acquaintance with German philosophy. — We shall first quote paragraphs from the Introduction.

Johnson's Version, § 1.-" A history of philosophy, to be complete,* demands a preliminary enquiry respecting the character of this science, as well as respecting its subject-matter,† its form and object, and also its extent or comprehensiveness, its method, its importance, and the different ways in which it may be treated. All these particulars, with the bibliography belonging to it, will form, together with some previous observations on the progress of philosophical research, the subject of a general introduction."

Literal Translation, § 1.-" The history of philosophy, if handled in conformity to the end in view, presupposes an inquiry touching the conception of the science, conjoining a view of its contents, form, and end, as also of its compass, method, importance, and the various modes in which it may be treated. These objects, along with the history and literature of the history of philosophy, combined with some preparatory observations on the progress of the philosophizing reason, afford the contents of a general introduction to the history of philosophy."

Johnson's Version, § 2.-" The human mind has a tendency to attempt to enlarge the bounds of its knowledge, and gradually to aspire to a clear development of the laws and relations of nature, and of its own operations. T At first it does nothing more than obey a blind desire, without accounting to itself sufficiently for this instinctive impulse of the understanding,** and

* "Complete," inaccurate; original, Zweckmaessig.

+ "Subject-matter;" original, Inhalt, i. e. contents, the complement of objects. Subject or Subject-matter is the materia subjecta or in qua; and if employed for the object, materia objecta or circa quam, is always an abuse of philosophical language, though with us unfortunately a very common one. But to commute these terms in the translation of a Kantian Treatise, where subject and object, subjective and objective, are accurately contradistinguished, and where the distinction forms, in fact, the very cardinal point on which the whole philosophy turns, is to convert light into darkness, order into chaos.

"Object;" original, Zweck, end, aim, scope. The unphilosophical abuse of the term object for end is a comparatively recent innovation in the English and French languages. Culpable at all times, on the present occasion it is equally inexcusable as the preceding.

|| "Philosophic Research." The translation is a vague and unmeaning version of a precise and significant original-philosophirende Vernunft. (See § 2.)

This sentence is mangled, and wholly misunderstood. "The end of philosophy," says Trismegistus, "is the intuition of unity;" and to this tendency of speculation towards the absolute-to the intensive completion in unity, and not to the extensive enlargement to infinity, of our knowledge, does Tennemann refer. The latter is not philosophy in his view at all. In the translation, Vernunft (Reason), the faculty of the absolute in Kant's system, and here used strictly in that sense, is diluted into "Mind;" and the four grand Categories are omitted, according to which reason endeavours to carry up the knowledge furnished through the senses and understanding, into the unconditioned.

*** Understanding;" just the reverse-" Reason;" original, Vernunft. The author and his translator are in these terms, always at cross-purposes. "Instinc

without knowing the appropriate means to be employed, or the distance by which it is removed from its object. Insensibly this impulse becomes more, deliberate, and regulates itself in proportion to the progress of the understanding,* which gradually becomes better acquainted with itself. Such a deliberate impulse is what we call philosophy." +

Literal Translation, § 2.—" Man, through the tendency of his Reason (Vernunft), strives after a systematic completion (Vollendung) of his knowledge considered in Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality, and consequently endeavours to raise himself to a science of the ultimate principles and laws of Nature and Liberty, and of their mutual relations. To this he is at first impelled by the blind feeling of a want; he forms no adequate appreciation of the problem thus proposed by reason; and knows not by what way, through what means, or to what extent, the end is to be attained. By degrees his efforts become more reflective, and this in proportion to the gradual development of the self-consciousness of reason. This reflective effort we denominate the act of philosophizing."

Johnson's Version, § 3.-" Thereupon arise various attempts to approximate this mental object of the understanding,‡ attempts more or less differing in respect of their principles, their methods, their consequences, || their extent, and, in general, their peculiar objects. In all these attempts, (which take the name of Philosophic Systems, when they present themselves in a scientific form, and the value of which is proportionate to the degree of intelligence manifested by each particular philosopher,) we trace the gradual development of the human understanding, according to its peculiar laws." Literal Translation, § 3.—“ Out of this effort arise the various attempts of thinkers to approximate to this Idea of reason, or to realize it in thought; attempts more or less differing from each other in principle, in method, in logical consequence, in result, and in the comprehension and general character of their objects. In these attempts (which, when they present themselves in a form scientifically complete, are denominated philosophic systems, and possess a value varying in proportion to the pitch of intellectual cultivation, and to the point of view of the several speculators) the thinking reason developes itself in conformity to its peculiar laws."

