Opinion of the Court

violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in discontinuing their practice of providing free tobacco to indigent inmates. The Council sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U. S. C. § 1915(a), claiming by affidavit of the Council's chairman that the warden forbad the Council to hold funds of its own. The District Court denied the motion for an inadequate showing of indigency, though it responded to the Council's motion for reconsideration with a suggestion of willingness to consider an amended application containing “details of each individual's indigency."

On appeal, the Council was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis to enable the court to reach the very question "whether an organization, such as [the Council], may proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1915(a)." No. 90-55600 (CA9, July 20, 1990). The court requested that a lawyer represent the Council pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1915(d).1

The Court of Appeals reversed, 939 F. 2d 854 (CA9 1991), noting that a "person" who may be authorized by a federal court to proceed in forma pauperis under § 1915(a) may be an "association" under a definition provided in 1 U. S. C. § 1. The Council being an "association," it was a "person" within the meaning of § 1915(a), and could proceed in forma pauperis upon the requisite proof of its indigency. The court found it adequate proof that prison regulations prohibited the Council from maintaining a bank account, and, apparently, from owning any other asset.

We granted certiorari, 503 U. S. 905 (1992), to resolve a conflict between that decision and the holding in FDM Manufacturing Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 855 F. 2d 213 (CA5 1988) (per curiam) ("person," within the meaning of § 1915(a), includes only natural persons). We reverse.

1 For a description of § 1915(d) and its relationship to § 1915(a), see infra, at 198, 203.

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II

A

Both § 1915(a), which the Council invoked in seeking to be excused from prepaying filing fees, and § 1915(d) employ the word "person" in controlling access to four benefits provided by § 1915 and a related statute. First, a qualifying person may “commenc[e], prosecut[e] or defen[d] . . . any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor." 28 U.S. C. § 1915(a). Second, a court may in certain cases direct the United States to pay the person's expenses in printing the record on appeal and preparing a transcript of proceedings before a United States magistrate. § 1915(b). Third, if the person is unable to employ counsel, “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent [him]." § 1915(d). And, fourth, in an appeal, the United States will pay for a transcript of proceedings below "if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous (but presents a substantial question)." 28 U. S. C. § 753(f); see ibid. (detailing slightly different criteria for habeas proceedings).

"Persons" were not always so entitled, for the benefits of § 1915 were once available only to "citizens," a term held, in the only two cases on the issue, to exclude corporations. See Atlantic S. S. Corp. v. Kelley, 79 F. 2d 339, 340 (CA5 1935) (construing the predecessor to § 1915); Quittner v. Motion Picture Producers & Distributors of America, Inc., 70 F. 2d 331, 332 (CA2 1934) (same). In 1959, however, Congress passed a one-sentence provision that "section 1915(a) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by deleting the word 'citizen' and inserting in place thereof the word 'person.'" Pub. L. 86-320, 73 Stat. 590. For this amendment, the sole reason cited in the legislative history was to extend the statutory benefits to aliens.2

2 The House Report noted three reasons for "extend[ing] the same privilege of proceedings in forma pauperis as is now afforded citizens." H. R. Rep. No. 650, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1959). First, "[i]t is the opinion of

Opinion of the Court

B

The relevant portion of the Dictionary Act, 1 U. S. C. § 1, provides (as it did in 1959) that

"[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise

"the wor[d] 'person'. . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals."

