fundamental legal principles. It is wrong for a man to get drunk, although mere private drunkenness is not an indictable offense at the common law. It is otherwise with public and disorderly drunkenness. But the ordinary effects of intoxication are well understood. It blunts the perceptive and reasoning faculties of the mind, it deadens the conscience, it stimulates the passions, and makes a man less regardful of the duties which he owes to himself, to his family, and to the public. To permit a man to urge in his defense to a criminal accusation that he would not have done the deed if he had not voluntarily divested himself of the safeguards with which reason and conscience protect a sober man from temptation, would be to allow a man to interpose his own wrong-doing as a shield against the conse quences of his acts. The ancient maxims of the common law teach us on the contrary that "no man shall take advantage of his own wrong," nor shall any man be heard in court to allege his own turpitude. ("Allegans suam turpitudinem non est audiendus.") Although these are maxims most frequently applied in civil cases, they illustrate fundamental principles which equally pervade the criminal law. And there is an ancient maxim of the common law which directly applies to the matter now under consideration: "Qui peccat ebrius luat sobrius." "Who sins when he is drunk shall pay the penalty when he is sober." Therefore, it is said, that one who voluntarily clouds his reason, inflames his passion, and deadens the voice of conscience by the use of intoxicating liquors or drugs, gets no immunity thereby, but his acts are to be judged as though he were sober at the time of committing the crime for which he is on trial. This is the general principle which has been announced in hundreds of cases, a

few of the most important of which are cited below."" Having thus stated the general doctrine, it now remains to see what apparent exceptions and modifications it has.

And, first, the student is to note that in what has been said the term "voluntary” intoxication has been used. A man may become involuntarily intoxicated; that is, without being himself at fault.51 But it is said that if a party be made drunk by stratagem, or the fraud of another, or through the unskillfulness of his physician, he is not criminally responsible for what he does while in that condition.52

The only importance of the fact of drunkenness in a criminal trial, where it has any relevancy, is its bearing upon the question of intent. As we shall see hereafter, there are crimes in which the matter of the specific intent with which an act is done determines whether an act is criminal or not, and there are other criminal acts in which the intent determines the degree of the crime. Burglary is an instance of the first class, and assault with intent to commit murder is an instance of the second class.

Burglary consists in the breaking and entering of the dwelling house of another in the night time with intent to commit a felony therein. The mere breaking and entering of the dwelling house of another in the night time, without any criminal purpose, would not be a crime at all, but merely a civil trespass. Here the intent and purpose to commit felony con

50 People vs. Rogers, 18 N. Y., 9; State vs. Tatro, 50 Vt., 483; 3 Am. Cr., 165; Burrow's case, 1 Lewin Crown Car., 75; U. S. vs. Drew, 5 Mason, 28; Rex. vs. Thomas, 7 Car. & P., 817; Kelley vs. State, 3 Smedes & M., 518: People vs. Garbutt, 17 Mich., 9; Rafferty vs. People, 66 Ill.. 118; Pirtle vs. State, 9 Humph., 663; People vs. Slack, 90 Mich., 448.

1 State vs. Brown, 8 Am. Cr., 165.

52 Pearson's Case, 2 Lewin, 144; People vs. Robinson, 2 Parker C. C., 235; see Roberts vs. People, 19 Mich., 401.

verts what is otherwise a mere trespass into a felony of an atrocious character.

Now, if a drunken man breaks into the house of another in the night time, it will readily be seen that the question of his drunkenness, and the degree of his drunkenness, may be important factors in determining whether or not the breaking and entry were in order to accomplish a criminal or felonious purpose. And in a prosecution for larceny, which crime is not committed unless there is an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property, it has been held to be a good defense that a man was too drunk to entertain this specific intent.53 And for the same purpose evidence of drunkenness has been admitted in cases where knowingly passing counterfeit money was charged,54 in cases of homicide to deter mine the degree of the crime,55 and in many other cases. The general doctrine is well stated in this language: "But although drunkenness is clearly no excuse for the commission of any crime, yet proof of the fact of drunkenness may be very material, as tending to show the 'intention' with which the particular act charged as an offense was committed, and whether the act done was accidental or designed."56

CORPORATIONS.

