nevertheless sold for the best price which could be obtained. When the poultry reached Chicago in that condition, the consignee discharged its duty to the Railway Company when it sold the damaged goods for what could be obtained for them. The testimony shows that the poultry was taken to a storage company at Chicago, where it was kept until it could be sold, and ultimately realized the sum of $10,035.69. The jury returned a verdict, under the instruction of the court to deduct the value of the property at Chicago from the invoice price, in the sum of $9,000 and interest. Evidently, in this state of the record, no harm was done to the rights of the plaintiff in error in assessing the sum which the jury awarded against it. We cannot agree with the contention of the plaintiff in error that the value of the deteriorated poultry at Temple or St. Louis should have been taken as the sum to be deducted from the invoice basis of value. Apart from the stipulation of these bills of lading, the ordinary measure of damages in cases of this sort is the difference between the market value of the property in the condition in which it should have arrived at the place of destination and its market value in the condition in which, by reason of the fault of the carrier, it did arrive. New York, Lake Erie & Western R. R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 591, 616. The stipulations of these bills of lading changed this rule in the requirement that the invoice price at the place of shipment should be the basis for assessing the damages. The poultry in fact had no market price at Temple or elsewhere. It was badly deteriorated, and when the shipper sold it at the point of destination for the best price it would bring he did all that could be fairly required of him to save the carrier from resulting loss. The trial court charged that the Santa Fe Company was entitled to a recovery against the Wabash Railroad Com Opinion of the Court. 244 U.S. pany if the jury found that the Santa Fe Company and Wabash Railroad Company were both guilty of negligence in the handling of the poultry, in which event the jury were told that the Santa Fe Company would be entitled to a verdict against the Wabash Railroad Company for that part of the sum to which the Wabash Company had contributed by its negligence to plaintiff's injury. It is urged by the plaintiff in error that the Santa Fe Company as the initial carrier, regardless of its own negligence, was entitled to recover against the Wabash Company in proportion as the negligence of that company contributed to the loss; and it is contended that the testimony tends to show that the Wabash Railroad Company did not properly re-ice and otherwise care for the poultry in transit. The record shows no proper exception reserved upon which to base this criticism; and the question becomes immaterial in view of the verdict of the jury in favor of the Wabash Railroad Company, and the express finding of the Court of Civil Appeals that the proof failed to show that any of the damages had been caused by the Wabash Railroad Company. We find no error in the judgment of the court below, and it is Affirmed. VAN DYKE ET AL. v. GEARY ET AL., MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA. No. 52. Argued March 23, 1917.-Decided May 7, 1917. In a case governed by Judicial Code, § 266, where the jurisdiction of the District Court is invoked upon constitutional questions, this court, upon appeal from an order denying preliminary injunction, has jurisdiction to review the whole case. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298. Extension of the power of the Corporation Commission to the regulation of water systems belonging to individuals, as provided in the Public Service Corporation Act of Arizona (Rev. Stats., 1913, Title 9, c. XI), is permitted by the Constitution of Arizona, Art. XV. In the absence of an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court of the State to the contrary, a contemporaneous construction of the state constitution by an act of the legislature which is reasonable in itself and designed to accomplish the obvious purpose of the constitutional provision in question should be followed by this court. Art. IV, pt. 2, § 13, of the Arizona Constitution requiring that acts of the legislature shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title, is sufficiently complied with by the Arizona Public Service Corporation Act, supra, although that act applies to individuals as well as corporations, while its title refers to corporations and makes no mention of individuals. One who uses his property in supplying a large community with water thereby clothes such property with a public interest and subjects the business to public regulation. Where it is conceded that the purpose of a water system is to supply water to the residents and inhabitants of a particular townsite, though not to outsiders or the public generally, the mere fact that the lots of the townsite were originally purchased from the owner of the water system with the oral understanding that water could be secured from that system for use on the lots has no tendency to support the claim that the system furnishes water only to particular individuals Opinion of the Court. 244 U. S. in pursuance of private contracts made with such lot purchasers and is hence devoted exclusively to private use. The fact that service is limited to a part of a town does not prevent a water system from being a public utility. Water rates fixed by a state commission upon a basis of a net annual return of 10% of the value of the property employed, allowing an annual depreciation charge of 32%, Held not confiscatory, the valua tion of the Dater system and estimate of operating expenses having been made by the state commission and concurred in by the District Court after careful inquiry by both, the evidence presented to this court being conflicting, and the District Court having appropriately protected the complaining party by providing that application for injunction may be renewed after one year if the rates appear too low. 218 Fed. Rep. 111, affirmed. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. William C. Prentiss, with whom Mr. F. C. Jacobs was on the brief, for appellants. Mr. Samuel Herrick, with whom Mr. Wiley E. Jones, Attorney General of the State of Arizona, and Mr. R. Wm. Kramer and Mr. Geo. W. Harben, Assistant Attorneys General of the State of Arizona, were on the brief, for appellees. MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the court. In 1909 Ida A. Van Dyke and her husband organized a corporation under the name of the Miami Townsite Company to acquire a tract in Gila County, Arizona, and establish a town thereon. A large part of Miami is now located on that land. In order to supply residents and others thereon with water for domestic, commercial and fire purposes, the Van Dykes introduced a water system which developed rapidly. In October, 1913, the Arizona Corporation Commission, a public service com mission with the usual powers of regulation, instituted before itself a proceeding to have the rates charged by the water system declared excessive, and to have reasonable rates established. The Van Dykes, who were duly served, filed a "plea in bar"; alleged that the plant was the individual property of Ida A. Van Dyke; that the business was operated by her with her husband as manager, and not by a corporation; and denied not only the validity of the order but also the jurisdiction of the commission over them. The objection to the jurisdiction was overruled; and the commission proceeded to a hearing on the merits, at which the Van Dykes offered no evidence. On May 1, 1914, after an elaborate report, an order was entered greatly reducing the water rates. The Van Dykes promptly filed a motion for a rehearing, which was denied. Thereupon they applied to the commission to stay the operation of the order pending proceedings for review in the state court. This application also was denied. Then they filed, in the District Court of the United States for the District of Arizona, this suit against the members of the commission, the Attorney General of the State and the county attorney to enjoin the enforcement of the order and the prosecution for penalties for failure to observe the same; and to have the order itself cancelled. Both plaintiffs and defendants are citizens and residents of Arizona. Jurisdiction of the federal court was invoked solely on the ground that the order of the commission, if enforced, would deprive plaintiffs of their property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and that the penalties prescribed by the Arizona statute for failure to obey the order are so severe as to prevent resort to the remedies therein provided for testing in the state courts the validity of the orders. An interlocutory injunction was applied for; and the case was heard before three judges under § 266 of the Judicial Code. The jurisdiction of the court was sustained under the rule declared |