business done in the stockyards by commission men and dealers. Congress declared in the act that the business sought to be regulated is one affected by a public interest and that it so directly affected interstate commerce as to make its regulation necessary for the protection of such commerce. The Supreme Court said: "It was for Congress to decide from its general information and from such special evidence as was brought before it, the nature of the evils actually presented or threatened, and to take such steps by legislation within its power as it deem proper to remedy them. "The reasonable fear by Congress that such acts, usually lawful, and effecting only intrastate commerce when considered alone, will probably and more or less constantly, be used in conspiracies against interstate commerce, or constitute a direct and undue burden on it, expressed in this remedial legislation, serve the same purpose as the intent charged in the Swift indictment to bring acts of a similar character into the current of interstate commerce for Federal restraint. Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threaten to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce, is within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide the fact of the danger and meet it. This court will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such matter unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are clearly nonexistent." The impact of the unregulated domestic production both on the problem of conservation and of a healthful interstate commerce, is obvious. This is also true of the reaction of unfair and disparate wages on fair competition in the interstate markets, and of labor disputes on the flow of coal in interstate commerce. These labor disputes, though they did not interfere with the actual shipment of coal or its sale in other States, have been often the subject of injunctions and other suits under the Federal antitrust laws. And this judicial recognition of the direct and immediate relation between these industrial disputes and the interstate commerce in coal affords an additional promise for the labor provisions of the bill. POWER OF CONGRESS EXERCISED OVER LABOR AT COAL MINES In 1890 Congress enacted the Sherman antitrust laws under its authority with respect to interstate commerce. Under this act miners have been enjoined by Federal district courts in all the large coal fields east of the Mississippi-not for interfering with shipment or sales but for combining through strikes to interfere with production, that is, mining as such. Finally, the case of Red Jacket Coal Co. et al. v. United Mine Workers came before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (18 Fed. 2d 840). In that case the Miners' Union issued a call inviting the miners of West Virginia to join the strike prevailing in the union fields. Certain coal companies of West Virginia secured a permanent injunction in the district court against organizing activities of the union in pursuance of the strike. Jurisdiction was wholly based on the act of Congress referred to. The circuit court of appeals considered the opinions holding that mining in itself was not interstate commerce, and then decided as follows: "Interference with the production of these mines as contemplated by defendants would necessarily interfere with the interstate commerce in coal to a substantial degree. Moreover, it is perfectly clear that the purpose of defendants in interfering with production was to stop the shipment in interstate commerce. It was only as the coal entered into interstate commerce that it became a factor in the price and affected defendants in their negotiations with the union operators. And, in time of strike, it was only as it moved in interstate commerce that it relieved the coal scarcity and interfered with the strike." The Supreme Court declined to review this decision on certiorari, and it became the authority for a general resort to the Federal district courts by operators seeking to enjoin strikes and protect their established labor relations with employes. In Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America (22 Fed. (2d) 557), the Court said: "In the case of the International Organization, United Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Coal Co., (18 Fed. (2nd) 830), the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, having before them facts similar to the facts recited in the bill of complaint in this case, held that the United States courts clearly had jurisdiction to restrain the interference of the United Mine Workers with the operation of coal mines, and held further that the interference with the production of the mines in question, as contemplated by the United Mine Workers, would necessarily interfere with interstate commerce in coal to a substantial degree.' Now the philosophy underlying these decisions is that Congress had by a law, as the courts interpreted its reach, denounced certain conduct or practices as directly affecting interstate commerce, though these practices in a general sense related only to the processes of mining and in a specific sense only to the labor relations involved in production. Our point here is, that if Congress has, under the interstate Commerce clause, created a jurisdiction in the Federal courts to intervene between the Miners' Union and coal operators in the familiar economic struggle which has wages and conditions of employment as its admitted motivation, Congress may not be denied the right to further legislate upon the subject. Can it be said that Congress has exhausted its power in the act which the courts say had brought the activities of the Miners' Union within their jurisdiction? If Congress may legislate at all with reference to the labor struggle at the mines, because of the impact that struggle has on commerce, it must have power to deal with the conditions which make that struggle inevitable. The suppression of organization, the denial of collective bargaining, the enforcement of yellow-dog contracts, the demand of miners for checkweighmen, the