Opinion of the Court-Deady, J. [July, the validity of it, deposited with Ladd & Tilton the certificate of the secretary of said corporation, that no payments had been made on such notes and accounts, and "I hereby further notify you, that unless your note to me of fifty thousand dollars, dated March 27, 1884, is paid within three days from the date hereof, according to its tenor and effect, I shall take steps to enforce the collection of the same as provided in my agreement with you of the 27th of March, 1884." The certificate of the secretary, dated April 22, 1886, a copy of which was inclosed in the letter of the defendant, states in effect, that no payments had been made on either of the notes in question, and that there is due Reed from the corporation, "on open account, the further sum of thirty-three thousand one hundred and twenty-six dollars and thirty-five cents for money advanced.” To this the plaintiff replied on the following day, claiming in effect that the defendant had undertaken to make an investment of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars in the securities of the Oregon Iron and Steel company, one-third of which was for the benefit of the plaintiff, and that as his trustee the defendant was bound to make a showing of the results of the investment and that the notes in question are actually one-third thereof, and are "good and valid claims" against the corporation, This ended the correspondence between the parties. The plaintiff did not accept the papers tendered him or offer to pay his note, but on April 24th brought this suit, without bringing his tender into court. The bill states the offer of the plaintiff to pay his note on March 30th, and alleges that the defendant refused to perform the contract on his part, and deliver up said note and stocks or any of the securities received on said loan, or to furnish any account thereof, and is threatening to sell and dispose of the same to the great and irreparable injury of the plaintiff, that "cannot be compensated for in money damages." It appears from the answer, and there is no doubt about the fact, that at the date of the contract Reed had already 1886.] Opinion of the Court-Deady, J. advanced to the corporation over ninety-five thousand dollars of this loan, and that that fact and all the circumstances of the transaction, down to and including the making of the notes to the defendant and the state of accounts between him and the corporation were and are as well known to the plaintiff as to the defendant. From this statement of the case, it is evident that this so-called tender of March 30th was a mere make-believe and intended for effect. When the defendant's attorney heard of it, and expressed his willingness to accept it, as soon as the papers could be properly endorsed and assigned, no quibble was made about the nature of the endorsement or the propriety of a report from the defendant as the supposed trustee of a joint investment. But when, on April 13th, the notes of the corporation were tendered to the plaintiff, duly endorsed "without recourse," objection was first made to this "qualification" or "restriction." Now the plaintiff had no right to any other endorsement. Reed did not agree to give him the corporation notes secured by his own unqualified endorsement. He simply agreed to give him one-third of the notes he received from the corporation, without any endorsement whatever. Seeley having the option to pay his note and receive the corporation notes or forfeit his stock, pledged as collateral, Reed could not safely take any of the corporation notes in the former's name. From the nature of the case, he was compelled to take them payable to his own order, and await Seeley's action. And when the latter signified his readiness to pay his note and take the securities, all that Reed was required to do under the circumstances was to endorse them, so as to pass the legal title to Seeley without in any manner making himself personally liable for their payment; and this was properly done by adding to his name thereon the words "without recourse." By this endorsement, however, Reed undertook that the notes were what they purported to be-the valid obligation of the Oregon Iron and Steel company for the sums stated therein. (1 Dan. N. I., sec. 670.) More than this, the plaintiff had no right to ask, and his [July, Opinion of the Court-Deady, J. having done so under the circumstances, is proof that he was merely playing a part. But in the letter of April 23d this objection is apparently abandoned, and the plaintiff assumes that the defendant has been acting in this matter in the high character of his trustee, and wants a showing as to what he has received from the corporation for this loan of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and in a roundabout way suggests, if not insinuates, that possibly he might have taken the corporation paper at a discount, and if so, he wants to know it, and have his share of the benefit. Of course, Seeley is entitled, on the payment of his note, to the full one-third of all the evidences of debt that Reed obtained from the corporation for this loan. But there is no presumption that they amount to more than the sum loaned. The transaction was not a purchase of the corporation paper in the market at a discount, with one hundred and fifty thousand dollars. It was simply an advance to the corporation from time to time, by the president thereof, of what amounted in the aggregate to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and taking its notes therefor, not as a speculation, but for the purpose of tiding the corporation, in which both parties were interested, over a financial difficulty. And no one knows any more about