment providing that no state shall deny any person the equal protection of the law. Santa Clara Co. v. So. Pac. R. R., 118 U. S. 394. A corporation is not a "citizen" within the meaning of Art. 4, sec. 2 of the Federal constitution which entitles the citizens of each state to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 168; Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181. It will be observed that while there is no question but that a corporation is a "person" there is a difference of interpretation as to when a corporation is a "citizen," within the meaning of the constitution. Here it is not the corporation but the agent who is on the stand testifying. In interpreting the Federal constitution and in applying it to corporations, courts have kept in mind the fact that corporations are creations of the state. As Mr. Justice Hughes says: "It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation, to make use of certain franchises, could not in the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how the franchise had been employed and demand the corporate books and papers for that purpose. Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 384.

BOOK REVIEWS

Good Will, Trade Marks, and Unfair Trading. By Edward S. Rogers. Chicago. A. W. Shaw Company. 1914. pp. 288.

Nowadays when books are being multiplied so rapidly, one may rightly demand of an author what excuse he has for adding to the difficulties which already confront him when he must select from a rapidly increasing mass of books a part of the small number which he can hope to read. The book here being considered has a real excuse for being. It does not purport to be a law book. But in these days when competition in business is so keen it should make an appeal to the business man and be of great practical value to whoever has a good will to protect. The lawyer should find it interesting. Besides being a very vivid and accurate portrayal of the difficulties which attend the protection of a good will, trade-mark or trade-name, it offers very practical suggestions for the solution of those difficulties.

Parts one and two of the book, comprising the first twelve chapters, are devoted to showing what good will is and to discussing the devices, such as trade-marks, trade-names, etc., which one may use to acquire it by enabling the public to recognize or identify his product. This part of the book is very practical and is well written.

Part three is devoted to what the author terms "Defending a Business from Unfair Competition." The object of the author is to minimize infringement. He is very intolerant of anything that savors of unfairness or which looks like an attempt to steal away any part of a good will that has been built up honestly. His views, so interestingly written, are distinctly in advance of those of the United States Supreme Court as shown by the decisions of that tribunal on the subject he discusses. Hence it is probable that it will not be altogether convincing to the mind of the lawyer. On the whole, however, the book is a very good piece of work and will do good. The business man should be grateful to the author for an invaluable guide book.

H. W. A.

Bender's War Revenue Law, 1914. Annotated With Reference To Earlier Acts And To Other Extant Laws. By the Publisher's Editorial Staff. Albany, New York. Matthew Bender & Co. pp. XIV and 181.

This little work is distinctly valuable and has been prepared with great care. By way of introduction the editors give us a sketch of the development of the Internal Revenue System as illustrated in federal statutes beginning March 3, 1791. The new law is presented with each section carefully annotated, the references including pertinent legislation and abundant citation of federal cases and such sources as the opinions of attorneysgeneral, etc. Appendant to the text is an exceedingly useful list of books and pamphlets touching the general subject. Both for the citizen, who is anxious to estimate his burdens as well as his privileges under federal law, and for the practicing lawyer this volume will prove an invaluable aid and can be very heartily commended to all seeking assistance or information in the field of which it treats. Our act of 1914 is essentially a revival of the legislation of 1898. The various rulings contained in Treasury Decisions touching the interpretation of that legislation, while not conclusive, will doubtless afford a guide to controversies likely to arise touching the new law. The editors have therefore made it a special feature of their work to indicate the cases of an administrative character which may throw light upon the new regulations. It is reasonably certain that no one will need to look further than this little volume and its references for a solution of the administrative problems begotten by this taxation.

G. E. S.

The Doctrine of Judicial Review. By Edwin S. Corwin. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 1914. pp. VII and 177.

"Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review," "We the People," "The Peletiah Webster Myth," "The Dred Scott Decision," and "Some Possibilities in the Way of TreatyMaking" are the titles of the five essays comprised in this book. All of them should be of interest to the legal profession. The book is written essentially from the point of view of the historian. It is a historical research into the power of courts to

disregard and declare of no effect acts passed by legislatures in excess of their constitutional authority. The author in his notes at the end of the essay has collected and classified a vast number of decisions and precedents which evidence the thoroughness and ability with which the work is done. The lawyer who reads the book will not have to be told that the author is not a lawyer. He will note terms having a very definite and technical meaning in the law which are used in a somewhat unorthodox fashion. He will also be surprised at the motive attributed to the highest court in our land when it handed down the decision in the great case of Marbury v. Madison. We commend the book to all who may be interested in the history of one of the most important powers of the United States Supreme Court.

H. W. A.

YALE

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. XXIV

MARCH, 1915

No. 5

DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

Persistent and Harmful Influence of Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.

The principle embodied in what is known as due process of law is the outcome of the progressive histories of the English and American peoples, considered as one unbroken development. It has no prototype in the constitutional history of any other people. As Lieber has expressed it: "The guarantee of the supremacy of the law (due process) leads to a principle which, so far as I know, it has never been attempted to transplant from the soil inhabited by Anglican people, and which, nevertheless, has been in our system of liberty the natural production of a thorough government of law as contradistinguished from a government of functionaries."

As thus defined, due process of law stands as the anti-pole of what French jurists call droit administratif, which rests upon the assumption that the government and each of its servants possesses a body of special rights and privileges as against private citizens to be fixed on principles different from those defining the legal rights and duties of one citizen toward another. Under that theory, speaking generally, the ordinary tribunals have no concern with the administrative law (droit administratif) as applied by administrative courts (tribunaux administratifs), at the head of which stands the Council of State. For example, if a body of policemen in France who have broken into a monastery, seized its property and expelled its inmates under an administrative order, are charged with what English lawyers would call trespass 'Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 91.