He is a corporeal being, while to others He is ever-present life or mind. To one He is anthropomorphic, having not only a human form, but also being swayed by the same passions that toss men to and fro; while to another He is eternal, omnipresent principle, without variableness or shadow of turning. Abraham, when he was about to offer up his only son on the altar, conceived of God as a being who demanded human sacrifices; and Jacob thought of Him as having a local habitation, until the vision of angels ascending and descending on the ladder as he slept at Bethel revealed to him that the Lord was even in that place. On the other hand, Jesus recognized God as spirit, John saw Him as love, Paul declared "in Him we live, and move, and have our being," and the Psalmist sang: If I take the wings of the morning And dwell in the uttermost parts of The sea; even there shall thy hand lead me It is the realization of the divine immanence, the presence, the allness and the availability of God, and the consequent absence and nothingness of disease and evil, which constitutes treatment by prayer. The prayer is not a pleading with God to deliver the afflicted from their suffering, but rather a knowing that sickness and suffering have no existence in His presence, however real they may seem to human sense looking through a glass darkly. In the consciousness thus clarified and uplifted, pain and disease lose their reality and disappear, while health and harmony are recognized as the facts of existence. This, of course, is not intended as a full presentation of metaphysical treatment. It is well understood that years of study and labor are required to gain any adequate conception of its processes, and it would be too much to expect complete elucidation in a few paragraphs. In fact the subject is one that is likely to suffer from any formal statement, for the case is one where the letter killeth. But enough has been said, perhaps, to indicate that metaphysical practice is, as its name discloses, totally unlike medical practice. The medical practitioner relies upon physical diagnosis, regards disease as a grim reality, and believes in the efficacy of drugs, serums, and other material remedies. The metaphysical practitioner rejects drugs and material curative agencies, repudiates every law of disease known to medical practice, and proceeds mentally to demonstrate the unreality of the ills of flesh and of mind. All his efforts and operations are in the mental realm, and his aim is to make the "word flesh," that is, to make spiritual truth, which knows no sickness nor sin, operative and controlling in the minds and bodies of his patients. And so far is he from resorting to diagnosis that, if he has been educated as a physician, he may find the very habit of diagnosing disease, which he has acquired, a positive hindrance and a thing to be overcome when he undertakes to administer metaphysical treatment, because diagnosis tends to build up and make formidable the disease which he is striving to realize the nothingness of. The same principle is applicable to other branches of medical learning; their possession by the metaphysician is less likely to help than to hinder him in his practice. Hence it is that he can see no reason why the law should compel him to qualify in pathology, materia medica, and surgery before he may pursue the vocation of metaphysical healing. He can make no use of the immense learning that has accumulated on those subjects, and may even find it an encumbrance when acquired. There seems, then, nothing in common between the metaphysical treatment of disease and the practice of medicine, and hence no valid reason appears for holding that the first is comprehended within the latter. As a matter of fact they are contraries and each excludes the other. At no point do they approach or resemble one another. They merely have a common purpose, the alleviation of pain and suffering. And certainly there is enough of distress on earth to-day in the form of sickness and disease, whether they are regarded as stern realities as affirmed by the materialist or as illusions of the human mind as asserted by the idealist, to occupy the attention of all schools of healing, physical and metaphysical; and the world will be pleased to see these various schools direct more energy toward the overcoming of the ills of flesh and less toward the overthrowing of one another. Suffering humanity is coming to have less and less patience with the controversies which have characterized the last hundred years of medical history, and which have seldom been more intense than now. It demands that its ailments be cured, rather than that this or that school or system be given exclusive place as the well-spring of medical virtue. Orthodox medicine has had full sway during all the long centuries that have passed since Hippocrates formulated his first prescription, yet disease and mortality still stalk among men, unswallowed up of health and immortality. The metaphysicians, after scarcely more than two score years of experience, are already certain that they have the universal panacea; but until they can speak to disease with authority as did the Master, it certainly will not be unbecoming of them to advance their claims with less assurance than has sometimes been their disposition, and to see to it, when their power increases