Opinion of WHITE, J. other than occupying the time and energy of counsel, court, and client. Section 1988 is not "a relief Act for lawyers." Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U. S. 561, 588 (1986) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Instead, it is a tool that ensures the vindication of important rights, even when large sums of money are not at stake, by making attorney's fees available under a private attorney general theory. Yet one searches these facts in vain for the public purpose this litigation might have served. The District Court speculated that the judgment, if accompanied by a large fee award, might deter future lawless conduct, see App. to Pet. for Cert. A23-A24, but did not identify the kind of lawless conduct that might be prevented. Nor is the conduct to be deterred apparent from the verdict, which even petitioners acknowledge is "regrettably obtuse." Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. Such a judgment cannot deter misconduct any more than a bolt of lightning can; its results might be devastating, but it teaches no valuable lesson because it carries no discernable meaning. Cf. Chicano Police Officer's Assn. v. Stover, 624 F. 2d 127, 131 (CA10 1980) (nuisance settlement that does not promote any public purpose cannot support award of attorney's fees), cited and quoted in Garland, supra, at 792. III In this case, the relevant indicia of success-the extent of relief, the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed, and the public purpose served-all point to a single conclusion: Joseph Farrar achieved only a de minimis victory. As the Court correctly holds today, the appropriate fee in such a case is no fee at all. Because the Court of Appeals gave Joseph Farrar everything he deserved-nothing-I join the Court's opinion affirming the judgment below. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE SOUTER join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether 42 U.S. C. § 1988 entitles a civil rights plaintiff who recovers Opinion of WHITE, J. nominal damages to reasonable attorney's fees. Following our decisions in Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782 (1989), Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755 (1987), Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983), and Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978), the Court holds that it does. With that aspect of today's decision, I agree. Because Farrar won an enforceable judgment against respondent, he has achieved a "material alteration" of their legal relationship, Garland, supra, at 792–793, and thus he is a "prevailing party" under the statute. However, I see no reason for the Court to reach out and decide what amount of attorney's fees constitutes a reasonable amount in this instance. That issue was neither presented in the petition for certiorari nor briefed by petitioners. The opinion of the Court of Appeals was grounded exclusively in its determination that Farrar had not met the threshold requirement under § 1988. At no point did it purport to decide what a reasonable award should be if Farrar was a prevailing party. It may be that the District Court abused its discretion and misapplied our precedents by belittling the significance of the amount of damages awarded in ascertaining petitioners' fees. Cf. Hensley, supra, at 436. But it is one thing to say that the court erred as a matter of law in awarding $280,000; quite another to decree, especially without the benefit of petitioners' views or consideration by the Court of Appeals, that the only fair fee was no fee whatsoever.* Litigation in this case lasted for more than a decade, has entailed a 6-week trial and given rise to two appeals. Civil rights cases often are complex, and we therefore have committed the task of calculating attorney's fees to the trial court's discretion for good reason. See, e. g., Hensley, supra, *In his brief to the Fifth Circuit, respondent did not argue that petitioners should be denied all fees even if they were found to be prevailing parties. Rather, he asserted that the District Court misapplied the law by awarding "excessive" fees and requested that they be reduced. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant in No. 90-2830, pp. 38-42. Opinion of WHITE, J. at 436-437; Garland, supra, at 789-790; Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U. S. 87, 96 (1989). Estimating what specific amount would be reasonable in this particular situation is not a matter of general importance on which our guidance is needed. Short of holding that recovery of nominal damages never can support the award of attorney's fees-which, clearly, the majority does not, see ante, at 115-the Court should follow its sensible practice and remand the case for reconsideration of the fee amount. Cf. FTC v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 542 (1960). Indeed, respondent's counsel all but conceded at oral argument that, assuming the Court found Farrar to be a prevailing party, the question of reasonableness should be addressed on remand. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-32. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings. Accordingly, I dissent. Syllabus DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ET AL. v. GREATER CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 91-1326. Argued November 3, 1992-Decided December 14, 1992 Section 2(c)(2) of the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Equity Amendment Act of 1990 requires employers who provide health insurance for their employees to provide equivalent health insurance coverage for injured employees eligible for workers' compensation benefits. Respondent, an employer affected by this requirement, filed an action in the District Court against petitioners, the District of Columbia and its Mayor, seeking to enjoin enforcement of § 2(c)(2) on the ground that it is pre-empted by §514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which provides that ERISA supersedes state laws that "relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA. Although petitioners conceded that §2(c)(2) relates to an ERISA-covered plan, the court granted their motion to dismiss. Relying on this Court's decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, it held that §2(c)(2) is not pre-empted because it also relates to respondent's workers' compensation plan, which is exempt from ERISA coverage, and because respondent could comply with the provision by creating a separate unit to administer the required benefits. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that pre-emption of § 2(c)(2) is compelled by §514(a)'s plain meaning and ERISA's structure. Held: Section 2(c)(2) is pre-empted by ERISA. A state law "relate[s] to" a covered benefit plan for § 514(a) purposes if it refers to or has a connection with such a plan, even if the law is not designed to affect the plan or the effect is only indirect. See, e. g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 139. Section 2(c)(2) measures the required health care coverage by reference to "the existing health insurance coverage," which is a welfare benefit plan subject to ERISA regulation. It does not matter that § 2(c)(2)'s requirements also "relate to" ERISA-exempt workers' compensation plans, since ERISA's exemptions do not limit § 514's pre-emptive sweep once it is determined that a law relates to a covered plan. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 525. Petitioners' reliance on Shaw, supra, is misplaced, since the statute at issue there did not "relate to" an ERISA-covered plan. Nor is there any support in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, for their position that §514(a) requires a two-part analysis WASHINGTON BOARD OF TRADE Opinion of the Court under which a state law relating to an ERISA-covered plan would survive pre-emption if employers could comply with the law through separately administered exempt plans. Pp. 129-133. 292 U. S. App. D. C. 209, 948 F. 2d 1317, affirmed. THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 133. Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were John Payton, Corporation Counsel, and Charles Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel. Lawrence P. Postol argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John N. Erlenborn.* JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. The District of Columbia requires employers who provide health insurance for their employees to provide equivalent health insurance coverage for injured employees eligible for *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Connecticut et al. by Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Arnold B. Feigin, Assistant Attorney General, and Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts; for the State of Oklahoma ex rel. Dave Renfro, Commissioner of Labor, et al. by Susan B. Loving, Attorney General, Rabindranath Ramana, Assistant Attorney General, Michael M. Sykes, and Kayla A. Bower; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Marsha S. Berzon and Laurence Gold; and for the American Optometric Association by Bennett Boskey, Ellis Lyons, and Edward A. Groobert. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Starr, Deputy Solicitor General Mahoney, Christopher J. Wright, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Deborah Greenfield; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Mona C. Zeiberg and Hollis T. Hurd; for the Connecticut Business and Industry Association by Daniel L. FitzMaurice; and for the District of Columbia Insurance Federation by William A. Dobrovir and Lawrence H. Mirel. Steven S. Zaleznick and Cathy Ventrell-Monsees filed a brief for the American Association of Retired Persons as amicus curiae. |