A corporation being an artificial person endowed

"Rex vs. Pitman, 2; Car. vs. P., 423: Com. vs. French, Thach. C. C., 163; Cline vs. State, 5 Am. Cr., 57.

"Pigman vs. State, 14 Ohio, 555.

"Haile vs. State, 11 Humph. (Tenn.), 154: Hopt vs. People, 104 U. S.. 631; 4 Am. Cr.. 365; Lancaster vs. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 375; 3 Am. Cr., 160.

"Broom Leg. Max.. 17; Hopt vs. People, 104 U. S.. 631 Reg. vs. Doherty, 16 Cox Cr. Cas., 306: Aszman vs. State. 123 Ind., 347: Bernhardt vs. State, 82 Wis., 23; People vs. Vincent, 95 Cal., 425; People vs. Langton, 67 Cal., 427; 7 Am. Cr., 439.

4

by law with certain attributes and powers, its liability under the criminal law must necessarily be limited by the nature of its duties and powers. It is an impersonal being, and cannot be guilty of those offenses which are made criminal by reason of the personal malice which accompanies the act. Thus it cannot be guilty of assaults, malicious mischiefs, etc., or of any felony.57

As a general rule, however, corporations are criminally liable for the failure to perform those duties imposed upon it by its charter or other laws, the same as an individual would be liable for the breach of a similar duty.58

While the authorities are agreed that a corporation may be indicted for a non-feasance, they disagree as to its criminal liability for a misfeasance. Some of the courts hold that a corporation may be indicted for a breach of duty, whether it consists in a wrongful act or of a wrongful omission.

Thus, in a case in which a corporation was indicted for obstructing a navigable stream, the court held as follows: "Corporations cannot be indicted for offenses deriving their criminal quality from evil intent, or which consist of a violation of those duties which appertain to men or subjects. They cannot be guilty of treason, felony, perjury or offenses against the person.

"But beyond this, there is no good reason for their exception from the consequences of unlawful and

57 Orr vs. Bank of U. S., 1 Ohio, 36; Bishop on Criminal Law, Sec. 422.

5 People vs. Albany, 11 Wend., 539; New York & G. L. R. Co. vs. State, 53 N. J. Law, 444.

wrongful acts committed by their agents in pursuance of authority derived from them."59

This seems to be the better rule, but many courts have held the contrary.6o

Other States have held that corporations might be indicted for maintaining a nuisance, but not for other misfeasances.61

While a corporation is indictable for a wrong, its punishment can only be by way of fine, and in those cases in which a corporation cannot be indicted, the 'officers or agents participating in the wrongful acts may be criminally responsible.62

CRIMINAL INTENT.

In the discussion of the question of what constitutes a criminal intent, it is important to have a clear understanding of what is meant by intent. It is not to be confounded with motive or purpose. With the best motives in the world, one may commit a criminal act, with a criminal intent, and yet be innocent of any purpose either to do wrong or to violate the law.63 By intent, in certain classes of cases, is meant the state or condition of the mind with regard to the facts which surround the act which is de

5 Com. vs. Proprietor New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, Mass., 339. See also State vs. Morris & Essex Ry., 3 Zab., 360; State vs. Vermont Central Ry., 27 Vt., 103, 30 Vt., 108; Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. vs. State, 3 Head, 523.

60 State vs. The Great Works Milling Co., 20 Maine, 41; Com. vs. Swift Turnpike Co., 2 Va. Cases, 362; see State vs. Ohio & Mississippi Ry. Co., 23 Ind., 362.

"Delaware Division Canal Co. vs. Com., 60 Penn. St., 367; Pelatka & I. R. Ry. Co. vs. State, 23 Fla., 546.

62 State vs. Conlee, 25 Iowa, 237.

"Religious belief does not excuse or justify doing the act which the law forbids. Davis vs. Beason, 8 Am. Cr., 89.