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Per Curiam

lowed until November 23, 1992, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petitions in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Martin in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.

Martin is a notorious abuser of this Court's certiorari process. We first invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Martin in forma pauperis status last November. See Zatko v. California, 502 U. S. 16 (1991) (per curiam). At that time, we noted that Martin had filed 45 petitions in the past 10 years, and 15 in the preceding 2 years alone. Although Martin was granted in forma pauperis status to file these petitions, all of these petitions were denied without recorded dissent. In invoking Rule 39.8, we observed that Martin is “unique—not merely among those who seek to file in forma pauperis, but also among those who have paid the required filing feesbecause (he has) repeatedly made totally frivolous demands on the Court's limited resources.” Id., at 18. Unfortunately, Martin has continued in his accustomed ways.

Since we first denied him in forma pauperis status last year, he has filed nine petitions for certiorari with this Court. We denied Martin leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39.8 of this Court with respect to four of these petitions, and denied the remaining five petitions outright.2 Two additional petitions for certiorari are before us today, bringing the total number of petitions Martin has filed in the

1 Martin v. Smith, post, p. 810; Martin v. Delaware, post, p. 810; Martin v. Sparks, post, p. 810; Martin v. Delaware, 505 U. S. 1203 (1992).

2 Martin v. Delaware Law School of Widener Univ., Inc., post, p. 841; Martin v. Delaware, post, p. 886; Martin v. Knox, 502 U. S. 999 (1991); Martin v. Knox, 502 U. S. 1015 (1991); Martin v. Medical Center of Delaware, 502 U. S. 991 (1991).

Per Curiam

past year to 11. With the arguable exception of one of these petitions, see Martin v. Knox, 502 U. S. 999 (1991) (STEVENS, J., joined by BLACKMUN, J., respecting denial of certiorari), all of Martin's filings, including those before us today, have been demonstrably frivolous.

In Zatko, we warned that “[f]uture similar filings from [Martin] will merit additional measures.” 502 U. S., at 18. As we have recognized, “[e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.” In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam). Consideration of Martin's repetitious and frivolous petitions for certiorari does not promote this end.

We have entered orders similar to the present one on two previous occasions to prevent pro se petitioners from filing repetitious and frivolous requests for extraordinary relief. See In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, supra. Although this case does not involve abuse of an extraordinary writ, but rather the writ of certiorari, Martin's pattern of abuse has had a similarly deleterious effect on this Court's "fair allocation of judicial resources." See In re Sindram, supra, at 180. As a result, the same concerns which led us to enter the orders barring prospective filings in Sindram and McDonald require such action here.

We regret the necessity of taking this step, but Martin's refusal to heed our earlier warning leaves us no choice. His abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order will therefore not prevent Martin from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. But it will free this Court's limited resources to consider the claims

STEVENS, J., dissenting

of those petitioners who have not abused our certiorari process.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting

In my opinion the judicial resources of the Court could be used more effectively by simply denying Martin's petitions than by drafting, entering, and policing the order the Court enters today. The theoretical administrative benefit the Court may derive from an order of this kind is far outweighed by the shadow it casts on the great tradition of open access that characterized the Court's history prior to its unprecedented decisions in In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180 (1989) (per curiam), and In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991) (per curiam). I continue to adhere to the views expressed in the dissenting opinions filed in those cases, and in the dissenting opinion I filed in Zatko v. California, 502 U. S. 16, 18 (1991) (per curiam). See also Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U. S. 1067 (1985), appeal dism'd (STEVENS, J., concurring).

STEVENS, J., concurring

MONTANA V. IMLAY

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA

No. 91–687. Argued October 7, 1992—Decided November 3, 1992 Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 249 Mont. 82, 813 P. 2d 979.

Marc Racicot, Attorney General of Montana, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Elizabeth L. Griffing, Assistant Attorney General.

Billy B. Miller argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent.*

PER CURIAM.

The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.

When the trial judge revoked respondent's parole, he reinstated a 5-year sentence of imprisonment. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court, in the decision before us, vacated the revocation order and remanded the case for resentencing. 249 Mont. 82, 813 P. 2d 979 (1991). The trial court subse

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, and Deputy Solicitor General Bryson; and for the State of Vermont et al. by Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, and Donald F. Hartman, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Charles E. Cole of Alaska, Paul J. McMurdie of Arizona, Charles M. Oberly III of Delaware, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Robert J. Del Tufo of New Jersey, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Lee Fisher of Ohio, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Paul Van Dam of Utah, and Mary Sue Terry of Virginia.

John E. B. Myers filed a brief for the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children as amicus curiae.

WHITE, J., dissenting

quently resentenced respondent, again to a 5-year term of imprisonment, and the Montana Supreme Court upheld that sentence in a judgment not now before us for review.

Thus, no matter which party might prevail in this Court, the respondent's term of imprisonment will be the same. At oral argument, neither counsel identified any way in which the interests of his client would be advanced by a favorable decision on the merits—except, of course, for the potential benefit that might flow from an advisory opinion.* Because it is not the business of this Court to render such opinions, it wisely decides to dismiss a petition that should not have been granted in the first place.

JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

We granted certiorari to consider whether the Fifth Amendment bars a State from conditioning probation upon the probationer's successful completion of a therapy program in which he would be required to admit responsibility for his criminal acts. In the decision below, the Montana Supreme Court held that, "absent any grant of immunity' from prosecution for incriminating statements made during therapy, the Fifth Amendment “prohibit[s] augmenting a defendant's sentence because he refuses to confess to a crime or invokes his privilege against self-incrimination.” 249 Mont. 82, 91, 813 P. 2d 979, 985 (1991). The constitutional question is an important one and the decision below places the Montana Supreme Court in conflict with other courts. See State v. Gleason, 154 Vt. 205, 576 A. 2d 1246 (1990); Henderson v.

*Indeed, counsel for the State went so far as to explain that a victory for Montana on the merits would actually work to the advantage of respondent, by subjecting him to treatment leading to parole eligibility:

“Question: So you're really trying to advance his [respondent's] interests?

"[Answer): Yes, sir, we are.
“Question: He is better off if you win than if you lose.

"[Answer]: In our judgment that is certainly the case.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 5.

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