its employment, if not suicidal, is absurd.-This condition of non-contradiction is unexpressed by Reid. It might seem to him too evidently included in the very conception of the argument to require enouncement. Brown has proved that he was wrong. Yet Reid could hardly have anticipated that his whole philosophy, in relation to the argument of common sense, and that argument itself, were so to be mistaken as to be actually interpreted by contraries. These principles established, we proceed to their application.

Brown's error, in regard to Reid's doctrine of perception, involves the other, touching the relation of that doctrine to Hume's sceptical idealism. On the supposition that Reid views in the immediate object of perception a mental modification, and not a material quality, Brown is fully warranted in asserting that he left the foundations of idealism precisely as he found them. Let it once be granted that the object known in perception is not convertible with the reality existing; idealism reposes in equal security on the hypothesis of a representative perception,whether the representative image be a modification of consciousness itself, or whether it have an existence independent either of mind or of the act of thought. The former, indeed, as the simpler basis, would be the more secure; and, in point of fact, the egoistical idealism of Fichte, resting on the third form of representation, is less exposed to criticism than the theological idealism of Berkeley, which reposes on the first. Did Brown not mistake Reid's doctrine, Reid was certainly absurd in thinking a refutation of idealism to be involved in his refutation of the common theory of perception. So far from blaming Brown, on this supposition, for denying to Reid the single merit which that philosopher thought peculiarly his own, we only reproach him for leaving, to Reid and to himself, any possible mode of resisting the idealist at all. It was a monstrous error to reverse Reid's doctrine of perception; but a greater still not to see that this reversal stultifies the argument from common sense; and that so far from "proceeding on safe ground” in an appeal to our original beliefs, Reid would have employed, as Brown has actually done, a weapon harmless to the sceptic, but mortal to himself.

The belief, says Brown, in the existence of an external world is irresistible, therefore it is true. On his doctrine of perception, which he attributes also to Reid, this inference is, however, incompetent, because on that doctrine he cannot fulfil the condition

which the argument implies. I cannot but believe that material things exist:-I cannot but believe that the material reality is the object immediately known in perception. The former of these beliefs, explicitly argues Brown, in defending his system against the sceptic, because irresistible, is true. The latter of these beliefs, implicitly argues Brown, in establishing his system itself, though irresistible, is false. And here not only are two primitive beliefs, supposed to be repugnant, and consciousness therefore delusive; the very belief which is assumed as true, exists in fact only through the other, which, ex hypothesi, is false. Both in reality are one.* Kant, in whose doctrine as in Brown's the immediate object of perception constitutes only a subjective phænomenon, was too acute, not to discern that, on this hypothesis, philosophy could not, without contradiction, appeal to the evidence of our ele

* This reasoning can only be invalidated either, 1°, By disproving the belief itself of the knowledge, as a fact; or 2°, By disproving its attribute of originality. The latter is impossible; and if possible would also annihilate the originality of the belief of the existence, which is supposed. The former alternative is ridiculous. That we are naturally determined to believe the object known in perception, to be the external existence itself, and that it is only in consequence of a supposed philosophical necessity, we subsequently endeavour by an artificial abstraction to discriminate these; is admitted even by those psychologists whose doctrine is thereby placed in overt contradiction to our original beliefs. Though perhaps superfluous to allege authorities in support of such a point, we refer, however, to the following, which happen to occur to our recollection.-DESCARTES, De Passionibus, art. 26.-MALEBRANCHE, Recherche, 1. iii. c. 1.-BERKELEY, Works, i. p. 216, 4to ed., and quoted by Reid in his Intellectual Powers, p. 165, orig. ed. -HUME, Treatise, i. pp. 330, 338, 353, 358, 361, 369, orig. ed.—Essays, ii. pp. 154, 157, ed. 1788. —As not generally accessible, we translate the following extracts.SCHELLING (Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, Einl. p. xix. 1st ed.)—“When (in perception) I represent an object, object and representation are one and the And simply in this, our inability to discriminate the object from the representation during the act, lies the conviction which the common sense of mankind (gemeine Verstand) has of the reality of external things, although these become known to it, only through representations." (See also p. xxvi.)- We cannot recover, at the moment, a passage, to the same effect, in Kant; but the ensuing is the testimony of an eminent disciple.-TENNEMANN, (Geschichte d. Philosophie, II. p. 294,) speaking of Plato: "The illusion that things in themselves are cognisable, is so natural, that we need not marvel if even philosophers have not been able to emancipate themselves from the prejudice. The common sense of mankind (gemeine Menschenverstand) which remains steadfast within the sphere of experience, recognises no distinction between things in themselves [unknown reality existing] and phænomena [representation, object known]; and the philosophizing reason commences therewith its attempt to investigate the foundations of this knowledge, and to recall itself into system."-See also JACOBI's David Hume, passim, (Werke, ii.) and his Allwills Briefsammlung, (Werke, i. p. 119, sq.) Reid has been already quoted.-[Diss. pp. 747, 748, give other testimonies of a similar purport.]

same.

mentary faiths." Allowing idealism," he says, "to be as dangerous as it truly is, it would still remain a scandal to philosophy and human reason in general, to be compelled to accept the existence of external things on the testimony of mere belief."*

But Reid is not, like Brown, felo de se in his reasoning from our natural beliefs; and on his genuine doctrine of perception, the argument has a very different tendency. Reid asserts that his doctrine of perception is itself a confutation of the ideal system; and so, when its imperfections are supplied, it truly is. For it at once denies to the sceptic and idealist the premises of their conclusion; and restores to the realist, in its omnipotence, the argument of common sense. The sceptic and idealist can only found on the admission, that the object known is not convertible with the reality existing; and, at the same time, this admission, by placing the facts of consciousness in mutual contradiction, denies its postulate to the argument from our beliefs. Reid's analysis therefore in its result,-THAT WE HAVE, AS WE

