many rules as you could think over methodically, in a week: and yet, in this surprising process, probably you have not been conscious, at the time, of applying a single rule.

Perhaps the same power of habit in forming rapid associations of thought, would be still better illustrated, by examining the progress of a person from the first rudiments of music, through the intermediate stages of improvement to the skill of a master on some complicated instrument. The perfection of this skill in the performer, depends on his exact conformity to the settled principles of his art. But his application of rules, must be so familiar by custom, as not to require the labor of recollection, or his performance is spoiled.

Just so in the province of style and elocution. If we would derive benefit from precepts, they must be familiar ;—must be inwrought into our habits of thinking and speaking; and must be applied in practice, spontaneously. We must carry into our public performances, those habits which are already formed. If these habits are correctly and thoroughly formed, the operations of the mind will no more be interrupted by their application, than by the motion of the heart and lungs. But whatever our habits may be, the attempt to mend them would be absurd, at a moment when every thought should be devoted to objects of higher importance.

Finally; though the principles of eloquence, being founded in the nature of man, are essentially the same in all ages and countries, yet the Christian preacher eminently needs a sound judgment, in applying scholastic precepts to his peculiar work. The interests committed to him, as much transcend those which have employed the splendid eloquence of secular orators, as the concerns of eternity surpass in importance, the momentary concerns of time. The spirit of the pulpit is to be learned, not in the school of Aristotle, but in the school of that great Teacher who came from God. Never then, let us build our hopes of usefulness to the church, on mere human attainments; nor submit our understandings to the guidance of human precepts, so far as to forget that one is our Master, even Christ.

LECTURE II.

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DEFINITION OF ELOQUENCE;—ITS ENDS ;—AND HISTORY.

IN entering upon the execution of the plan proposed in my introductory lecture, it is proper to apprize you that I shall pass very briefly over some of the first heads of the course, as being but subordinately connected with its main design.

It may be proper also to remark, that no peculiar elevation or ornament of language, will be employed in these Lectures, from respect to what their subjects might be thought to demand. Unquestionably, a didactic treatise on Eloquence and Style, requires the same simplicity of manner as is adapted to the elementary discussion of any other subject.

We proceed now to inquire,

I. WHAT IS ELOQUENCE?

The most celebrated writers on Rhetoric and Oratory, have given different answers to this question. Isocrates called eloquence," the power of persuading ;"-and in other words expressive of the same thought," the skill of persuasion." Gorgias defined it,—"the power of persuading, by speaking :" and Aristotle,-"the power of inventing whatever is persuasive in discourse." Quinctilian says this last definition is defective, because it leaves out of sight the end of rhetoric; and because it includes only invention, which without elocution, cannot constitute a discourse. Nor is he satisfied with the description of eloquence, given by Theodectes, that it is "the leading of men

wherever one pleases, by the faculty of speaking;”—nor with that of Cicero, that "it is speaking in a manner proper to persuade." "Does not money, he asks, likewise persuade? Does not personal influence, the authority of the speaker, the dignity of a respectable man, persuade? Others, besides the orator, persuade by their words, and even without speaking a word, induce men to do what they please. On the contrary, an orator does not always persuade; sometimes it is not properly his end."

This acute writer having condemned the definitions of his predecessors, gives as his own, that "Eloquence is the science of speaking well." Without supposing Quinctilian tinctured with that pride of originality, which he ascribes to others, as a motive for seeming to differ from all who wrote before them; it is difficult to perceive that his own definition is essentially more perfect than those which he rejects. Probably all these rhetoricians meant much the same thing, though they adopted different phraseology to express their meaning. Modern critics following Quinctilian, have objected to the definitions of Aristotle and Cicero on two accounts. First, to say that Rhetoric is the art of persuasion,' is to make success the only criterion of eloquence;" whereas "all the arts of rhetoric have often been employed without producing persuasion." Secondly, "Persuasion is effected by money, by personal influence, and even by silence, as well as by eloquence."

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Why, on the same principles, shall not the common definition of logic, be rejected? Why shall we not say in the same style of critical discrimination ;-First, all the powers of logic have often been employed without producing conviction of the understanding: or Secondly, earthquakes, fires, and diseases, are often instruments of conviction; therefore Logic is not the art of reasoning.

In justice to Quinctilian, it is to be observed, that his definition of eloquence has respect to the moral qualities of an orator; and supposes that none but a man of pure intentions, can properly be denominated eloquent. Yet in other places he admits,

as of course he must admit, that eloquence may be perverted : that is, it may be employed by bad men, for bad purposes.

After all his labor to set up a perfect distinction, at the expense of his predecessors, to what does it amount? "Rhetoric is the science of speaking well-consequently, to speak well is its proper end." In other words, the end of eloquence, is to be eloquent. Now it is certain that every human effort is made, for the accomplishment of some purpose beyond itself. When a man speaks to his fellow men, he has some design, some object, which he wishes to promote by speaking. If he is a bud man, his object will be perhaps, fame, or money, or power. If he is a good man, he will aim to accomplish some useful and benevolent end :—to enforce some duty, to avert calamity, to render his fellow men better and happier. For the attainment of his ultimate object, whatever it may be, the orator proposes other objects, which are intermediate and subordinate. These are usually classed under the heads of instruction, pleasure, and persuasion thus Cicero says, " He is the perfect orator who in speaking, instructs, delights, and moves his hearers."

In this view of the subject, among all the definitions of eloquence which I have seen, I am best satisfied with that of Dr. Campbell, viz. that "in its largest acceptation, it is that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end."

II. WHAT IS THE END OF ELOQUENCE?

The general answer is,―to move men to action as rational beings. This answer has of necessity, been partly anticipated, in the remarks just made.

For whatever purpose we address our fellow men, the attainment of that purpose commonly requires that they should be excited to do something. Action presupposes feeling, and feeling, conviction. Hence writers on Rhetoric have generally agreed in saying, that its principal end is persuasion. Aristotle and Plato laid it down as a maxim, that "the best precepts are unavailing, if the minds of men are not moved :" and the Ro

man masters taught, that "to move the heart, is the life and soul of eloquence."* On this principle, the theory of the passions, and the various avenues to the human heart, were subjects of much study in the rhetorical schools of Greece. The affections were classed into two general denominations; one comprehending the milder, such as favor, benevolence, mercy, called os—the other, comprehending the more vehement, as anger, hatred, grief, joy, called лados. But as men are never induced to act without motive, and without more or less excitement of feeling so it should be remembered that the heart is accessible chiefly through the intellect. No one is delighted or moved with that which he does not understand, or does not believe. The affections therefore cannot be moved, unless the understanding is previously enlightened; at least, they cannot be moved in any manner which is worthy of the dignity of true eloquence. From this established connexion betwixt reasoning and persuasion, probably the Latin word oratio, (the reasoning of speech, oris ratio,) was derived. The end of true eloquence, then, is to move men to action,—proper and useful action, as rational beings; by exhibiting light to convince the understanding, and motives to influence the heart. The end of sacred eloquence, is to bring men to believe, and feel, and act, as the gospel requires; in other words, to make them good and happy.

III. THE HISTORY OF ELOQUENce.

A very brief sketch is all that will be attempted under this

head.

The capacity of expressing thoughts by articulate language has, with a few exceptions, been common to men, from the beginning of the world. By this medium of intercourse, chiefly, individuals have communicated to others, their opinions and feelings, on all subjects. But the use which has been made of the faculty of speech, constitutes almost as great a difference betwixt one man

* Arist. L. 1. c. 2. Quin. L. 6. c. 2. Cic. De Or.