See 1 U. S. C. §1 (1958 ed.). "Context" here means the text of the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or the texts of other related congressional Acts, and this is simply an instance of the word's ordinary meaning: "[t]he part or parts of a discourse preceding or following a 'text' or passage or a word, or so intimately associated with it as to throw light upon its meaning." Webster's New International Dictionary 576 (2d ed. 1942). While "context" can carry a secondary meaning of "[a]ssociated surroundings, whether material or mental," ibid., we doubt that the broader sense applies here. The Dictionary Act uses "context" to give an

the Department of Justice that this proposal would be consonant with the ideas or policies of the United States." Ibid. Second, "the Judicial Conference of the United States in recommending this legislation pointed out that the distinction between citizens and aliens as contained in existing law may be unconstitutional." Ibid. Third, "it may also be in violation of various treaties entered into by the United States with foreign countries which guarantees [sic] to their citizens access of the courts of the United States on the same terms as American citizens." Ibid.; see also S. Rep. No. 947, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1959) (quoting the portion of the House Report containing these three reasons). None of these reasons supports extension of § 1915 benefits to artificial entities, or suggests that anyone involved with drafting or evaluating this legislation was thinking of such an extension. The House debate on the bill contains a discussion about the deportation of alien criminals, a matter which obviously concerns only natural persons, see 105 Cong. Rec. 13714 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Gross and Rep. Rogers); otherwise, the congressional debates provide no additional information, see ibid.; id., at 18909 (remarks of Sen. Eastland).

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instruction about how to “determin[e] the meaning of a[n] Act of Congress," a purpose suggesting the primary sense. If Congress had meant to point further afield, as to legislative history, for example, it would have been natural to use a more spacious phrase, like "evidence of congressional intent," in place of "context."

If "context" thus has a narrow compass, the “indication" contemplated by 1 U. S. C. §1 has a broader one. The Dictionary Act's very reference to contextual "indication" bespeaks something more than an express contrary definition, and courts would hardly need direction where Congress had thought to include an express, specialized definition for the purpose of a particular Act; ordinary rules of statutory construction would prefer the specific definition over the Dictionary Act's general one. Where a court needs help is in the awkward case where Congress provides no particular definition, but the definition in 1 U. S. C. § 1 seems not to fit. There it is that the qualification "unless the context indicates otherwise" has a real job to do, in excusing the court from forcing a square peg into a round hole.

The point at which the indication of particular meaning becomes insistent enough to excuse the poor fit is of course a matter of judgment, but one can say that "indicates" certainly imposes less of a burden than, say, "requires" or "necessitates." One can also say that this exception from the general rule would be superfluous if the context "indicate[d] otherwise" only when use of the general definition would be incongruous enough to invoke the common mandate of statutory construction to avoid absurd results.3 See, e. g., Mc

3 This rule has been applied throughout the history of 1 U. S. C. § 1 and its predecessors. See, e. g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 510-511 (1989); Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U. S. 631, 643 (1978); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U. S. 563, 571 (1965); Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U. S. 504, 510-511 (1941); United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 357 (1926); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 490 (1917); United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486-487 (1869).

Opinion of the Court

Nary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, 496 (1991) ("It is presumable that Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules of statutory construction"). In fine, a contrary "indication" may raise a specter short of inanity, and with something less than syllogistic force.

III

Four contextual features indicate that "person" in § 1915(a) refers only to individuals, the first being the provision of § 1915(d) that "[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel." (Emphasis added.) This permissive language suggests that Congress assumed the court would in many cases not "request" counsel, see Mallard v. United States District Court, Southern District of Iowa, 490 U. S. 296, 301-302 (1989) (holding that § 1915(d) does not authorize mandatory appointments of counsel), leaving the "person" proceeding in forma pauperis to conduct litigation on his own behalf. Underlying this congressional assumption are probably two others: that the "person" in question enjoys the legal capacity to appear before a court for the purpose of seeking such benefits as appointment of counsel without being represented by professional counsel beforehand, and likewise enjoys the capacity to litigate without counsel if the court chooses to provide none, in the exercise of the discretion apparently conferred by the permissive language. The state of the law, however, leaves it highly unlikely that Congress would have made either assumption about an artificial entity like an association, and thus just as unlikely that "person" in § 1915 was meant to cover more than individuals. It has been the law

4 This assumption reflects a reality well known within the legal community. See, e. g., Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 617 (1979) (study of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 cases filed by prisoners in five districts found that the "overwhelming majority" of cases were filed in forma pauperis, and that "almost all" the cases were filed pro se).