BELIEVE WE HAVE, AN IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MATERIAL REALITY,-accomplished every thing at once.†

Brown is not, however, more erroneous in thinking that the argument from common sense could be employed by him, than in supposing that its legitimacy, as so employed, was admitted by Hume. So little did he suspect the futility, in his own

* Cr. d. r. V.-Vorr. p. xxxix. Kant's marvellous acuteness did not however enable him to bestow on his "Only possible demonstration of the reality of an external world," (ibid. p. 275, sq.) even a logical necessity; nor prevent his transcendental, from being apodeictically resolved (by Jacobi and Fichte) into absolute, idealism. In this argument, indeed, he collects more in the conclusion, than was contained in the antecedent; and reaches it by a double saltus, overleaping the foundations both of the egoistical and mystical idealists.-Though Kant, in the passage quoted above and in other places, apparently derides the common sense of mankind, and altogether rejects it as a metaphysical principle of truth; he at last, however, found it necessary (in order to save philosophy from the annihilating energy of his Speculative Reason) to rest on that very principle of an ultimate belief, (which he had originally spurned as a basis even of a material reality), the reality of all the sublimest objects of our interest-God, Free Will, Immortality, &c. His Practical Reason, as far as it extends, is, in truth, only another (and not even a better) term for Common Sense.-Fichte, too, escaped the admitted nihilism of his speculative philosophy, only by a similar inconsequence in his practical. (See his Bestimmung des Menschen.) "Naturam expellas furca," &c. + [This is spoken too absolutely. Reid I think was correct in the aim of his philosophy; but in the execution of his purpose he is often at fault, often confused, and sometimes even contradictory. I have endeavoured to point out and to correct these imperfections in the edition which I have not yet finished of his works.]

hands, of this proof, he only regards it as superfluous, if opposed to that philosopher, who, he thinks, in allowing the belief in the existence of matter to be irresistible, allows it to be true. (Lect. xxviii. p. 176.) Brown has committed, perhaps, more important mistakes than this, in regard to scepticism and to Hume;-none certainly more fundamental. Hume is converted into a dogmatist; the essence of scepticism is misconceived.

On the hypothesis that our natural beliefs are fallacious, it is not for the Pyrrhonist to reject, but to establish their authenticity; and so far from the admission of their strength being a surrender of his doubt, the very triumph of scepticism consists in proving them to be irresistible. By what demonstration is the foundation of all certainty and knowledge so effectually subverted, as by showing that the principles, which reason constrains us speculatively to admit, are contradictory of the facts, which our instincts compel us practically to believe? Our intellectual nature is thus seen to be divided against itself; consciousness stands self-convicted of delusion. "Surely we have eaten the fruit of lies!"

This is the scope of the "Essay on the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy," from which Brown quotes. In that essay, previous to the quotation, Hume shows, on the admission of philosophers, that our belief in the knowledge of material things, as impossible is false; and on this admission, he had irresistibly established the speculative absurdity of our belief in the existence of an external world. In the passage, on the contrary, which Brown partially extracts, he is showing that this idealism, which in theory must be admitted, is in application impossible. Speculation and practice, nature and philosophy, sense and reason, belief and knowledge, thus placed in mutual antithesis, give, as their result, the uncertainty of every principle; and the assertion of this uncertainty is-Scepticism. This result is declared even in the sentence, with the preliminary clause of which Brown abruptly terminates his quotation.

But allowing Brown to be correct in transmuting the sceptical nihilist into a dogmatic realist; he would still be wrong (on the supposition that Hume admitted the truth of a belief to be convertible with its invincibility) in conceiving, on the one hand, that Hume could ever acquiesce in the same inconsequent conclusion with himself; or, on the other, that he himself could, without an abandonment of his system, acquiesce in the legitimate

conclusion. On this supposition, Hume could only have arrived at a similar result with Reid; there is no tenable medium between the natural realism of the one and the sceptical nihilism of the other. "Do you follow," says Hume in the same Essay, "the instincts and propensities of nature in assenting to the veracity of sense?"-I do, says Brown. (Lect. xxviii. p. 176, alibi.)— "But these," continues Hume, "lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external?"-It is the vital principle of my system, says Brown, that the mind knows nothing beyond its own states (Lectt. passim); philosophical suicide is not my choice; I must recall my admission, and give the lie to this natural belief." You here," proceeds Hume, " depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects."-I allow, says Brown, that the existence of an external world cannot be proved by reasoning, and that the sceptical argument admits of no logical reply. (Lect. xxviii. p. 175.)—“ But” (we may suppose Hume to conclude) "as you truly maintain that the confutation of scepticism can be attempted only in two ways (ibid.), either by showing that its arguments are inconclusive, or by opposing to them, as paramount, the evidence of our natural beliefs, and as you now, voluntarily or by compulsion, abandon both; you are confessedly reduced to the dilemma, either of acquiescing in the conclusion of the sceptic, or of refusing your assent upon no ground whatever. Pyrrhonism or absurdity ?—

choose your horn."

Were the scepticism into which Brown's philosophy is thus analysed, confined to the negation of matter, the result would be comparatively unimportant. The transcendent reality of an outer world, considered absolutely, is to us a matter of supreme indifference. It is not the idealism itself that we must deplore; but the mendacity of consciousness which it involves. Consciousness, once convicted of falsehood, an unconditional scepticism, in regard to the character of our intellectual being, is the melancholy, but only rational, result. Any conclusion may now with impunity be drawn against the hopes and dignity of human nature. Our Personality, our Immateriality, our Moral Liberty,