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decision dealing with the Anthracite Coal Combination. torically and geographically, the property and property-rights involved in this case are deserving of more than passing notice. The hard-coal deposits of the United States are localized to a remarkable degree. Some four hundred and eighty-four square miles of workable beds are contained in five adjoining counties of Northeastern Pennsylvania; and these yield 96% of the total output of the country, averaging annually 75,000,000 tons. The distance to tide-water is only two hunderd miles; and six railroads extend into portions of those fields. Canal transportation at an early period afforded water competition, but this means of transit has fallen into disuse.

Under a mistaken policy, the State of Pennsylvania not only tolerated but afforded actual encouragement to purchases of these coal lands on the part of railways, with the result that in 1874 most of these lands were in process of being taken over by railway interests. In that year, the state constitution was amended to prohibit the combination of mining and transportation utilities; but the change came too late to prevent the virtual monopolizing of coal lands.

Policy Violated Economic Principle.

This mistake was not alone an error of judgment in permitting a necessity of life to fall into hands that were not inclined to promote the public welfare through active competition; the fault goes deeper and enters into the region of false economics and superficial statecraft. For it is very plain that private ownership of mineral resources extending far beyond present needs inevitably requires that the ultimate user shall pay a price that will compensate for the interest charges during the intervening years; whereas public conservation holds the property intact until there is present need for exploitation of the property. Computation discloses that even at a nominal purchase price, the product must be held at a high cost to the consumer, when actual mining occurs at the close of a fifty-year period, if interest charges are added to the initial cost.

Be that as it may, the six coal roads between 1873 and 1898

entered into various pools or combinations to govern the production and price of anthracite coal, and also to compel the independent miners to maintain the standard price, viz., the price fixed by the railways. When pooling was made illegal, the device of leasing competing systems was inaugurated, with the result that, by the year 1892, the Reading Company controlled 70% of all anthracite shipments.

When this course became burdensome and inconvenient for the railways concerned, an era of consolidation began as instanced by the purchase, in 1898, of the New York, Susquehanna and Western Railroad in the interest of the Erie Railroad; and about that time (1901) the Reading Company absorbed the Central Railroad of New Jersey. The independent operators took alarm at the impending destruction of all competition in transit rates to tidewater, and began construction of a seventh railway to meet their needs.

Such an enterprise was naturally regarded unfavorably by the six existing systems; and they made common cause to prevent intrusion upon their virtual monopoly. To effectuate their purpose, the broad charter powers of the Temple Iron Company, organized in 1873, were utilized; and the presidents of the combining railroads were given seats upon its directorate. Through this channel, a community of interests was established in the coal trade; and by perpetual leases extorted from the independent operators, competition was eliminated, and the project of a seventh coal-carrying road was likewise given a death-blow. This unified control reduced the tonnage in private hands to less than 4% by the year 1907.

In 1902 the Federal Government, through the Interstate Commerce Commission began taking testimony concerning conditions in the anthracite coal trade; and a mass of useful information had been accumulated in 1906, when the Congress enacted the commodities clause (Hepburn Act), making it unlawful for railways engaged in interstate traffic to transport over their lines coal mined or owned by coal companies with which they were associated by stock ownership. The Sherman Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, illegalized combinations in restraint of

trade and attempts to monopolize trade and commerce, and in 1913 under each of these statutes suit was brought against the companies and individuals concerned in the anthracite coal combination.

Grounds on Which Dissolution Decree was Based.

In the opinion of the United States Supreme Court delivered by Mr. Justice Clarke, the legal fiction of joint holdings per holding companies is brushed aside; and it is held that "the abdication of all independent corporate action" destroys the right of the companies to be considered separate entities, since they are subject to actual dictation and control by identical paramount interests. Such emasculated corporate organizations are denominated (as is every way proper) mere instruments of those paramount interests; and it is held the laws of agency apply to their acts, making the paramount interests liable therefor, in law as in fact.

