are subject to a certain supervision by the Federal Government, and thereby fair competition and high business standards and the public interests are severally and continuously safeguarded.

Trade Standardization Wins Approval Abroad.

It is an outstanding fact that the Webb-Pomerene Law represents the first effort involving compulsory registration of export trade combinations by a government agency under a special law. This fact alone constitutes a noteworthy forward step in the consummation of an American foreign trade policy, the significance and importance of which is being favorably recognized not only among our own people but also in foreign countries. In Canada and in England commercial legislation along similar lines has been initiated and the old traditional policy of laissez faire in export trade seems gradually to be giving way to new principles such as are embodied in the Webb-Pomerene Act.

CHAPTER XII.

Section I of the Webb-Pomerene Law.

Export Trade

Meaning of "Export" Judicially Determined.

The correct definition of the word "export" is highly important, in connection with our general subject. Fortunately, we have at our command an authoritative statement by the United States Supreme Court:

"Whatever primary meaning may be indicated by its derivation, the word 'export' as used in the Constitution and Laws of the United States, generally means the transportation of goods from this to a foreign country." Swan & Finch Co. v. United States (190 U. S. 143, 1902). Obviously enough, however, this definition does not cover the entire subject, which demands the broadest treatment, but here, too, we are fortunate in having a further description of the essential quality of export trade:

"As the legal notion of emigrating is a going abroad with an intention of not returning, so that of exportation is a severance of goods from the mass of things belonging to some foreign country or other." (17 Op. Attys. Gen. 583, 1883).

So that by combining these two descriptive terms and making them into one composite whole, we have for our version the authoritative definition of the term as employed in the United States Constitution and Laws; and "export" means the transporting of goods from this to a foreign country, with an intention of there so disposing of them that those specific goods will not return to the United States. It is plainly seen that mere pricefixing, allotting orders, etc., does not come within the definition; physical transmitting of actual goods is required.

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Even this definition, however, requires some elucidation-as that export of the goods in question is not effectuated by the intention to (a) store the articles abroad, with the idea of importing them at a later time; and with the implication that the purpose of the transaction is not scientific or otherwise altruistic, but is commercial, i. e., intended to make money; (b) send them upon a voyage for the ripening effect, as upon wine or fruits; or (c) cause the goods to be carried through foreign ports en route from one domestic port to another, as, for example, stopping some time at Buenos Aires in transit from San Francisco to New York; and (d) supply provisions, coal, etc., for consumption upon the voyage or journey. It is quite evident the term "export" does not properly apply to any of these four situations.

The rules of legal construction call for a liberal disposition of the doubtful element in favor of the individual when a burden is placed upon a citizen; but where a grant of privilege exists, the benefit of the doubt goes to the grantor, in this case the government. (Swan & Finch Co., supra.) Unquestionably, the merchant or manufacturer engaged in export trade will in most instances have some duty to perform; so that having assumed the "burden," he is entitled to favorable consideration, for the performance of acts in way of duties will not be imposed by means of vague or doubtful interpretations. (See Powers v. Barney, 5 Blatch. 202, mentioned in the Swan & Finch Co. case, already quoted herein.)

Other Authorities Confirm Judicial Definition.

In confirmation of the description and definition of the term "export" embodied in these authorities, we call attention to the fact of its acceptance and application by the United States Treasury Department, when determining the status under the custom laws, of coal and other stores, laden upon vessels for consumption or use during a voyage to a foreign country. The word "export," regarded as a noun, is defined in Webster's International Dictionary as "a commodity conveyed from one country or state to another in way of traffic;" and the Century

Dictionary describes "exportation" as "the act of conveying or sending to a distance, especially to another state or country, commodities in the course of commerce." All of which, in substance, restates and reiterates the position assumed by the Attorney General and the Supreme Court in the opinions set forth by those public functionaries, respectively, in the years 1883 and 1902.

"Export Trade" Means Outgoing Trade.

In a relatively early case, the Supreme Court ruled (Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 132, 1868) that the constitutional provision, "No State shall levy any imposts or duties on imports or exports," did not refer to articles transported from one State to another, but only to articles connected with trade between foreign countries and the United States; and this holding was in the face of a remark by Chief Justice Marshall (Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton 449) that the principles involved in the construction of this phase of the Constitution "apply equally to importations from a sister State." Those utterances, however, were so intimately associated with ideas born of colonial associations and methods of thought that we should and do discount them when dealing with current situations; and the sentiments expressed by the same court in the Swan & Finch Co. case are the more convincing because they are founded upon a broader view of the plan of government provided for us by the Fathers of the Constitution.

In brief, "export trade" is a term which was employed by the framers of the Webb-Pomerene Law to designate the outgoing commerce of the United States; and no other meaning is admissible when construing and applying that statute.

TRADE AND COMMERCE.

Definition of Terms by Courts.

These terms have been so long and so frequently applied to the affairs of traffic that it is difficult to disassociate or differentiate between them. Obviously there must be a distinction—

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otherwise the act of dealing in products would be described in one compact composite term. The distinction is set forth in one of the earlier anti-trust cases, United States v. Coal Dealers' Assn., 85 Fed. 252, 265:

"What, then, is trade and commerce among the several States and with foreign nations? 'Trade,' in a business sense, has been defined as 'the exchange of commodities for other commodities or for money; the business of buying and selling; dealing by way of exchange.'

"The word 'commerce,' as used in the statute and under the terms of the Constitution, has, however, a broader meaning than the word 'trade.' Commerce among the states consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons and property, and the navigation of public waters for that purpose, as well as the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities." Circuit Judge William W. Morrow, sitting as a Circuit Court in the Northern District of California (1898).

The same court, sitting in the District of Massachusetts, per Mr. Circuit Judge William L. Putnam, says in definition of the same words:

"The court does not feel at all embarassed by the use in the anti-trust act, commonly styled the Sherman Law, of the words 'trade or commerce.'

"The word 'commerce' is undoubtedly in its usual sense a larger word than 'trade,' and sometimes 'trade' is used to embrace as much as 'commerce.' They are, in the judgment of the court, in this statute, synonymous." (United States v. Patterson, 55 Fed. 639, 1893.)

The last-named authority illustrates his contention by numerous illustrations, and, inter alia, specifies that in an English case (Regina v. McCully, 2 Moody, Cr. Cases, 34) the words "ram, ewe, sheep and lamb" were construed as if they read "sheep and lamb," the first two words being rejected as surplusage.

Another Federal Court, when ruling that transportation "in interstate commerce" is equivalent to transportation "from one state to another," has said:

"The word 'commerce' as used in the Constitution has never been given any fixed, definite or circumscribed meaning by the Supreme Court; but it was said in Gibbons v.