"This most offensive proposition was also rejected, being accompanied, as the former had been, by other demands of the most exceptionable nature, and especially of indemnity for all American vessels detained and condemned onder the orders in council, or under what were termed illegal blockades; a compliance with which demands, exclusive of all other objections, would have amounted to an absolute surrender of the rights on which those orders and blockades were founded.

"Had the American government been sincere in representing the orders in council as the only subject of difference between Great Britain and the United States, calculated to lead to hostilities, it might have been expected, so soon as the revocation of those orders had been officially made known to them, that they would have spontaneously recalled their letters of marque,' and manifested a disposition immediately to restore the relations of peace and amity between the two powers.

"But the conduct of the government of the United States by no means corresponded with such reasonable expectations.

"The orders in council of the 23d of June being officially communicated in America, the government of the United States saw nothing in the repeal of the orders in council which should of itself restore peace, unless Great Britain were

prepared, in the first instance, substantially to relinquish the right of impressing her own seamen, when found on board American merchant ships.

"The proposal of an armistice, and of a simultaneous repeal of the restrictive measures on both sides subsequently made by the commanding officer of his majesty's naval forces on the American coast, were received in the same hostile spirit by the government of the United States. The suspension of the practice of impressment was insisted upon, in the correspondence which passed on that occasion, as a necessary preliminary to a cessation of hostilities: negociation, it was stated, might take place without any suspension of the exercise of this right, and also without any armistice being con cluded; but Great Britain was required previ ously to agree, without any knowledge of the adequacy of the system which could be substituted, to negociate upon the basis of accepting the legislative regulations of a foreign state as the sole equivalent for the exércise of a right which she has felt to be essential to the support of her maritime power.

"If America, by demanding this preliminary concession, intends to deny the validity of that right, in that denial Great Britain cannot acquiesce; nor will she give countenance to such a pretension, by acceding to its suspension, much

any

less to its abandonment, as a basis on which to treat. If the American government has devised, or conceives it can devise, regulations which may safely be accepted by Great Britain, as a substitute for the exercise of the right in question, it is for them to bring forward such a plan for consideration. The British government has never attempted to exclude this question from amongst those on which the two states might have to negociate: it has, on the contrary, uniformly professed its readiness to receive and discuss any proposition on this subject, coming from the American exclusive government: it has never asserted right, as to the impressment of British seamen from American vessels, which it was not prepared to acknowledge, as appertaining equally to the government of the United States, with respect to American seamen when found on board British merchant ships. But it cannot by acceding to such a basis in the first instance, either assume, or admit that to be practicable, which, when attempted on former occasions, has always been found to be attended with great difficul ties; such difficulties as the British commissioners, in 1806, expressly declared, after an at、 tentive consideration of the suggestions brought forward by the commissioners on the part of America, they were unable to surmount.

"Whilst this proposition, transmitted through the British admiral, was pending in America,

another communication, on the subject of an armistice, was unofficially made to the British government in this country. The agent from whom this proposition was received, acknowledged that he did not consider that he had any authority himself to sign an agreement on the part of his government. It was obvious that any stipulations entered into, in consequence of this overture, would have been binding on the British government, whilst the government of the United States would have been free to refuse or accept them, according to the circumstances of the moment. This proposition was, therefore, necessarily declined.

After this exposition of the circumstances which preceded, and which have followed the declaration of war by the United States, his royal highness the prince regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of his majesty, feels himself called upon to declare the leading principles by which the conduct of Great Britain has been regulated in the transactions connected with these discussions.:

"His royal highness can never acknowledge any blockade whatsoever to be illegal, which has been duly notified, and is supported by an adequate force, merely upon the ground of its extent, or because the port or coasts blockaded are not at the same time invested by land.

His royal highness can never admit, that

neutral trade with Great Britain can be constituted a public crime, the commission of which can expose the ships of any power whatever to be denationalized.

"His royal highness can never admit, that Great Britain can be debarred of its right of just and necessary retaliation, through the fear of eventually affecting the interest of a neutral.

"His royal highness can never admit, that in the exercise of the undoubted, and hitherto undisputed, right of searching neutral merchant. vessels in time of war, the impressment of British seamen, when found therein, can be deemed any violation of a neutral flag. Neither can he admit, that the taking such seamen from on board such vessels, can be considered by any neutral state as a hostile measure, or a justifiable cause of war.

"There is no right more clearly established, than the right which a sovereign has to the allegiance of his subjects, more especially in time of war. Their allegiance is no optional duty, which they can decline and resume at pleasure. It is a call which they are bound to obey; it began with their birth, and can only terminate with their existence.

"If a similarity of language and manners may make the exercise of this right more liable to partial mistakes, and occasional abuse, when practised towards vessels of the United States,