Before I enter upon the regular discussion of these topics, I shall suggest some preliminary considerations, on the utility of precepts to the Christian student of Rhetoric and Oratory, particularly, as they respect the work of the preacher. On this subject my FIRST remark is, that mere technical rules cannot make any man eloquent. They cannot furnish him with the matter and style of an eloquent discourse. The obvious reason is, that genius is the gift of God; and where it is wanting, its production is as much beyond the power of human art, as any other act of creation. This remark however, is not restricted to the work of the preacher, the secular orator, or the crictic its application may be extended to all the employments of life, in which the exercise of intellect is required. No respectable attainments are ever made in literature or science, by the force of mere precepts, because a man is not the passive subject of a physical operation, while he is becoming acquainted with languages, with mathematics, or theology. In this process, he must have something more than books and teachers; he must possess faculties of thinking, and must use them. : The same thing is true with reference to the polite and even the mechanic arts; and in some sort it is true, with reference to every department of human action. The skilful legislator, or judge, or general, or painter, or poet; nay, the skilful husbandman or mechanic, is never made such by mere rules. In application to the province of oratory and criticism, I admit that this principle has some peculiar claims to consideration. The properties and the importance of a correct and cul-* tivated taste, I shall not now discuss. But it comes within my present purpose to say that a genuine perception of the beauties of style, depends on the structure of the mind; and however it may be regulated, cannot be produced by art. That mechanical correctness which often assumes the name of taste, may indeed, be chiefly artificial. This may enable a man to detect a these topics, is embraced in his Lecture on the Cultivation of Spiritual Habits, and Progress in Study, and in his Sermon on the Hindrances to Ministerial Usefulness. violation of syntax, or to apply the canons of verbal criticism with great precision. For certain purposes, and to a certain extent, this technical accuracy is useful, and even indispensable. But while it qualifies one to discern blemishes with a microscopic eye, it often renders him (like the fly described by Addison, on a pillar of St. Paul's church), unable to perceive the design, the proportions, the beauty of a whole. Habits of minute accuracy ought to be formed; but not at the expense of our sensibility, and our regard to objects of the highest magnitude. Longinus says, "That composition which is sublime with some faults, is better than that which is merely correct though faultless. Homer has faults. Apollonius and Theocritus are without a blemish but who would choose to be Apollonius or Theocritus, rather than Homer?" The same opinion was expressed by Pope in his own manner : : "Great wits sometimes may gloriously offend, And rise to faults, true critics dare not mend." If technical rules cannot furnish the matter and style of a discourse, it is equally true that they cannnot produce a good delivery. They cannot produce that expression of voice and countenance, that flow of soul, in which the vital principles of true eloquence consist. These attributes of delivery must result in common cases, at least, from the enthusiasm of genius; and in the pulpit, from the superadded influence of a solemn persuasion of the truth, and a deep sense of eternal things. Any man, therefore, certainly, any preacher who shall hope to succeed in public speaking, by an artificial manner, will fail of producing a good impression on respectable hearers, if he does not even make himself ridiculous. My SECOND general remark is, that though mere precepts cannot supply the place of native endowments, they may afford great assistance in the CULTIVATION of those endowments where they exist. Even this, I know, has been denied; but the denial is consistent neither with facts, nor with common sense. Some pieces of ground are incurably barren. Does it thence follow that every fertile spot of ground is a garden? A sculptor cannot create marble. Do we say therefore that the use of the chisel is absurd? or that a rude block from the quarry, is the same thing as a finished statue? No technical rules could have produced Demosthenes, Apelles, Virgil or Handel. Yet no one can suppose that these masters in their respective arts of eloquence, painting, poetry, and music, attained their high perfection without study and labor. Every art has its elementary principles, which must be theoretically known before they can be applied to practical purposes. A man may as well hope to become a physician or philosopher, by chance, às an orator. Quinctilian illustrates this thought by an example. "A gladiator though never taught to fence, is reckoned brave for rushing on his adversary; and a wrestler, potent, who by main strength, holds