UNIT II MEN'S ADVISORY COUNCIL THOMAS, J., dissenting forma pauperis statute. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U. S. 319 (1989), presented the question whether a complaint that fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is necessarily "frivolous" for purposes of 28 U.S. C. § 1915(d). Rejecting the argument that an affirmative answer to that question would help to lighten the burden that the in forma pauperis statute imposes on "efficient judicial administration," we stated that "our role in appraising petitioners' reading of § 1915(d) is not to make policy, but to interpret a statute," and that the proposed reading might be appealing "as a broadbrush means of pruning meritless complaints from the federal docket," but "as a matter of statutory construction it is untenable." 490 U. S., at 326. The Court suggests that a reading of § 1915 under which an artificial entity is entitled to in forma pauperis status would force it to confront "difficult issues of policy and administration." Ante, at 208. Far from avoiding policy determinations, however, the Court effectively engages in policymaking by refusing to credit the legislative judgments that are implicit in the statutory language. Any reading of the phrase "unless the context indicates otherwise" that permits courts to override congressional policy judgments is in my view too broad. Congress has spoken, and we should give effect to its words. III Congress has created a rule of statutory construction (an association is a "person") and an exception to that rule (an association is not a "person" if the "context indicates otherwise"), but the Court has permitted the exception to devour the rule. In deciding that an association is not a "person" for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1915(a), the Court effectively reads 1 U. S. C. § 1 as if the presumption ran the other way— as if the statute said that "in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise, the word 'person' does not include corporations, partnerships, and associations." While it might make sense as a THOMAS, J., dissenting matter of policy to exclude associations and other artificial entities from the benefits of the in forma pauperis statute, I do not believe that Congress has done so. I respectfully dissent. Syllabus NIXON v. UNITED STATES ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 91-740. Argued October 14, 1992-Decided January 13, 1993 After petitioner Nixon, the Chief Judge of a Federal District Court, was convicted of federal crimes and sentenced to prison, the House of Representatives adopted articles of impeachment against him and presented them to the Senate. Following proceedings pursuant to Senate Rule XI-which allows a committee of Senators to hear evidence against an impeached individual and to report that evidence to the full Senatethe Senate voted to convict Nixon, and the presiding officer entered judgment removing him from his judgeship. He then commenced the present suit for a declaratory judgment and reinstatement of his judicial salary and privileges, arguing that, because Senate Rule XI prohibits the whole Senate from taking part in the evidentiary hearings, it violates the first sentence of the Constitution's Impeachment Trial Clause, Art. I, §3, cl. 6, which provides that the "Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." The District Court held that his claim was nonjusticiable, i. e., involved a political question that could not be resolved by the courts. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Nixon's claim that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause is nonjusticiable. Pp. 228-238. (a) A controversy is nonjusticiable where there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it . . . ." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217. These two concepts are not completely separate; the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch. Pp. 228-229. (b) The language and structure of Art. I, §3, cl. 6, demonstrate a textual commitment of impeachment to the Senate. Nixon's argument that the use of the word "try" in the Clause's first sentence impliedly requires a judicial-style trial by the full Senate that is subject to judicial review is rejected. The conclusion that "try" lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review is compelled by older and modern dictionary definitions, and is fortified by the existence of the three very specific requirements that the Clause's second and third sentences do impose-that the Senate's Members must be under oath or affirmation, that a two-thirds vote is required to convict, and Syllabus that the Chief Justice presides when the President is tried-the precise nature of which suggests that the Framers did not intend to impose additional limitations on the form of the Senate proceedings. The Clause's first sentence must instead be read as a grant of authority to the Senate to determine whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted, and the commonsense and dictionary meanings of the word "sole" indicate that this authority is reposed in the Senate alone. Nixon's attempts to negate the significance of "sole" are unavailing, while his alternative reading of the word as requiring impeachment only by the full Senate is unnatural and would impose on the Senate additional procedural requirements that would be inconsistent with the three express limitations that the Clause sets out. A review of the Constitutional Convention's history and the contemporary commentary supports a reading of the constitutional language as deliberately placing the impeachment power in the Legislature, with no judicial involvement, even for the limited purpose of judicial review. Pp. 229–236. (c) Justiciability is also refuted by (1) the lack of finality inherent in exposing the country's political life-particularly if the President were impeached-to months, or perhaps years, of chaos during judicial review of Senate impeachment proceedings, or during any retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if its first judgment of conviction were invalidated, and by (2) the difficulty of fashioning judicial relief other than simply setting aside the Senate's judgment of conviction. See Baker, supra, at 210. P. 236. (d) A holding of nonjusticiability is consistent with this Court's opinion in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486. Unlike the situation in that case, there is no separate constitutional provision which could be defeated by allowing the Senate final authority to determine the meaning of the word "try" in Art. I, §3, cl. 6. While courts possess power to review legislative action that transgresses identifiable textual limits, the word "try" does not provide such a limit on the authority committed to the Senate. Pp. 236–238. 290 U.S. App. D. C. 420, 938 F. 2d 239, affirmed. REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 238. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 239. SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 252. David Overlock Stewart argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Peter M. Brody, Thomas B. Smith, Boyce Holleman, and Michael B. Holleman. Opinion of the Court Solicitor General Starr argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Jeffrey P. Minear, Douglas Letter, Michael Davidson, Ken U. Benjamin, Jr., Morgan J. Frankel, and Claire M. Sylvia.* CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Walter L. Nixon, Jr., asks this Court to decide whether Senate Rule XI, which allows a committee of Senators to hear evidence against an individual who has been impeached and to report that evidence to the full Senate, violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, Art. I, §3, cl. 6. That Clause provides that the "Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." But before we reach the merits of such a claim, we must decide whether it is "justiciable," that is, whether it is a claim that may be resolved by the courts. We conclude that it is not. Nixon, a former Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, was convicted by a jury of two counts of making false statements before a federal grand jury and sentenced to prison. See United States v. Nixon, 816 F. 2d 1022 (CA5 1987). The grand jury investigation stemmed from reports that Nixon had accepted a gratuity from a Mississippi businessman in exchange for asking a local district attorney to halt the prosecution of the businessman's son. Because Nixon refused to resign from his office as a United States District Judge, he continued to collect his judicial salary while serving out his prison sentence. See H. R. Rep. No. 101-36, p. 13 (1989). On May 10, 1989, the House of Representatives adopted three articles of impeachment for high crimes and misde *Patti A. Goldman and Alan B. Morrison filed a brief for Public Citizen as amicus curiae urging reversal. Joseph P. Galda, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. |