Sidebilder
PDF
ePub

(Paste in text book, Criminal Law, in substitution for paragraph, page 15, which reads "The authorities are not agreed" etc., and the paragraph in black type on page 16).

In most jurisdictions the rule as to the degree of proof necessary is order to secure an acquittal on the ground of insanity may be stated as follows:

Where, after all the evidence pro and con has been produced, there remains in the minds of the jurors (or the members of the court-martial) a reasonable doubt of the sanity of the accused he is entitled to an acquittal,

In other words where, during a crimi❤ nal trial, the question of the sanity of the accused is raised he must, in order to warrant a conviction, be proved sane beyond a reasonable doubt.

[ocr errors][merged small]

mitted the act in a manner which would be criminal and unlawful, if they were sane, the verdict should be not guilty, if the killing was an offspring, or product, of mental disease in the prisoners." In the opinion of the authors, these cases lay down the correct rule but it cannot be said as yet that this doctrine prevails in all the courts. And in the Alabama case, Stone, J., one of the greatest jurists of this cen tury delivered a very able dissenting opinion.

AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH INSANITY AS A DEFENSE TO A CHARGE OF CRIME.

Sanity or mental soundness is the normal condition of mankind. It is, therefore, the rule that every person accused of crime is presumed to be of sound mind until there is some evidence to the contrary. This evidence may be found in the circumstances attending the commission of the crime for which the accused is on trial, or it may be in the appearance and demeanor of the prisoner at the trial, or independent evidence may be given in support of the defense of insanity.

The authorities are not agreed upon the question as to what degree of proof of insanity shall be suffi cient to warrant an acquittal upon this ground. In New Jersey it has been held that it is necessary to prove the insanity of the prisoner beyond a reasonable doubt.31 In other jurisdictions it would seem to be the rule that where any evidence has been given tending to establish the insanity of the accused, the burden is upon the State to prove his sanity beyond

"State vs. Spencer, 1 Zab. (21 N. J. Law), 202.

reasonable doubt.32.

a

But the clear weight of

modern authority is in favor of the following rule:

When insanity is set up as a defense in a criminal case, it must be established by a preponderance of evidence, and a reasonable doubt of the defendant's sanity, raised by all the evidence, does not authorize an acquittal, 3 3

In conclusion, it may be added that an insane person cannot be tried while he is insane, nor can he be sentenced if he has been convicted until he has regained control of his faculties.34

MARRIED WOMEN.

At the common law there is a prima facie presumption in favor of a married woman that certain criminal acts done by her in her husband's presence are done as the result of his coercion, on account of which the law holds her excused.

The ground upon which the married woman is excused is that the criminal act is not her free and voluntary act, but that she does it under coercion or duress, a ground of defense to criminal accusations which has been already adverted to. A married woman is not excused for committing a crime in the presence and even at the instigation of her husband,

"People vs. Garbutt, 17 Mich., 9; State vs. Mixon, 32 Kan., 205; 5 Am. Cr., 307.

33 Parsons vs. State, 81 Ala., 577; Lynch vs. Com., 77 Pa. St., 205; People vs. Best, 39 Cal., 690; State vs. Lawrence, 57 Me., 574; State vs. Potts, 100 N. C., 457; Com. vs. Rogers, 7 Metcf. (Mass.), 500; contra Langdon vs. People, 133 Ill., 382; State vs. Lewis, 8 Am. Cr., 574; Coates vs. State, 50 Ark., 330; 7 Am. Cr., 585.

"Deaf mutes incapable of understanding the proceedings in a trial are classed with insane persons. Queen vs. Berry, 3 Am. Cr., 428.

or jointly with him, unless she is actually coerced by him. The law, therefore, should be stated as follows:

A married woman who commits a crime in the presence and under the coercion of her husband is not criminally responsible for the act, and when the act is committed in the presence of the husband there is a prima facie presum tion that it is done under his coercion.

As stated, the presumption is merely a prima facie presumption; that is, it is a disputable and not a conclusive presumption. It is rather a weak than a strong presumption, and may be overcome by the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, as, for instance, when the evidence tends to show that the wife took a leading and active part.35 But where the evidence shows and the jury finds that the act was done in the presence and under the coercion of the husband, the wife is not criminally punishable.36 And the mere fact that the wife is the more active of the two, where husband and wife commit a crime jointly, is not conclusive as to her guilt, for notwithstanding this her participation may not have been a voluntary one.37 In a recent Massachusetts case the general doctrine was well stated as follows:

"When a married woman is indicted for a crime, and it is contended in defense that she ought to be acquitted because she acted under the coercion of her husband, the question of fact to be determined is whether she really and in truth acted under such

"People vs. Wright, 38 Mich., 744; Miller vs. State, 25 Wis., 384; State vs. Cleaves, 59 Me., 302; Blakeslee vs. Tyler, 55 Conn., 397.

26 Com. vs. Neal, 10 Mass., 152; Davis vs. State, 15 Ohio, 72.

"State vs. Houston, 29 S. C., 108.

rests upon citizens generally to deliver up a felon to the officers of justice.48

INTOXICATED PERSONS.

In a great number of adjudicated cases evidence has been offered that the respondent was intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime for which he was on trial. Such evidence is always admissible. Upon the trial of any person charged with crime every fact which may throw any light upon the guilt, or the degree of guilt, of the accused may be laid before the jury, and under this general principle the question of the mental condition of the prisoner at the time of the commission of the act, may always be inquired into, because it bears upon the question of his intent. Evidence as to intoxication is admitted because it may shed some light upon the intent with which the alleged criminal act was committed. What force or effect is to be given to the fact of intoxication, when it is proven, depends upon what light it sheds on the question of intent. While in some cases intoxication of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime may be a factor in determining the question of guilt, it must always be remembered that this is the exception and not the rule. The general rule as to intoxication may be stated in these words:

Voluntary intoxication is no defense to crime, and does not lessen, palliate, or extenuate its guilt.49

This general proposition rests upon elementary and

"Reg. vs. Manning, 2 Car. & K., 887, 903.

"Warner vs. State, 9 Am. Cr., 526; and it is said that temporary insanity induced by voluntary intoxication is no defense. Upstone vs. People, 109 Ill., 169; 4 Am. Cr., 395.

« ForrigeFortsett »