fast what he has seized with his grasp. But the former is often ruined by the fierceness of his onset, and the latter surprised to see all his impetuosity frustrated by a dexterous motion of his antagonist." So, he says, "a man may speak without learning; but no man is truly an orator, unless he has learned to be so." If other arts have, in every nation, been deemed proper subjects of study and instruction, and schools for these purposes have been thought necessary in every period; he must indeed be a prodigy of genius, who can learn nothing in the art of writing and speaking from the precepts of Tully and Quinctilian, the example of eloquent men, and the diligent cultivation of his own powers. A THIRD general remark is, that the utility of precepts depends on two things: 1. On their being applied with JUDGMENT. Quinctilian says "We must keep to a certain way, and a certain order for speaking well. It is a thing to be done according to rule, and not at random: a thing in which an ignorant person will be surpassed by one that is learned." Yet he says, "The rules of rhetoric must admit of variation, according to time, circumstances and necessity." "For a general, whenever he puts his army in order of battle, first to range properly his van, next to display his wings on each side, and then to place his cavalry on the right and on the left, is the best position when it is practicable. But if a precipice, a river, a forest, a defile, obstruct this order, there is a necessity for altering it. At one time the line of battle must present a full front; at another, the form of a wedge here, the corps of reserve must be drawn up; there, the legion. In like manner, to know whether the exordium be necessary or superfluous, whether it ought to be long or short, whether the narration ought to be concise or diffuse, divided or continued, direct or transposed, all these particulars depend on the nature of the case, and by it they must be decided." "The art of speaking," continues this great master, "requires labor, study, long experience and practice, consummate prudence, a signal presence of mind, and an acute judgment. We shall therefore proceed, as we see necessary, by different routes; sometimes quitting the public road for a shorter one; sometimes making a circuit, if torrents have swept away the bridges; and escaping through a window if a fire has reached the door." According to these obvious principles, it is certain that the utility of precepts to the orator, depends very much upon a sound judgment, by which he may determine what is proper in any given case. Next to this, it depends, 2. On the familiarity of HABIT. My meaning is that the elementary principles of good writing and speaking, should be so well known to us, that we may apply them, of course, without effort, and without reflection, at the time. Does any one think this impossible? Perhaps a little attention to the subject may serve to correct such an opinion. The maxim, that "custom is a second nature," is ground ed on philosophy, and especially on experience. The facility with which we combine and use the elements of knowledge, in all common cases, proves that the mind may perform the most complex operations, not only without difficulty, but without being conscious of its own acts. Dugald Stewart in his treatise on "Intellectual habits," cites the following passage from Polybius. "Many things which appear in the beginning to be absolutely impracticable, are in the course of time, and by continual use, accomplished with the greatest ease. Among numberless instances, the art of reading may be mentioned, as one of the clearest and most convincing proofs of this remark. Take a man who has never learned to read, but is otherwise a man of sense; set a child before him who has learned, and order him to read a passage in a book. It is certain that this man will scarcely be able to persuade himself, that the child, as he reads, must consider distinctly, first the form of all the letters; in the next place their power; and thirdly, their connexion, one with another: for each of these things requires a certain portion of time. But if to the reading some gesture should be added; if the child should observe all the stops, and all the breathings rough and smooth, it will be impossible to convince the man that this is true. Hence we may learn, never to be deterred from any useful pursuit, by the seeming difficulties that attend it; but to endeavour rather to surmount those difficulties by practice and habit."* This illustration is perfectly simple, and corresponds with our experience in many other cases. You sit down and write a letter to your friend. In doing this you apply all the principles of language which you have been learning from infancy. You combine letters into syllables and words; you make words the vehicle of thought; you apply the rules of orthography, of syntax, of punctuation, and of rhetoric; and at the same instant, the rules of that wonderful art, by which the pen records the acts of the mind. In thirty minutes, you have applied as * Stewart's Phil. Essays, p. 412. |