In brief, the relations existing between the several coal-carrying railways and their affiliated mining companies, and the restrictive claims in mining leases with respect to the exclusive shipments of coal over favored roads are each declared illegal; and such practices are ordered to be terminated in the interest of the public and in conformity with the provisions of the Sherman and Hepburn Acts.1

This decree of our highest tribunal is not only of importance per se by reason of the vast interests at stake in a commodity which is a necessity of life in northern climes; it constitutes as well a complete answer to those persons who intentionally or otherwise are disposed to disparage and belittle the vitality and efficacy of the anti-trust laws. Like the rock of Gibralter, the Sherman Law stands erect, and dominates the situation; and its continuation is necessary as a place of refuge—a virtual tition are overcome by forces that perennially are seeking to obstruct or monopolize the fields and highways of American commerce and trade.

1See U. S. v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., Dec. 6, 1920, and Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, Jan. 3, 1921-where the Sherman Anti-trust Law is construed and enforced. The latter case also construes portions of the Clayton Act.

LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN ANTI-TRUST PROCEEDINGS.

Cycles occur in matters economic and legal, as well as in those concerning developments in geology and astronomy; and so it seems to us that the close of the third decade since the enactment of the Sherman Law marks the ending of a distinct era in the anti-trust department of American jurisprudence, and calls for some comment upon the extent and nature of the progress achieved during this period covering the third of a century -the average duration of human life.

The twenty-five year period extending from 1890, the year when the Sherman measure became law, down to 1915, marks the vital era of active anti-monopoly prosecution, since (for reasons which will appear later), the Federal Trade Commission has to a large extent preempted the ground heretofore occupied by the Department of Justice; and the public interests since 1915 are protected and conserved by that semi-judicial body rather than through the terror of the law as applied in drastic anti-trust prosecutions, that savor more of criminal than civil procedure. The subject is interesting per se; and should not be wanting in value as a basis for taking stock and estimating those things accomplished and reforms still demanded in the cause of better government in general, and more particularly in behalf of greater freedom in trade along the highways of interstate traffic.

Summary of Results Attained.

During this quarter of a century of Sherman Law enforcement-1890 to 1915-eighty-four indictments were returned under the criminal features of the statute; and six convictions were secured. In a number of civil actions, defendants were prosecuted for violating the court's injunctions; and sentences of fine or imprisonment were imposed.

Eighty-seven civil suits sounding in equity were filed under the anti-trust statute, in the corresponding period, and prayers for dissolution were incorporated in the petitions of the most important cases. Judgments in favor of the Government were

entered in twenty-nine cases; in thirteen instances decisions of an adverse nature were rendered, or decrees of dismissals were entered; in fifteen cases agreements were reached and the prosecutions were terminated by the entry of consent decrees; while at the close of the twenty-five years period, i. e. in 1915, thirty proceedings were still pending. Only one suit was brought to enforce the condemnation of property seized in transit, as permitted under the statute; and this proceeding was dismissed with the consent of the Government.

Numerous private actions for damages were brought in the years 1890-1915; but the provision permitting recovery of treble damages proved to be illusory and very inadequate, when actually invoked by injured persons. The recoveries in the Danbury Hatters' case (235 U. S. 522) and the action by the City of Atlanta against the Addystone Pipe and Steel Combination (203 U. S. 390) are perhaps best known among cases where actual recoveries were obtained.

In nine suits brought by non-government parties, injunctions to prevent alleged threatened injuries were refused; not even the State of Minnesota was able to obtain such relief in equity through the Sherman Law channel. In every instance the court held, under a somewhat strained or very literal construction, that the statutory right to apply for injunctive relief pertained solely to the Federal Government, operating through the Department of Justice.

Judicial Supervision Lacks Administrative Element.

Summarizing these results, it will be readily observed that the positive results are far from satisfactory. It is true a number of powerful combinations were dissolved and their separate units compelled to operate as individual entities; but the former interests almost universally continue in control, and in numerous instances there is ground for belief that the "overhead" charge for administration is increased by such duplication of official staffs, and that some measure of economic waste has resulted from the enforcement of the separatistic policy inherent in the