Johnson's Version, § 4.-" But the development of human reason is itself subject to external conditions, and is sometimes seconded, sometimes re

tinctive impulse of the understanding" is also wrong in itself, and wrong as a translation. The whole sentence, indeed, as will be seen from our version, is one tissue of error.

* "Understanding;" the same error; "Reason." The whole sentence is ill

rendered.

+"Philosophy;" das Philosophiren, not philosophy vaguely, but precisely, philosophic act-philosophizing.-Streben here, and before, is also absurdly translated "impulse;" a "deliberate impulse!" a round square!

‡ “Object of the Understanding;" the opposite again; original, Idee der Vernunft.

"Consequences;" wrong; Consequenz.

"Understanding,” usual blunder for reason, and twice in this §. It is so frequent in the sequel, that we cannot afford to notice it again. The whole paragraph is in other respects mutilated, and inaccurately rendered.

tarded, or suspended, according to the different impressions it receives from without."*

Literal Translation, § 4.—" But the development of human reason does not take place without external excitement; it is consequently dependent upon external causes, in as much as its activity through the different direction given it from without, is now promoted in its efforts, now checked and held back."

Johnson's Version, § 5.-" To give an account of the different works produced by the understanding, thus in the progress of improvement, and favoured or impeded by external circumstances, is, in fact, to compose a history of philosophy." +

Literal Translation, § 5.—“ An account of the manifold efforts made to realize that Idea of reason (§ 2) in Matter and Form, (in other words, to bring philosophy as a science to bear,) efforts arising from the development of reason, and promoted or held in check by external causes-constitutes, in fact, the History of Philosophy."

Johnson's Version, § 6.-"The subject-matter of the history of philosophy, is both external and internal. The internal or immediate embraces, 1. The efforts continually made by the understanding to attain to a perception of the first principles of the great objects of its pursuit, (§ 2,) with many incidental details relating to the subject of investigation, the degree of ardour or remissness which from time to time have prevailed; with the influence of external causes to interest men in such pursuits, or the absence of them. || 2. The effects of philosophy, or the views, methods, and systems it has originated; effects varying with the energies out of which they sprang. In these we see the understanding avail itself of materials perpetually accumulating towards constituting philosophy a science, or rules and principles for collecting materials to form a scientific whole; or finally, maxims relating to the method to be pursued in such researches. 3. And lastly: We observe the development of the understanding as an instrument of philosophy, that is to say, the progress of the understanding towards researches in which it depends solely on itself; in other words, its gradual progress towards the highest degree of independence; a progress which may be observed in individuals, in nations, and in the whole race of man." **

Literal Translation, § 6.-" The matter about which the history of philosophy is conversant, is consequently both internal and external. The internal or proximate matter, comprehends, in the first place, the continued application of reason to the investigation of the ultimate principles and laws of Nature and Liberty; for therein consists the act of philosophising (§ 2). And here are to be observed great differences in regard to subject and object -to the extensive application and intensive force of the philosophising

* Mangled and incorrect.

+ Mangled and incorrect.

"Subject-matter;" Stoff, matter, or object-matter: see note on § 1.

|| The whole sentence execrable in all respects; we cannot criticise it in detail. In this sentence there are nine errors, besides imperfections.

** In this sentence, what is suffered to remain is worse treated than what is thrown out.

energy-to internal aims and motives (whether generous or interested)—as likewise to external causes and occasions. It comprehends, secondly, the products of the philosophising act, in other words, philosophic views, methods, and systems, (§ 3,) which are as manifold as the efforts out of which they spring. Through these reason partly obtains materials becoming gradually purer, for philosophy as science, partly rules and principles by which to bind up these materials into a scientific whole, partly, in fine, maxims for our procedure in the search after philosophy. Thirdly, it comprehends the development of reason, as the instrument of philosophy, i.e. the excitation of reason to spontaneous inquiry, in conformity to determined laws through internal inclination, and external occasion, and herein the gradual progress manifested by individuals, nations, and the thinking portion of mankind. This therefore constitutes an important anthropological phasis of the history of philosophy." Johnson's Version, § 7.-" The external matter consists in the causes, events, and circumstances which have influenced the development of philosophic reason, and the nature of its productions. To this order of facts belong: 1. The individual history of philosophers, that is to say, the degree, the proportion, and the direction of their intellectual powers; the sphere of their studies and their lives, the interests which swayed them, and even their moral characters.* 2. The influence of external causes, that is to say, the character and the degree of mental cultivation prevalent in the countries to which they belonged; the prevailing spirit of the times; and, to descend still farther, the climate and properties of the country; its institutions, religion and language.† 3. The influence of individuals in consequence of the admiration and imitation they have excited, by their doctrines or example; an influence which betrays itself in the matter as well as in the manner of their schools." (Bacon, Locke, Leibnitz.)