the transaction than the plaintiff does. The history of it is contained in the corporation books, with which he is familiar, and which were kept during the greater portion, if not the whole of this period, by his particular friend and business associate. And yet he dares not say in his bill, and does not say in this correspondence, that Reed got one dollar more in notes and accounts from the corporation than the amount of the money advanced to it. On the other hand, Reed offers these notes and this account as the one-third of what he got for the loan. By a necessary implication, he asserts that they are one-third in value of what the corporation gave for the one hundred and fifty thousand dollars advanced to it, and I see no reason to doubt the truth of his statement. The refusal to pay the note on this flimsy pretext furnishes further proof if any is necessary, that the plaintiff is not acting in good faith in this matter, and this is further confirmed by the fact that he has not kept his tender good by bringing the amount into court. The plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under this bill, and the same is dismissed with costs. SAMUEL NORRIS v. J. B. HAGGIN ET AL. NINTH CIRCUIT, DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. 1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-EQUITY.-The rule established by the decisions of the supreme court as to the efiect of statutes of limitations in courts of equity appears to be, that, in those states where the statutes of limitations are made applicable to suits in equity, as well as to actions at law, and they embrace in terms the specific case, and in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, they are, as obligatory, as such, upon the national courts of equity, as they are upon the state courts and as they are in actions at law; and the courts of equity should act in obedience, rather than upon analogy, to them. But where they are not applicable to equity cases in the state courts, and there is not concurrent jurisdiction, and where the specific case is not covered in terms by the statute, then the time prescribed by the statute of limitations will, ordinarily, be applied by analogy, in accordance with the provisions most nearly analogous and applicable. 2. LIMITATIONS AS TO ACTIONS FOR FRAUD.-In providing for actions for relief on the ground of fraud, the legislature carried into the provision, the principle established by courts of equity, that the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the "discovery of the facts constituting the fraud;" and to ascertain, what conditions constitute a discovery within the meaning of the provisions, the principles established in equity law, whence the idea was derived, must be applied. 3. SAME DILIGENCE-MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.-The established principles as to the discovery of fraud are: That the party defrauded must be diligent in making inquiry; that means of knowledge are equivalent to knowledge; that a clue to the facts, which, if diligently followed, would lead to a discovery, is, in law, equivalent to a discovery. 4. IMBECILITY FROM INJURIES AS AN EXCUSE FOR NON-ACTION.-Conceding imbecility resulting from a serious injury upon the head, to be a sufficient excuse for not discovering the facts constituting the frauds, while such imbecility continues, the party must act, as soon as his imbecility ceases, or he will be deemed to have the knowledge which he might have obtained by the exercise of proper diligence. Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. [August, 5. WHAT FACTS CONSTITUTE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE, which the party is bound to pursue, pointed out, in a case where the title to large estates are alleged to have been fraudulently obtained by defendants. 6. MULTIFARIOUSNESS considered. Before SAWYER, Circuit Judge, and SABIN, District Judge. Mr. J. H. McKune and Mr. C. L. White, for complainant. Mr. Louis T. Haggin and Messrs. Beatty & Denson, for defendants. SAWYER, Circuit Judge. It is alleged in the bill, that the complainant, in the year 1859, and, thenceforth, till the title was divested in the years 1860-1-2-3, in the manner set out, was the owner of several tracts of land in Sacramento city and county, including the Rancho del Paso, containing forty-five thousand acres, situate on the right bank of the American river, opposite the city of Sacramento, all of the aggregate value, in round numbers, of about a million and a half of dollars; that from about 1855 till about 1868, the defendants were the trusted agents, business managers and attorneys of complainant in the management of his business connected with said property; that on the fourth day of March, 1859, he received a severe blow on the head, which rendered him insensible for several days, and his nervous system was so shocked thereby, that, for ten years thereafter he was unable, and, mentally and physically, incompetent te attend in person to his business affairs; or to comprehend what had been done in and about his business; or to direct his agents what to do, or how to act in the premises; and, during all this time, he was wholly dependent on the said defendants for advice and action in his affairs, and the defendants assumed the full charge and management of his business; that in violation of the trust and confidence thus reposed in them, defendants, during the year 1859, obtained a note and mortgage upon said property for a large amount, without his knowledge, and without proper consideration; that they foreclosed the mortgage in the following year and purchased in the property. Also, that during the years 1860 and 1861, they procured other judgments, fraudulently, |