Opinion of the Court would be entitled to home office deductions "even though they spend most of their time on the road as long as they spend 'a substantial amount of time on paperwork at home."" Ibid. (quoting proposed Treas. Reg. §1.280A-2(b)(3), 45 Fed. Reg. 52399 (1980), as amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 33320 (1983)). While recognizing that the proposed regulation was not binding on it, the court suggested that it "evince[d] a policy to allow 'home office' deductions for taxpayers who maintain 'legitimate' home offices, even if the taxpayer does not spend a majority of his time in the office." 935 F. 2d, at 55. The court concluded that the Tax Court's test would lead to identification of the "true headquarters of the business." Ibid. Like the dissenters in the Tax Court, Judge Phillips in his dissent argued that the plain language of § 280A(c)(1)(A) requires a comparative analysis of the places of business to assess which one is principal, an analysis that was not undertaken by the majority. Ibid. Although other Courts of Appeals have criticized the focal point test, their approaches for determining the principal place of business differ in significant ways from the approach employed by the Court of Appeals in this case, see Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F. 2d 495, 497 (CA9 1988); Meiers v. Commissioner, supra, at 79; Weissman v. Commissioner, supra, at 514-516; Drucker v. Commissioner, supra, at 69. Those other courts undertake a comparative analysis of the functions performed at each location. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 503 U. S. 935 (1992). II Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to deduct "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business." 26 U. S. C. § 162(a). That provision is qualified, however, by various limitations, including one that prohibits otherwise allowable deductions "with respect to the use of a dwelling Opinion of the Court unit which is used by the taxpayer . . . as a residence." § 280A(a). Taxpayers may nonetheless deduct expenses attributable to the business use of their homes if they qualify for one or more of the statute's exceptions to this disallowance. The exception at issue in this case is contained in § 280A(c)(1): "Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis— “(A) [as] the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer[,] "(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business, or "(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business. "In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if the exclusive use referred to in the preceding sentence is for the convenience of his employer." (Emphasis added.) Congress adopted §280A as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Pub. L. 94-455, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. Before its adoption, expenses attributable to the business use of a residence were deductible whenever they were "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's business. See, e. g., Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F. 2d 998 (CA2 1970). This generous standard allowed many taxpayers to treat what otherwise would have been nondeductible living and family expenses as business expenses, even though the limited business tasks performed in the dwelling resulted in few, if any, additional or incremental costs to the taxpayer. H. R. Rep. No. 94–658, p. 160 (1975); S. Rep. No. 94-938, p. 147 (1976). Comparing the newly enacted section with the previous one, the apparent purpose of § 280A is to provide a narrower scope for the Opinion of the Court deduction, but Congress has provided no definition of "principal place of business." In interpreting the meaning of the words in a revenue Act, we look to the "ordinary, everyday senses"" of the words. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U. S. 569, 571 (1966) (per curiam) (quoting Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1, 6 (1947)). In deciding whether a location is "the principal place of business," the commonsense meaning of "principal" suggests that a comparison of locations must be undertaken. This view is confirmed by the definition of "principal," which means "most important, consequential, or influential." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1802 (1971). Courts cannot assess whether any one business location is the "most important, consequential, or influential" one without comparing it to all the other places where business is transacted. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' suggestion, the statute does not allow for a deduction whenever a home office may be characterized as legitimate. See 935 F. 2d, at 55. That approach is not far removed from the "appropriate and helpful" test that led to the adoption of § 280A. Under the Court of Appeals' test, a home office may qualify as the principal place of business whenever the office is essential to the taxpayer's business, no alternative office space is available, and the taxpayer spends a substantial amount of time there. See id., at 54. This approach ignores the question whether the home office is more significant in the taxpayer's business than every other place of business. The statute does not refer to the "principal office" of the business. If it had used that phrase, the taxpayer's deduction claim would turn on other considerations. The statute refers instead to the "principal place" of business. It follows that the most important or significant place for the business must be determined. B In determining the proper test for deciding whether a home office is the principal place of business, we cannot de Opinion of the Court velop an objective formula that yields a clear answer in every case. The inquiry is more subtle, with the ultimate determination of the principal place of business being dependent upon the particular facts of each case. There are, however, two primary considerations in deciding whether a home office is a taxpayer's principal place of business: the relative importance of the activities performed at each business location and the time spent at each place. Analysis of the relative importance of the functions performed at each business location depends upon an objective description of the business in question. This preliminary step is undertaken so that the decisionmaker can evaluate the activities conducted at the various business locations in light of the particular characteristics of the specific business or trade at issue. Although variations are inevitable in case-by-case determinations, any particular business is likely to have a pattern in which certain activities are of most significance. If the nature of the trade or profession requires the taxpayer to meet or confer with a client or patient or to deliver goods or services to a customer, the place where that contact occurs is often an important indicator of the principal place of business. A business location where these contacts occur has sometimes been called the "focal point" of the business and has been previously regarded by the Tax Court as conclusive in ascertaining the principal place of business. See 94 T. C., at 24-25. We think that phrase has a metaphorical quality that can be misleading, and, as we have said, no one test is determinative in every case. We decide, however, that the point where goods and services are delivered must be given great weight in determining the place where the most important functions are performed. Section 280A itself recognizes that the home office gives rise to a deduction whenever the office is regularly and exclusively used "by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business." §280A(c)(1)(B). In that circumstance, Opinion of the Court the deduction is allowed whether or not the home office is also the principal place of business. The taxpayer argues that because the point of delivery of goods and services is addressed in this provision, it follows that the availability of the principal place of business exception does not depend in any way upon whether the home office is the point of delivery. We agree with the ultimate conclusion that visits by patients, clients, and customers are not a required characteristic of a principal place of business, but we disagree with the implication that whether those visits occur is irrelevant. That Congress allowed the deduction where those visits occur in the normal course even when some other location is the principal place of business indicates their importance in determining the nature and functions of any enterprise. Though not conclusive, the point where services are rendered or goods delivered is a principal consideration in most cases. If the nature of the business requires that its services are rendered or its goods are delivered at a facility with unique or special characteristics, this is a further and weighty consideration in finding that it is the delivery point or facility, not the taxpayer's residence, where the most important functions of the business are undertaken. Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not regard the necessity of the functions performed at home as having much weight in determining entitlement to the deduction. In many instances, planning and initial preparation for performing a service or delivering goods are essential to the ultimate performance of the service or delivery of the goods, just as accounting and billing are often essential at the final stages of the process. But that is simply because, in integrated transactions, all steps are essential. Whether the functions performed in the home office are necessary to the business is relevant to the determination of whether a home office is the principal place of business in a particular case, but it is not controlling. Essentiality, then, is but part of the assess |