as now seems to be destined, that they do not manifest that spirit of intolerance toward others which they believe has been shown toward them. Meanwhile mankind will gladly accept anything from any source which assures relief from its infirmities, and will stand ready to recognize, without persuasion or compulsion, that school or system which attains the high mark of infallibility. SAN FRANCISCO. PETER V. Ross. SOME LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EUROPEAN WAR The sudden outbreak of war among five great European powers gave rise to many questions affecting the liability of citizens of our own country in their commercial dealings with inhabitants of the belligerent countries, some of which may be of interest to the readers of this Review. During the two or three weeks of the mobilization of armies in France, Austria, Russia and Germany, when all communication by telegraph or post was cut off from large portions of those countries, these questions presented themselves in acute form, and required the determination by residents of this country of a course of action in the face of the extraordinary condition of affairs then existing, which threatened serious legal liability in whatever event might be the outcome. Agents in America, cut off from all communication with their European principals, were compelled, on their own responsibility, to take action concerning the business of their agency and the performance of contracts with, or made by them on behalf of their foreign principals. Certain legal principles had been settled in cases growing out of wars in the past, by the application of which conclusions were reached as to these problems of 1914 with a certain degree of confidence. While the general rule is that agents must strictly adhere to the instructions of their principals and only act within the scope of the powers expressly conferred, or necessary to the carrying out of the principals' instructions, in the face of unforeseen circumstances, agents have been held to be vested with discretionary powers, and to be liable for the exercise of such powers only where guilty of gross negligence or fraudulent conduct.1 Even where specific instructions are given by the principal, if it become impossible to comply with them, and communication with the principal cannot be had within the time. allowed for action, the agent is held to be invested with authority to do for his principal that which a prudent man would do for the reasonable protection of his own interests under the given circumstances. This principle was enunciated and applied by 'Leotard v. Graves, 3 Caines (N. Y.) 225. 2 Judson v. Sturges, 5 Day (Conn.) 559; Drummond v. Wood, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 310. Mr. Justice Story, on the circuit, in a case which is frequently cited and relied upon as establishing the law on this point. The facts in that case were that cargo of flour had been shipped from Boston to South America in charge of a supercargo. Part of it was sold in Rio Janeiro and the remainder carried to Montevideo, but the market at that place being unfavorable, the supercargo concluded to carry it to Batavia. He did so and there delivered it to the plaintiff, a merchant, to sell and invest the proceeds, together with the proceeds of the flour sold in South America, for the benefit of the shipper. The market at Batavia was glutted; the flour was somewhat damaged, but the plaintiff succeeded in selling it on six months' credit, himself advanced the amount of the price, and invested it in coffee, which he consigned to the Boston shipper by whom it was received, without knowledge of the fact that the flour had been sold on credit. The purchaser of the flour became insolvent and unable to pay the purchase price, and the Batavia merchant thereupon brought suit against the Boston shipper and recovered the amount so advanced. Mr. Justice Story, in charging the jury, referred to the fact that the shipper's instructions in their terms only contemplated sales of the cargo in South America, and then said: "It turned out, however, that the flour could not all be sold at the South American ports, or at least not sold, unless at an enormous sacrifice. The parties had not looked for any such event. What then was it the duty of the supercargo to do, in such a case of unexpected occurrence not within the contemplation of the instructions? Was he to sacrifice the flour, or throw it overboard? No one pretends that it was intended to be brought back to the United States under any circumstances. It would probably have been spoiled and ruined on the return voyage and come home actually worthless. Now I take it to be clear that if, by some sudden emergency, or supervening necessity, or other unexpected event, it becomes impossible for the supercargo to comply with the exact terms of his instructions, or a literal compliance therewith would frustrate the objects of the owner, and amount to a total sacrifice of his interests, it becomes the duty of the supercargo, under such circumstances, to do the best he can, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to prevent a total loss to his owner; and if he acts bona fide, and exercises a reasonable discretion, his acts will bind the owner. He becomes, in such case, an agent from necessity for the power.' 'Forrester v. Boardman, I Story 43. |