arbitrary hours and the constant paring of wages to keep up with the cut-throat competition, all these practices on the one hand and the recurring strikes upon the other, were the stigmata of a distempered commerce. In the Red Jacket case alone, 316 companies secured an injunction that insulated 40,000 miners from contract with the Union. Similar labor injunctions have been issued in other fields, and all on the promise that a power exerted by Congress in the antitrust acts covered labor relations at the mines since; while the miners thought a stoppage of production may result in better wages and working conditions, it also resulted in the restraint of commerce. The ills of this industry came before the Supreme Court in Appalachian Coal v. United States (288 U. S. 344), decided shortly before the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act. A group of operators shipping a large tonnage to the principal markets of the country had adopted a scheme for agreed prices and trade practices, which the lower court enjoined under the Sherman Act. This judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court, which said: "It is therefore necessary in this instance to consider the economic condition peculiar to the coal industry, the practices which have obtained, the nature of defendants' plan, the reason which led to its adoption, and the probable consequences of carrying out that plan in relation to market prices, and other matters affecting the public interest in interstate commerce in bituminous coal. * * * "In the graphic summary of the economic situation the Court found that 'numerous producing companies have gone into bankruptcy or into the hands of receivers, many mines have been shut down, the number of days of operation have been curtailed, wages to labor have been substantially lessened, and the States in which coal-producing companies are located have found it increasingly difficult to collect taxes.' "When industry is grievously hurt, when producing concerns fail, when unemployment mounts, and communities dependent upon profitable production are prostrated, the wells of commerce go dry." The Supreme Court was considering conditions that reached back of transportation-into the minnig industry itself. The Court plainly had in mind the conditions and practices that prevail in the mines which are the wells of commerce. The Court said: "The industry was in distress. It suffered from overexpansion and from a relative decline through the growing use of substitute fuels. It was afflicted with injurious practices within itself-practices which demanded correction." Mr. HILL. I notice the next three witnesses here are Mr. Charles O'Neill, Mr. T. G. Essington, attorney, and Mr. John L. Steinbugler, attorney, who are designated as coal operators.. I am wondering if it is necessary to have all of these witnesses appear, or shall one speak for the three and conserve a little time of the committee and the witnesses. Who can speak for them? Mr. JOHN L. LEWIS. They are conferring now. Mr. HILL. We will call Mr. O'Neill. Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, we would prefer in order to save the time of the committee to have one man speak for us. We would like to have Senator Essington appear on our behalf. Mr. HILL. We are leaving that to you. Are you Mr. O'Neill? Mr. O'NEILL. Yes. Mr. HILL. You may come forward, Mr. O'Neill. We will hear your statement. STATEMENT OF CHARLES O'NEILL, CHAIRMAN OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BITUMINOUS COAL PRODUCERS Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, we will expedite it, and I will simply introduce ourselves and then ask Senator Essington to make our statement. Mr. HILL. Very well. Mr. O'NEILL. I appear here as chairman of the legislative committee of the National Conference of Bituminous Coal Producers. My name is Charles O'Neill, of New Rochelle, N. Y. I am vicepresident of Peale, Peacock, & Kerr, miners and shippers of bituminous coal, with mines located in Cambria, Clearfield, and Indiana Counties of Pennsylvania. Mr. VINSON. What is this organization to which you first referred? Mr. O'NEILL. This organization is an organization of bituminouscoal producers which was called together by a group of us who believed that special legislation was necessary for the stabilization of the bituminous-coal industry. Mr. VINSON. What is known as the "Shoreham conference"? Mr. O'NEILL. We called ourselves the "National Conference of Bituminous Coal Producers." Mr. VINSON. But it has been referred to here in the hearings as the "Shoreham conference"? Mr. O'NEILL. That is right. Mr. VINSON. Are you in position to present for the consideration of the committee those persons who conferred, who were represented in the Shoreham conferences? Mr. O'NEILL. I have here a list of 288 companies, which produced, in 1934, according to the registrations, 150,000,000 tons of bituminous coal. When Mr. Findlay appeared before your committee on the N. R. A. resolution, we had 175,000,000 tons, but three large companies in western Pennsylvania withdrew at the closing conference. Mr. VINSON. Did you favor the 2-year extension of the N. R. A.? Mr. O'NEILL. We favored the 2-year extension of the N. R. A. except as to bituminous coal. Mr. VINSON. Then you did not favor it as affecting bituminous coal? Mr. O'NEILL. That is right. The production in the United States for 1934, was 358,000,000 tons, and 50,000,000 of that was wholly captive, or coal produced by their owners for their own use. The Bureau of Mines advised me that about 20,000,000 tons in 1934 was produced by what are called "wagon" or "truck" mines throughout the country; leaving a balance of 288 billion tons that was produced by commercial companies that mine and sell their produce in common markets. Our conference, with the withdrawals, represents 55 percent of that tonnage. These companies that came here are listed individually. Mr. HILL. That list may go in the record here. (The list referred to follows:) List of members of the National Conference of Bituminous Coal Producers |