Literal Translation. § 7.-" The external matter consists in those causes, events, and circumstances, which have exerted an influence on the development of the philosophising reason, and the complexion of its productions. To this head belong, in the first place, the individual genius of the philosopher, i. e. the degree, the mutual relation, and the direction of his intellectual faculties, dependent thereon his sphere of view and operation, and the interest with which it inspires him, and withal even his moral character. In the second place, the influence of external causes on individual genius, such as the character and state of cultivation of the nation, the dominant spirit of the age, and less proximately the climate and natural qualities of the country, education, political constitution, religion, and language. In the third place, the effect of individual genius itself (through admiration and imitation, precept and example) on the interest, the direction, the particular objects, the kind and method of the subsequent speculation-an influence variously modified in conformity to intellectual character, to the consideration and celebrity of schools established, to writings, their form and their contents." (Bacon, Locke, Leibnitz.)

* In this sentence there are four inaccuracies.

In this sentence there are two omissions, one essential to the meaning, and one inaccuracy.

Compare the literal version!

Johnson's Version, § 9.-" History in general is distinguished, when properly so called, from Annals, Memoirs, &c., by its form: i.e. by the combination of its incidents, and their circumstantial development." "'*

Literal Translation, § 9.—“ History, in the stricter signification, is distinguished by reference to its form, from mere annals, memoirs, &c., through the concatenation of events, and their scientific exposition," [i. e. under the relation of causes and effects.]

Passing now to the body of the book:-we shall first take a paragraph from the account of Aristotle's philosophy, in which an Oxford Tutor and Examining Master may be supposed at home. With the exception, however, of four popular treatises, we suspect that the Stagirite is as little read or understood in Oxford, as in Edinburgh.

Johnson's Version, § 140.-" Aristotle possessed in a high degree the talents of discrimination and analysis, added to the most astonishing knowledge of books, † and the works of Nature. To the latter, more especially, he had devoted himself. He rejected the doctrine of ideas; maintaining that all our impressions and thoughts, and even the highest efforts of the underderstanding, are the fruit of experience; that the world is eternal, even in its form, and not the work of a creative providence. In the theory of composition he drew a distinction between the matter, which he referred to philosophy, and the form, which he derived from poetry. Instead of following his master in his way of reasoning from the universal to the particular, he always takes the opposite course, and infers the first from the latter. His writings contain valuable remarks on the systems of his predecessors; his own being that of Empiricism, modified in a slight degree by the Rationalism of Plato." Literal Translation, § 140.—“ Aristotle possessed in a high degree the talent of discrimination, and an extensive complement of knowledge derived

* Circumstantial development; pragmatische Darstellung. No word occurs more frequently in the historical and philosophical literature of Germany and Holland, than pragmatisch, or pragmaticus, and Pragmatismus. So far from pragmatisch being tantamount to "circumstantial" and opposed (see § 12 of translation) to "scientific," the word is peculiarly employed to denote that form of history, which, neglecting circumstantial details, is occupied in the scientific evolution of causes and effects. It is, in fact, a more definite term than the histoire raisonée of the French. The word in this signification was originally taken from Polybius; but founded, as is now acknowledged, on an erroneous interpretation. (See Schweighaeuser ad Polyb. L. i. c. 2,—C. D. Beckii Diss. Pragmaticæ Historiæ apud veteres ratio et judicium,—and Borgeri Oratio de Historia Pragmatica.)

+ Tennemann does not make Aristotle a bibliographer.

The question of origin refers not to the subjective efforts of our faculties, but to the objective knowledge about which these efforts are conversant. The sentence is otherwise mutilated, and its sense destroyed.

What this may possibly mean we confess ourselves at a loss to guess. Is it an attempt at translating some interpolation of Wendt in the last edition of the Grundriss ours is the fourth. It cannot surely be intended for a version of what is otherwise omitted by Mr Johnson.